Engaging Central Asia: The European Union's New Strategy in the Heart of Eurasia. CEPS Paperbacks. May 2008 by Melvin, Neil J.
 
 
 
ENGAGING CENTRAL ASIA  
 
ENGAGING CENTRAL ASIA 
THE EUROPEAN UNION’S NEW STRATEGY 
IN THE HEART OF EURASIA 
 
 
EDITED BY 
NEIL J. MELVIN 
 
CONTRIBUTORS 
BHAVNA DAVE 
MICHAEL DENISON 
MATTEO FUMAGALLI 
MICHAEL HALL 
NARGIS KASSENOVA 
DANIEL KIMMAGE 
NEIL J. MELVIN 
EUGHENIY ZHOVTIS 
 
 
 
 
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES 
BRUSSELS  
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent policy 
research institute based in Brussels. Its mission is to produce sound analytical 
research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe 
today. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors writing in a 
personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect those of CEPS or any other 
institution with which the authors are associated.  
This study was carried out in the context of the broader work programme of 
CEPS on European Neighbourhood Policy, which is generously supported by 
the Compagnia di San Paolo and the Open Society Institute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN-13: 978-92-9079-707-4 
© Copyright 2008, Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system 
or transmitted in any form or by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording 
or otherwise – without the prior permission of the Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
Centre for European Policy Studies 
Place du Congrès 1, B-1000 Brussels 
Tel: 32 (0) 2 229.39.11 Fax: 32 (0) 2 219.41.51 
e-mail: info@ceps.eu 
internet: http://www.ceps.eu CONTENTS 
1.  Introduction 
Neil J. Melvin................................................................................................. 1 
2.  Security Challenges in Central Asia: Implications for the EU’s 
Engagement Strategy 
Daniel Kimmage............................................................................................. 9 
3.  Democratisation and Human Rights in Central Asia: Problems, 
Development Prospects and the Role of the International Community 
Eugheniy Zhovtis......................................................................................... 20 
4.  The EU and Kazakhstan: Is the pursuit of energy and security 
cooperation compatible with the promotion of human rights and 
democratic reforms?  
Bhavna Dave................................................................................................. 43 
5.  The EU and Uzbekistan: Where to go from here?  
Michael Hall................................................................................................. 68 
6.  Turkmenistan and the EU: Contexts and Possibilities for Greater 
Engagement 
Michael Denison........................................................................................... 81 
7.  Tajikistan and the EU: From Post-Conflict Reconstruction to Critical 
Engagement 
Matteo Fumagalli....................................................................................... 105 
8. A  View from the Region 
Nargis Kassenova....................................................................................... 122 
9.  The European Union’s Strategic Role in Central Asia 
Neil J. Melvin............................................................................................. 137 
Annex 1. Mandate of the EU Special Representative for Central Asia...... 152 
Annex 2. Extension of the Mandate of the EU Special Representative 
for Central Asia........................................................................................ 156 
Annex 3. The European Union and Central Asia: 
 Strategy for a New Partnership............................................................ 162 
 |1 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
NEIL J. MELVIN* 
 
uring the Soviet era, the lands of contemporary Central Asia were 
largely terra incognito for the outside world. Located deep within 
the Soviet Union, the region was isolated for much of the 20th 
century. During this period, Soviet Central Asia (the Uzbek, Tajik, 
Turkmen and Kyrgyz republics) and Kazakhstan (which was seen as 
administratively separate from the other four republics) were to an 
extraordinary degree controlled by Moscow and the institutions of 
Communist power. The sudden and dramatic collapse of the USSR under 
Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of 1991 thus marked an historic moment for 
Central Asia for it exposed the region almost overnight to the international 
community. Direct flights from Europe and Asia to the newly independent 
states of Central Asia were opened and diplomatic representations and 
international economic links were set in place. In the years immediately 
following independence, there was considerable optimism about the 
prospects for Central Asia to become closely integrated into the global 
system of states. 
However for much of the first post-Soviet decade, despite the fact 
that Central Asia was now more open than it had been for hundreds of 
years and was actively seeking greater contact with the outside world, 
international engagement remained weak. China was focused on domestic 
issues and cautious about moving into Moscow’s historical ‘backyard’. The 
Russian Federation, reeling from the collapse of the Soviet order, was in 
disarray and in retreat. Moreover, the fledgling states of the region were 
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anxious to consolidate their sovereignty free of the former colonial power. 
The priority was to fashion strong links with the global economy and to 
promote foreign direct investment. The governments of Central Asia 
looked to the United States, Europe and Japan to help with these aims. The 
decade of the 1990s was, then, the period when Central Asia was most open 
to the influence of the West. It was, however, an opportunity that was 
largely ignored.  
Despite the swift opening of the region in the early 1990s, the 
engagement of the Western states in Central Asia remained modest; 
essentially focused on energy projects and cultural ties. European states 
took an especially cautious approach. While the larger EU members states 
(notably the United Kingdom and France) opened diplomatic 
representations in most of the states of Central Asia, only Germany was 
represented in all five ‘stans’. Most EU member states chose to cover the 
region diplomatically from Moscow or Ankara or with roving ambassadors 
based in their capitals. As a result of this caution, political ties were slow to 
develop and economic links continued to be relatively modest for most of 
the 1990s. While the states of the region were able to become participating 
members of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, they 
could not join the Council of Europe and links to NATO and the European 
Union were weak. 
The European Union was especially timid. An EU delegation was 
initially opened in Kazakhstan in 1994 with additional responsibility for 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and two sub-offices followed in Bishkek and 
Dushanbe. But this left most of the region without any substantial EU 
presence. The region was included within some of the generic EU 
programmes established for the post-Soviet territories (notably TACIS) and 
at the end of the decade Brussels sought to conclude Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with a number of the states of the region.1 
Despite the establishment of the PCAs, the EU’s engagement in the region 
remained modest, lacking both a clear sense of political priorities and the 
                                                      
1 PCAs were concluded with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan in 1996. The PCA with Turkmenistan was not, however, ratified and 
so did not come into force. A PCA was not signed with Tajikistan until 2004 
because of the civil war in the country during the 1990s. The terms of the Central 
Asia PCAs were noticeably more modest than those concluded with Ukraine and 
the Russian Federation. INTRODUCTION | 3 
resources necessary to have a significant impact on the countries of the 
region.2 
Deprived of major international engagement and assistance and 
facing a complex set of challenges, including the brutal civil war in 
Tajikistan and the breakdown of much of the Soviet-era infrastructure, and 
lacking significant political or legal checks on executive power, the 
countries of Central Asia drifted steadily towards authoritarian 
government. By the end of the 1990s, the early optimism that had 
accompanied independence seemed largely to have disappeared as Central 
Asia appeared caught in a cycle of declining economies and stagnating 
political orders. Within a few years, however, the scene in Central Asia was 
to be significantly changed and with it the picture for external engagement 
in the region.  
By the late 1990s, there were already signs that in parts of the region, 
notably in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the economic malaise of the first 
part of the decade was being transformed under the impact of increasing 
hydrocarbon revenues. With the growth of Central Asia’s energy resources 
came increased attention from China, anxious to secure supplies for its fast-
developing economy, while the revival of Russia under President Putin 
based, to a significant degree, upon the Kremlin’s ability to harness Central 
Asia energy resources to Russian energy companies, led to a rapid increase 
in Russian commercial and political-military interest in the region. 
In the aftermath of the attacks against the United States of 11 
September 2001 and the subsequent launch of the ‘War on Terror’, Central 
Asia acquired further significance for the international community. Placed 
strategically close to the theatre of operations for the US-led military 
coalition in Afghanistan, in the years after 9/11, the region, for the first 
time, acquired the presence of western military facilities – notably the US 
airbases established in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the German presence in 
Uzbekistan and the French support operation in Tajikistan. 
                                                      
2 The EU provided regional assistance to the countries of Central Asia for the first 
15 years of independence amounting to over €1.3 billion, mainly in grant aid 
through TACIS and other assistance programmes. A number of observers question 
the effectiveness of this assistance given the lack of a strategy for the region during 
this period and the low level of interest from the EU in the region. For the period 
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While initially welcomed, if cautiously, by Russia and China, the 
western military presence in Central Asia quickly became a source of 
concern in Moscow and Beijing. The latter has promoted the consolidation 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a means to resist 
western interference in the region. And Russia has also sought to 
strengthen its security profile in the region through measures to strengthen 
the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) as a military 
counterweight to expanding western influence, including that of NATO. 
Following 9/11, the European Union also began to pay much closer 
attention to Central Asia. The particular focus for the new interest in the 
region was the security sector and especially the issue of borders. The EU 
subsequently made available large-scale aid through the Border 
Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA). This initiative also 
helped to strengthen the EU’s Central Asian Drug Assistance Programme 
(CADAP), which had been launched in the late 1990s but had found it hard 
to have a significant impact on the ground. 
By the early part of this century, the new combination of security and 
energy interests had led to a major geopolitical shift in Eurasia as Central 
Asia acquired ever more importance for the outside world. The growing 
international interest in Central Asia has magnified the significance of 
regional developments to an international level. Thus, the shooting dead of 
hundreds of protesters by Uzbekistan’s state security forces during the 
Andizhan events of 2005 led to a major crisis in relations between Tashkent 
and the West. Eventually, following calls by the United States and the EU 
for an independent international inquiry into the Andizhan massacre, 
Uzbekistan forced the United States to withdraw from its military base 
while the EU opted to impose sanctions on Uzbekistan. The fallout of the 
crisis in relations between the West and Uzbekistan was widely viewed in 
geopolitical terms, with the Russian Federation and China seen as 
advancing their hold on Central Asia with the weakening of Western 
influence. 
Against the background of the growing international interest, even 
competition, in respect to Central Asia’s energy resources, the significant 
security interests in the region and a perceived weakening of the position of 
the Western powers in the region, the European Union decided to relaunch 
its engagement within Central Asia. Already in July 2005, the EU 
established the post of European Union Special Representative for Central INTRODUCTION | 5 
Asia (EUSRCA) with a mandate (reproduced in Annex 1) to enhance 
relations with the five former Soviet republics.3 A broader initiative was to 
emerge in 2007, however, when the Germany Presidency of the European 
Union sought to forge a comprehensive approach by the Union to Central 
Asia as part of a larger effort to reshape the EU’s relations with its 
neighbouring eastern regions. As a result of this initiative, the EU elected to 
upgrade its relations with Central Asia through the introduction of a 
Strategy for a New Partnership (see Annex 3), which was adopted in July 
2007 at the European Council Meeting. 
The Strategy represents the EU’s most ambitious project in the region 
and signals a significant upgrading of relations. It is designed to unfold 
over the coming years at both the regional level and through bilateral 
relations. The European Union Special Representative for Central Asia will 
have a leading role in coordinating the Strategy along with the European 
Commission. EU member states are also expected to upgrade their relations 
with countries of the region and to increase their diplomatic engagement 
with Central Asia. As part of the Strategy, the European Union will seek to 
enhance its relations with Central Asia across a spectrum of issues, 
including energy, security, environment, transport, education and 
democracy and human rights. 
The adoption of the Strategy signals a significant upgrade in EU-
Central Asian relations but it comes rather late. Central Asia has already 
experienced almost two decades of independence and there is now 
increased attention on the region from a range of powerful international 
actors, including Russia, China, India and Iran. This is a very different 
environment from the 1990s when western engagement faced little 
significant domestic or international opposition and little serious 
competition. The EU’s ambition to strengthen its ties to Central Asia also 
comes at a time of growing engagement in the region of powers with little 
interest in the EU’s ideas of democracy and human rights. Instead, Moscow 
and Beijing come with a stress on stability supported through narrow 
notions of security and a focus on energy issues. Finding purchase for the 
EU Strategy in Central Asia will thus be a major challenge. 
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In this context, the implementation of the EU Strategy for Central 
Asia will represent one of the severest tests for the EU approach to external 
relations based, as it is, on sets of complex, multilevel and multi-
dimensional engagements built around a intermeshing of interests and 
values. Central Asia has thus become a testing ground for the EU’s ability 
to maintain and advance its position in the world in the face of new and 
rising powers with very different views of issues of democracy and human 
rights and far more realist conceptions of foreign policy for the region. 
While the EU’s awareness of the importance of Central Asia comes 
late and the Union has yet to commit major resources to the region, the new 
EU initiative is not without its strengths. In particular, the EU Strategy is 
not an isolated commitment to Central Asia; rather, the Strategy forms part 
of the complex and evolving policies developed towards the former Soviet 
lands, with Russia at the centre. Notably, the Strategy has been developed 
in the context of efforts to strengthen the EU’s presence and activities in the 
South Caucasus. Interest in this region is magnified by its potential to serve 
as a transit for energy resources from Central Asia to Europe. Steps to draw 
the South Caucasus closer to Europe will therefore serve to move Central 
Asia and Europe that much closer, making the emergence of the EU as a 
significant actor in the region more feasible.  
Reflecting the diversity of issues involved in the new relationship 
between the EU and Central Asia, the EU Strategy was actively debated 
within and between EU member states and civil society ahead of its 
adoption. A particular focus of this debate was on the balance of priorities 
between energy/security and democracy/human rights. During the spring 
of 2007, the EU’s approach to Uzbekistan played a particularly significant 
role within this debate and thereby had a strong influence on the 
discussions about the shape and direction of the Strategy. 
The conviction of the German EU Presidency and the EUSR for 
Central Asia was that improved relations with Uzbekistan were essential 
for the launch of the Strategy – due to the relatively large population of the 
country, its geopolitical position in the centre of Central Asia and its 
importance for energy issues – thereby requiring a removal of existing EU 
sanctions on Tashkent in place since the Andizhan events. This view was 
challenged by a group of EU member states, supported by human rights 
NGOs, which questioned the priority accorded to the regime of President 
Karimov for the implementation of the Strategy and the idea of retreating 
on democracy and human rights positions for the sake of security and 
energy interests. INTRODUCTION | 7 
In the end, the Strategy was adopted containing both commitments to 
security and energy and to human rights and democratisation.4 Agreement 
on the Strategy, however, did not resolve the political debate about the 
priorities and direction of EU policy in Central Asia, and the political 
struggle over the EU sanctions on Uzbekistan continued to dog the Union 
into 2008. Indeed, the effort to upgrade the EU engagement in Central Asia 
starkly exposed some of the key divisions within the EU with regard to 
external policy towards the former Soviet territories and the balance 
between the promotion of democracy and human rights and the economic 
and security interests of the Union. In the years to come and in the face of 
the policies in Central Asia by countries that have little concern for 
‘European values’, the debate about the how Europe can best engage in the 
region is likely to continue to be defined by these two poles. 
The papers contained in this volume were commissioned from 
leading European and Central Asian experts in order to address many of 
the key issues in the emerging relationship between the European Union 
and Central Asia. Most of the papers were originally presented at a 
conference on “The European Union and Central Asia: Building Stronger 
Ties, Meeting New Challenges”, organised in March 2007 by the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) with the support of the Open Society 
Institute (OSI). The conference was designed to examine the options for the 
EU in terms of the character of the engagement that it should pursue 
through the Central Asia Strategy. The papers were later updated in light 
of the subsequent adoption of the Strategy. 
The collection of papers within this book is organised in the following 
way. The first part of the volume examines two major issues that run 
through the EU’s policies towards Central Asia – security and 
democracy/human rights. Daniel Kimmage highlights the inherent 
tensions within the EU-Central Asia security dialogue that stem from the 
different conceptions of security held by Central Asian regimes, with the 
focus on state security, and the EU, with its notion of comprehensive 
security involving issues of democracy and human rights. In the second 
                                                      
4 The Strategy provides the overall framework for EU relations with Central Asia. 
The EU has also developed a cooperation strategy  towards the Central Asian 
region (Central Asia: Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013) whose core objective is 
“to promote the stability and security of the Central Asian countries and to assist 
in their pursuit of sustainable economic development and poverty reduction.” 8 | NEIL J. MELVIN 
paper, Evgeniy Zhovtis explores the broad terrain of democratisation in the 
region, with a special focus on Kazakhstan. He points to the enormous 
challenges that face efforts to promote democracy in the region, but also 
finds opportunities for the EU to strengthen the rule of law and liberal 
politics in the region. 
In the second part of the volume, leading specialists on the politics 
and societies of Central Asia examine the evolving relationship between the 
European Union and four of the states of the region. Bhavna Dave outlines 
the links between Kazakhstan and the EU and highlights the opportunities 
for promoting reforms in Kazakhstan in connection with Astana’s 
chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
in 2010. Michael Hall focuses on Uzbekistan where he finds a strong case 
for a continuation of the EU sanctions regime, and he points to the need to 
maintain a clear focus on human rights in the Brussels-Tashkent 
relationship. Michael Denison explores the situation in Turkmenistan 
following the death of the long-serving President Niayazov. He notes the 
continuing difficulties for the EU to operate in the country, but also finds 
increasing openings and opportunities for a new relationship with 
Ashgabad, with important implications for energy issues. Matteo 
Fumagalli considers the situation in Tajikistan nearly ten years after the 
end of the civil war and concludes that the EU should lead the way in 
developing a new approach to the country that moves beyond the post-
conflict paradigm. 
In the final section, two observers look at the broader aims of the 
EU’s Strategy in Central Asia. Nargis Kassenova offers a perspective from 
the region with a focus on the EU-Kazakhstan relationship. She notes the 
important role that Europe has played in advancing democratisation in 
Kazakhstan and points to the critical role that the Union could play in the 
future. Neil Melvin concludes the volume by examining the broad political 
aims of the EU in Central Asia and argues that the Union should be careful 
to play to its strengths by promoting a European form of development in 
the region rather than seeking to operate as a geopolitical actor. 
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2.  SECURITY CHALLENGES IN CENTRAL 
ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU’S 
ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 
DANIEL KIMMAGE
∗ 
Introduction 
Central Asia presents the European Union with a uniquely problematic set 
of security challenges. Enumerated in their most basic form, without 
reference to context, the challenges are formidable enough: the threat of 
violent extremism, a well established conduit for smuggling illegal 
narcotics and potential instability rife with the possibility of conflict and 
humanitarian catastrophe. But these challenges are not stand-alone issues 
that can be treated individually; they are embedded in a regional context 
that creates additional difficulties for engagement. Namely, while Central 
Asian states may share a common understanding of ‘security challenges’, 
that understanding differs considerably from accepted definitions within 
the EU. More importantly, the Central Asian states themselves have 
evolved in various directions since gaining independence in 1991, and it is 
by no means clear that a ‘regional policy’ is the most effective means by 
which to engage them. 
This paper examines security challenges in Central Asia in light of the 
recently adopted EU strategy. It begins with an examination of the differing 
definitions of ‘security’ and disjunctions within Central Asia before moving 
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to a discussion of the linked challenges of extremism, drug trafficking and 
potential instability. Recommendations are presented in the conclusions. 
2.1  What do we mean by 'security'? 
In established democracies with strong institutions, security challenges on 
the national level are broadly understood as serious, wide-ranging threats 
to the well-being of the citizenry that are best countered by concerted 
government action. This definition presumes the existence of robust, 
transparent institutions; elections in accord with international standards; 
and an elected political leadership that is accountable to voters. As a result, 
it does not envision a contradiction between the actions of government and 
the interests of citizens. 
The assumption rarely holds in Central Asia. None of the Central 
Asian nations is a fully functioning democracy in the sense accepted by the 
EU, as indicated by numerous reports prepared by the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on the monitoring of elections 
in the region. Some of the Central Asian nations lack all but the barest 
trappings of democratic governance. All of Central Asia's states are, to one 
degree or another, nations in which an elite partly or wholly consumed by 
the pursuit of its own material interests maintains power through the 
exercise of decorative democracy. With elections stage-managed and 
institutions weak, the elite, which breaks down into a welter of informal 
influence groups vying for control of material resources, is largely 
unaccountable. 
Throughout the region, national elites have repeatedly demonstrated 
their commitment to a single overriding interest – the preservation of 
power to maintain a materially beneficial status quo. This does not 
preclude the existence of other interests, including the common good of 
ordinary citizens, but it by no means presumes them. 
Elite commitment to the maintenance of the status quo is usually 
expressed in terms of a need to preserve ‘stability’, with Western calls for 
reform or the application of international standards frequently interpreted 
as menacing attempts to ‘destabilise’ the country. After Uzbekistan used 
massive force to quell unrest in Andijon in May 2005, for example, a 
number of Western nations issued calls for an independent international 
inquiry. In a typical example of an official Uzbek response at the time, the 
country's embassy in Kyrgyzstan issued a statement lambasting “the 
puppeteers who want to destabilise the Ferghana Valley by means of SECURITY CHALLENGES IN CENTRAL ASIA | 11 
 
obedient international organisations and NGOs continue to exploit the 
fallout from the failed plan to bring off an armed coup in Uzbekistan in 
order to justify their step-by-step imposition of the so-called ‘project to 
advance democracy’.”1 
An article in the government-controlled Uzbek newspaper Pravda 
vostoka on 24 June 2005, made a similar point: "Under the pretext of 
concern for human rights, there are unceasing attempts to interfere in the 
internal affairs of the independent state of Uzbekistan. Especially active in 
this respect is the United States, which uses the cover of the United Nations 
and the creation of an international commission to destabilise the 
situation."2 
In a word, Central Asian elites are strongly inclined to define as a 
‘security challenge’ anything that they perceive as a threat to their power, 
including calls for democratic reform. In extreme cases, this produces a 
near-total disjunction with the EU concept of a security challenge. For 
example, a Central Asian regime may perceive political pluralism as a 
security challenge and commit considerable resources to prevent this 
undesirable outcome. In less extreme cases, a Central Asian regime may 
commit scant resources, say, to narcotics smuggling both because it does 
not see the problem as a threat to its power and because elements of the 
ruling elite may view the financial rewards they reap from involvement in 
the drug trade as an enhancement to their power. 
This disjunction puts the EU in a double bind. First, as in the case of 
political pluralism, a situation may arise in which the Central Asian regime 
views as a security challenge something that the EU considers a desired 
outcome. Second, the means the Central Asian regime employs to meet its 
perceived security challenge, which include the suppression of dissent in 
the case of political pluralism, may in fact create a situation that the EU 
views as a security challenge in and of itself – namely, a suffocating 
political system that increases the chances of instability. 
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This paper uses EU definitions of security challenges, but it does not 
presume that the definitions employed here match those of Central Asian 
regimes. The disjunction is of minor importance in the overview but of 
considerably greater importance in the recommendations for engagement 
with Central Asian states. 
2.2  Does 'Central Asia' exist? 
Like the nations that make up the EU, Central Asian nations share 
considerable historical, cultural and, at times, linguistic similarities against 
a backdrop of significant differences. Unlike the EU, however, Central Asia 
is not home to a regional integrationist project with a well developed 
institutional structure. While Central Asian nations belong to a variety of 
regional organisations, there is no regional organisation that consists solely 
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, nor 
are any of the supranational organisations to which these countries belong 
remotely similar to the EU. 
What's more, the nations of Central Asia have followed distinct 
trajectories of development since gaining their independence in 1991. 
Kazakhstan enjoys increasing oil wealth, along with the problems of an 
extraction-based economy, and has embarked on limited democratic 
reforms. Resource-poor Kyrgyzstan has suffered from economic malaise 
and, since 2005, political turmoil, yet it has achieved a degree of rough-
hewn political pluralism that is unique in the region. Tajikistan endured a 
destructive 1992-97 civil war, and has been economically battered and 
politically quiescent ever since. Turkmenistan veered into extreme 
isolationism and mounting socio-economic peril under the despotic rule of 
President-for-life Saparmurat Niyazov and now faces uncertain prospects 
under the leadership of President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov. 
Uzbekistan confronts considerable socio-economic problems with few 
venues for dissent and a disturbing history of violent incidents. 
This overview perforce treats Central Asia as a region. Nevertheless, 
while grouping security challenges under thematic rubrics, it looks also at 
national specifics within each rubric. The recommendations deal in more 
detail with the problem of EU engagement with a ‘region’ that is really 
composed of five distinct and disparate nations. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN CENTRAL ASIA | 13 
 
2.3  Extremism 
The security challenge most commonly associated with Central Asia is 
religious extremism; more precisely, the threat of radical Islam. Despite the 
attention this issue has received, both from Central Asian governments and 
foreign powers, it is by no means clear that it is truly the most serious 
security challenge facing the region. Moreover, the efforts undertaken by 
Central Asian governments to stamp out extremism provide a textbook 
example of differing EU and Central Asian definitions of ‘security 
challenges’, posing additional questions about the possibility of effective 
engagement on this issue. 
Central Asia is home to at least one internationally known terrorist 
organisation and one widespread movement espousing extremist views. 
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which grew out of radical 
tendencies in the Uzbek section of the Ferghana Valley in the 1990s, 
eventually adopted a violent, extremist ideology not unlike that of Al-
Qaeda, with which the IMU established strong organisational ties in 
Afghanistan in the late 1990s. Recognised as a terrorist organisation by the 
US State Department, the IMU carried out armed incursions into Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the late 1990s. 
After 9/11, the US-led military operation in Afghanistan, where the 
IMU had come to base itself, seriously impacted the organisation's 
operational abilities and drove it to seek refuge in the lawless hinterlands 
of Pakistan. Though occasional reports have indicated that the IMU may be 
regrouping in Pakistan, and may be widening its target theatre as the 
Islamic Movement of Turkestan, it is not certain that the organisation 
retains any real capability to carry out terrorist operations in Central Asia. 
Recent fighting in Pakistan appeared to degrade the IMU's operational 
capacity even further.3 
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), an organisation that emerged in the Arab world 
in the 1950s, seeks to unite all Muslims in a restored caliphate ruled by 
Islamic law. HT employs stinging anti-American and anti-Semitic rhetoric, 
and its ultimate goal would seem to imply the overthrow of secular 
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regimes throughout the Muslim world, including Central Asia, yet the 
organisation claims that it pursues change by non-violent means. In Central 
Asia, HT operates through a clandestine cell structure and reportedly has 
thousands of followers, leading some to speculate that HT could potentially 
mount a Bolshevik-style coup attempt should it abandon its avowed 
commitment to non-violent means. 
A number of incidents in Uzbekistan, including a series of bombings 
and shootouts in Tashkent in 2004 and a popular uprising in Andijon in 
2005, underscored the potential for violence in the region, although the 
extent of the role played by extremist ideology and violent Islamists in 
these events is somewhat unclear. There were substantial indications that 
the 2004 violence in Tashkent was the work of an extremist group, but the 
absence of a credible investigation has left many questions unanswered. 
The unrest in Andijon in May 2005, which Uzbek authorities crushed 
with the use of massive force, neatly illustrated the ambiguities 
surrounding the issue of religious extremism in Central Asia. The Uzbek 
authorities asserted that the violence was perpetrated by an Islamic 
extremist group called Akramiya, although there were credible indications 
that the uprising had a strong socio-economic component. Moreover, 
accounts by independent witnesses that the Uzbek security services 
massacred demonstrators were never properly investigated, and the trial of 
individuals involved in the violence failed to meet international standards 
of fairness and impartiality. 
Uzbekistan has adopted the harshest policies on extremism, with 
thousands of people believed to be imprisoned there on flimsy charges of 
Islamist activity.4 Other Central Asian governments have also employed 
tough tactics to deal with the threat, and credible allegations of human 
rights violations by security services in the battle against extremism have 
emerged in virtually every Central Asian country. A considerable body of 
expert opinion argues that the methods adopted by Central Asian 
governments, and particularly the Uzbek authorities, are 
counterproductive, and have in fact contributed to the rise of extremism in 
the region. 
                                                      
4 See Creating Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan, Human Rights 
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Viewed in the context of extremist movements worldwide, Central 
Asia's threat does not appear to warrant the draconian measures often 
employed by regional governments. The number of terrorist attacks in 
Central Asia is relatively low, and the involvement of Central Asian 
extremists in globally active terrorist organisations is minimal (with the 
notable exception of the IMU's close ties to Al-Qaeda, although that 
phenomenon appears to be geographically limited to parts of Pakistan, and 
perhaps Afghanistan, at present). 
This does not mean that violent extremism is not a threat in Central 
Asia. The region has numerous features that make it a potential breeding 
ground for terrorists. Poverty in and of itself does not foster extremism, but 
the same cannot be said of serious socio-economic problems left to fester by 
unaccountable, undemocratic governments that err on the side of brutality 
in their efforts to combat extremism. 
2.4  Narcotics 
Central Asia is an important corridor for the smuggling of illegal narcotics 
produced in Afghanistan through Russia to European markets. The 
problem is most acute in Tajikistan, which shares a long, porous border 
with Afghanistan, but it is present in all of the other Central Asian 
countries as well. Moreover, the growing presence of cheap illegal 
narcotics, and particularly heroin, is fuelling drug abuse within Central 
Asian countries. This has resulted in rising rates of HIV/AIDS, with the use 
of contaminated needles the most common route of infection. The UN has 
warned that if the spread of HIV/AIDS is not contained, a serious public 
health crisis could emerge in coming years. Finally, the same channels used 
by drug smugglers to move illegal narcotics could serve as conduits for 
extremists to ferry weapons and explosives across borders. 
2.5  Instability 
Instability remains a looming threat in Central Asia. As 2003-05 upheaval 
in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan demonstrated, post-Soviet regimes – 
of which the Central Asian nations are outstanding examples – cannot be 
assumed to be stable. What's worse, since the regime changes in those three 
countries do not seem to have made a fundamental impact on the 
underlying system of flawed governance, there is no guarantee that history 
will not be repeated. If anything, the post-Soviet world's clan-ridden, 
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less stable as they age, their dysfunctional political systems incapable of 
imparting legitimacy or resolving internal contradictions. Bungled elections 
are only one potential flashpoint. In the more authoritarian systems, where 
the greatest power is concentrated in aging presidents and repressive 
mechanisms are most prominently employed to maintain order, succession 
poses grave risks. 
Since the end of the Tajik civil war in 1997, the centre has held in 
Central Asia, despite violent outbursts in Uzbekistan and the tumultuous 
fall of President Askar Akaev in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Even the sudden 
death of long-ruling Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov in December 
2006, saw Deputy Prime Minister Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov 
ascend to the presidency in what appeared to be a smoothly orchestrated 
succession (although the true extent of the new president's power remains 
somewhat unclear). 
But it would be foolish to assume that the tenuous centre will hold 
indefinitely. Broadly speaking, the region's political systems are as opaque 
as its socio-economic problems are clear. More specifically, instability could 
result from infighting in Turkmenistan's new leadership, from renewed 
violence or a succession struggle in Uzbekistan, or from unchecked political 
turmoil in Kyrgyzstan. Even in Kazakhstan, which has benefited from 
windfall oil profits, one should remember that it is not poverty that spawns 
conflict, but inequality. 
Instability in any Central Asian country could open a Pandora's box 
of problems with significant spillover potential for neighbouring countries. 
Violent conflict along ethnic or regional lines could wreak havoc in a 
number of places, but most devastatingly in the densely populated 
Ferghana Valley. Conflict would cause refugee flows for which the regional 
infrastructure is woefully unprepared. And conflict zones are often the 
greatest incubators of extremism. 
2.6  Governance 
As the preceding overview suggests, the issue of governance is of dual 
relevance to the EU as it implements its strategy for engaging Central Asian 
nations. First, in each of the security challenges reviewed here – the threat 
of extremism, narcotics smuggling, and instability – governance is of 
crucial importance. Central Asian governments share a penchant for 
repressive, and possibly counterproductive, measures to combat 
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that eases the flow of narcotics through the region. And the overall lack of 
good governance in Central Asia creates preconditions for instability. 
Nevertheless, there is no way to engage Central Asia effectively 
without engaging Central Asian governments. While some countries, such 
as Kyrgyzstan, boast relatively numerous and vibrant non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), the pervading attitude in the region towards NGOs 
is suspicion, even outright hostility. In Turkmenistan, NGOs are for all 
practical purposes non-existent. In Uzbekistan, they operate under heavy 
surveillance and tight constraints. Moreover, the crucial role played by 
national governments in efforts to combat extremism, narcotics trafficking 
and instability underscores the need to confront the issues of governance 
that have hamstrung the effectives of these efforts in Central Asia. 
In its efforts to engage Central Asian governments, the EU should 
remain aware of the above-noted regional tendency to view Western 
reform initiatives as potentially damaging to their hold on power and, thus, 
as security threats. Russia and China reinforce this view, with the Russian- 
and Chinese-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO: China, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) a case in point. 
As this author argued elsewhere: “for SCO member states, ‘terrorism, 
separatism, and extremism’ are viewed not as distinct abstract phenomena 
with global relevance to be dealt with globally, but rather as a single 
phenomenon that is locally defined by the ruling elite and left to sovereign 
states to combat by any means they see fit”.5 To this end, the SCO's charter 
lists among its aims and objectives “joint opposition to terrorism, 
separatism, and extremism in all their manifestations”, but the 
organisation's first principle is "mutual respect for states' sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity and the sanctity of borders, 
nonaggression, non-interference in internal affairs, the non-use of force or 
the threat of force in international relations and renunciation of unilateral 
military superiority in contiguous areas”. 
                                                      
5 See Daniel Kimmage, Does the Road to Shanghai go through Tehran?, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 12 June 2006 (http://www.rferl.org/ 
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2.7  Recommendations for EU engagement 
•  The EU should take care to ensure that it sticks to its definitions of 
security challenges and remains vigilant to the differing definitions 
used by Central Asian governments. Because the former are explicit, 
while the latter are often implicit, the EU must carefully examine the 
real definitions employed on a case-by-case basis and target for 
engagement those areas where it can make progress on security 
challenges as they are explicitly defined within the EU, and not as 
they are defined implicitly by Central Asian governments. The 
strategy states: "To align expectations of Central Asian partners with 
those of the EU will be a mutually beneficial and reinforcing process." 
EU representatives should be mindful, however, that the alignment 
of expectations may prove somewhat more difficult in practice. 
•  The EU should not make excessive efforts to engage Central Asia as a 
region. Instead, the EU should pursue a policy of targeted 
engagement directed at specific issues in specific countries. This is 
particularly important in light of the limited availability of resources, 
since nationally targeted engagement can make effective use of 
resources in areas where they can produce results, while a region-
wide policy will necessarily waste resources by spreading them 
across five countries when they are likely to be effective only in some 
parts of the region. The current strategy rightly accords ‘special 
importance’ to bilateral cooperation, but also advocates a ‘regional 
approach’ for a welter of issues including organised crime, human, 
drugs and arms trafficking, terrorism and non-proliferation issues, 
inter-cultural dialogue, energy, environmental pollution, water 
management, migration as well as border management and transport 
infrastructure. While this is conceptually appealing, the less-than-
encouraging record of regional cooperation in Central Asia suggests 
that the regional approach to these issues should be subject to regular 
review with an eye to alternate bilateral approaches. 
•  The EU can and should engage Central Asian governments, both 
because governments are key interlocutors in meeting security 
challenges and because the quality of governance is a crucial factor in 
combating extremism, narcotics smuggling, and potential instability. 
•  The EU should focus primarily on the quality of governance in the 
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to bolster existing approaches to these problems. The emphasis, in 
other words, should be on qualitative change, not quantitative 
improvement. 
•  Moving from the regional to the national context, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan present the most attractive options for heightened EU 
engagement. Kazakhstan is committed to maintaining solid ties with 
the West through its multi-vector foreign policy, and it has invested 
considerable prestige in its bid to chair the OSCE in 2009. This 
renders it amenable to properly formulated and targeted reform 
efforts, and its political system, while far from ideal, affords 
possibilities for positive change. Kyrgyzstan, despite its unsettled 
domestic politics, has a thriving civil-society sector, and the country's 
small size makes it a good target for the allocation of limited 
resources. On security issues, neither country is as beholden to the 
rigid security conceptions shared by the leaderships of Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan. For example, both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
make fewer efforts to control their citizens' movements than 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and are thus likely to be significantly 
more receptive to cooperation on border issues.  
•  The EU can and should engage Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, but 
with realistic expectations of what can and cannot be achieved. As 
Turkmenistan begins to open up to the outside world in the wake of 
Niyazov's death, opportunities for limited engagement will arise, and 
these should be seized upon, particularly in follow-up efforts to 
ensure the implementation of stated reform policies in education, 
health care, and social services. Current levels of engagement with 
Uzbekistan should be preserved, with an emphasis on maintaining 
lines of communication with an eye to expanded engagement if and 
when the opportunity presents itself. 20 | 
 
 
3.  DEMOCRATISATION AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN CENTRAL ASIA:  
PROBLEMS, DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS 
AND THE ROLE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
EUGHENIY ZHOVTIS
∗ 
Introduction and background 
To understand the reasons for the relative failures of the transition to 
democracy, the formation of a law-based state and the establishment of 
respect for human rights in the independent states of Central Asia today, as 
well as the role of the international community, one has to assess, first of 
all, the dynamics of the political process in this region of the world. In large 
part, the origins of the current weakness of democratic processes are the 
result of developments during the final decades of Soviet power. By the 
early 1990s, there arose a situation in which the ruling authorities 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), ruling authorities, realising 
the necessity of reform but at the same time wishing to retain power, 
initiated a set of reforms that employed democratic phraseology but which 
aimed first of all at protecting the interests of the ruling group. 
In this context, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the reduction of 
the CPSU’s power, on the other hand, and the beginning of independence 
for the former republics of the Soviet Union, on the other, resulted in a 
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certain liberalisation of both public opinion and social institutions. The first 
signs of political and social pluralism appeared in Central Asia in the form 
of opposition’s political groups and parties and independent non-
governmental organisations. Independent journalists and even 
independent mass media also emerged. For various reasons, the process of 
reform took different forms in each of the Central Asian countries. 
The First Secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party, Nursultan 
Nazarbaev, proved to be one of the most energetic, decisive and far-sighted 
representatives of the Soviet nomenclature. Rejecting the Communist 
rhetoric, and instead offering Kazakh national statehood as a main political 
argument, he sought to attract foreign experts and young executive 
technocrats to initiate reforms. Relying upon absolute control of the State 
machinery and valuable experience acquired in the Communist Party 
institutions, Nazarbaev introduced a series of macroeconomic reforms that 
achieved important success; he also set up an institutional structure for the 
newly independent state. Skilfully balancing between Russia, China, the US 
and Europe, Nazarbaev’s foreign policy has allowed the president to gain 
certain external guaranties of security. The establishment of the 
institutional infrastructure of a market economy and the launching of 
investment-efficient economic branches, focused primarily upon the 
considerable mineral raw material resources, including oil, gas, non-ferrous 
and rare metals in Kazakhstan attracted significant foreign investments to 
be made in the country and, correspondingly, has raised the level of 
economic and political interest in Kazakhstan on the part of industrialised 
countries. 
Kyrgyzstan’s President Askar Akayev, being a representative of the 
same Soviet nomenclature as Nazarbaev but belonging to its scientific 
branch, has managed to undertake more serious attempts at 
democratisation in the political system and social sphere compared with 
his Central Asian neighbours. In part this was possible because of the 
country’s weak economic capacity. As a result of the poor economic 
conditions in Kyrgyzstan, during the 1990s the country became 
increasingly dependent on foreign credits and loans, which led to a positive 
international influence on the speed of democratic reforms. Civil society 
quickly developed in the country, as well as the institutions of a political 
system, a parliamentary-based form of power, and independent mass 
media. However, with scarce economic resources, the top elite belonging to 
the same former Communist Party nomenclature, were increasingly 22 | EUGHENIY ZHOVTIS 
 
criminalised and prone to corruption, by the early part of this century, the 
economic reforms had slowed almost to a halt which led, eventually, to a 
popular uprising to remove President Akaev from power in 2005. 
A brief period of political liberalisation and public activism in 
Tajikistan in the early 1990s was followed by a bloody civil war. The legacy 
of this conflict continues to cast a long shadow over Tajikistan today. The 
impact of the war has severely limited the economic development of the 
country and held back political liberalisation.  
The First Secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party, Islam 
Karimov, initially demonstrated some support for a democratic way of 
development of his country (political opposition, independent mass media, 
alternative presidential elections, and a tolerant attitude towards NGOs in 
the early 1990s). Then in the latter part of the decade, Karimov moved 
clearly to a highly authoritarian form of rule. Political opponents were 
persecuted and imprisoned or they left the country. Under the pretence of 
combating Islamic radicalism and fundamentalism, many religious figures 
and believers were persecuted. The independent mass media were almost 
completely annihilated and many foreign non-governmental and 
international organisations were expelled from the country. Individuals 
who did not conform to the new political order also came under pressure.  
And finally in Turkmenistan, the First Secretary of the Communist 
Party, Saparmurat Niyazov, very quickly stopped all the democratic 
reforms that had been initiated in the newly independent country. Relying 
upon powerful domestic security structures (the army, police and special 
services), he usurped power and thereby created a totalitarian regime 
similar to that of North Korea. During the last decade, almost all public 
figures and civil society activists working to develop democracy were 
either imprisoned or left the country. Absolute control over the mass 
media, the judiciary system, and the way that people think prohibition of 
different ways of thinking and the creation of a new ‘iron curtain’ were 
typical features of Turkmenistan under Turkmenbashi. 
It should be noted that Turkmenistan has ratified almost all the 
international agreements on human rights but became a member of the UN 
and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
without observing its obligations, neither within the framework of the 
ratified international tools on human rights, nor those of OSCE. Despite the 
failure to fulfil its international commitments, Turkmenistan did not suffer 
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3.1  The challenges to democratisation and the protection of human 
rights 
This example of Turkmenistan can be used as a litmus test to assess the 
capacity and possibility of developed democratic states to influence the 
development of democracy, civil society and human rights in any region of 
the world, including Central Asia. This case demonstrates, firstly, the 
weakness of the instruments available to the EU states in trying to 
challenge anti-democratic developments in Central Asia. Secondly it shows 
the shortcomings of international organisations (including the UN and the 
OSCE) in fulfilling their responsibility to challenge states that fail to 
observe their international obligations on human rights agreements. 
Thirdly, the situation with Turkmenistan has highlighted the crisis of 
international law in the sphere of human rights. International agreements 
and documents on human rights (including juridical obligations on 
democracy and civil society development, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights) have become agreements of a ‘second order’ as compared 
with similar agreements in the spheres of security and economic 
cooperation. A failure to observe commitments made under the former 
types of agreement seems to imply no consequences for the delinquent 
country Fourthly, the international approach to Turkmenistan points to the 
observance of double standards with respect to democracy and civil society 
development, the rule of law and respect for human rights when weighed 
against economic, geopolitical and security considerations. One can say 
that in the modern world, democracy, human rights and sustainable 
development have four enemies: oil, gas, the war against terrorism, and 
geopolitical considerations. Moreover, Turkmenistan’s complete neglect of 
its obligations vis-à-vis the OSCE ’third basket’(the human dimension 
commitments), the organisation in which the European Union members 
play a key role, renders all the criteria and obligations into very abstract 
notions. 
When assessing the democracy and human rights situation in the 
different countries of the OSCE, developed democratic states and notably 
European countries, instead of applying clear criteria fixed in the 
international human rights tools and OSCE documents, have begun to 
practice the so-called ‘comparative method’. Under this method, politicians 
in Brussels, Vienna or Strasburg ask: “Is the situation in Kazakhstan, for 
instance, better or worse than in Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan?” “Better” 
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Kazakhstan. And in this way, the positive dynamics in Kazakhstan are 
noted! With similar success, North Korea, Burma, Cuba, etc. could be 
chosen as criteria for comparison. 
Under these circumstances, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Azerbaijan, Russia and Belarus – all of whose records fall short in many 
respects of meeting the international standards of- human rights and 
freedoms fixed in OSCE documents would look more or less decent, since 
they are being compared to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Unfortunately, 
all the countries become hostage to this policy: both democratic OSCE 
countries and the ruling elites in those countries that are trying to develop 
democratically, and those countries that imitate democratic reforms and the 
peoples of those countries. 
Now it should be noted that the main ‘property’ of the Party 
nomenclature in the Soviet period was the ‘armchair’ (formal position), 
which ensured access to comforts, privileges, scarce goods and other 
advantages granted to the elite. Money and property by themselves were 
not as important as a place in the Party hierarchy in terms of determining 
one’s level of influence and ensuring access to comforts. 
With the transition to private property and the market economy, the 
situation changed dramatically. During this period of change, the main task 
was to convert the ‘armchair’ into money and property in the form of 
factories, employment, houses, ships, etc. This effort was led by the Party 
nomenclature in all the republics of the former Soviet Union. Having 
preserved complete control of law-enforcement structures (thus securing 
oneself from possible persecutions), and of the national mass media (i.e. 
controlling people’s access to information), the Party nomenclature at the 
same time started to build up a new statehood, reform the economy and 
secure its own interests during the privatisation processes. 
After the basis of a market economy was set up and privatisation, or 
to be precise, property-sharing between representatives of the political 
elite, was completed, three challenges have emerged to a lesser or greater 
extent in all the countries of the region, as discussed below. 
1.  The legitimisation of the outcome of privatisation before the general public. 
To say it plainly, this is to ensure the agreement of the people with 
the fact that the majority of property has already been distributed, 
and to reconcile the general population with that fact. The 
instruments of ‘reconciliation’ are various: from absolute control of 
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resentment, up to achieving consent with the results of this primary 
‘savage’ stage of capital accumulation. The consent of the people is 
obtained by those who have accumulated this capital by their sharing 
it with the people through ensuring a visible growth of welfare and 
living standards, and then, after all, strengthening the belief that “all 
the same you can change nothing”. 
2.  The legalisation of capital and property ‘accumulated’ during the 
transition period in order that those who have acquired wealth in this 
way are able to sleep calmly, without being afraid that any change of 
power or dissent would result in an unwanted visit by the financial 
police, prosecutor’s office officials or national security bodies. 
3.   Securing guaranties against any revision of privatisation results, property-
sharing, investigation and persecution in case of a change of power. 
Until these issues are addressed by the ruling authorities, all the 
former-Soviet states will be politically unstable. The first countries of the 
former Soviet Union (with the exception of the Baltic states) to start an 
active search for the answers to these questions are Georgia, Ukraine and, 
to some extent, Kyrgyzstan – resulting in confrontation and political 
change. We shall see what solutions will be found and how successful they 
will be. In all of these countries, the replacement of the Party nomenclature 
with a new elite has just started, and many years must pass before the 
process will be completed, resulting in a certain stability of political 
development. Against this background, let us try to assess the state of 
society and people 15 years after perestroika. 
First, the notion of democracy has been significantly discredited. It is 
often identified with anarchy, chaos, robbery, the cancellation of social 
guarantees, criminal enrichment, etc. Meanwhile, public opinion does not 
see that all this instability is, in fact, a result of the rule by the same 
Communist Party nomenclature who were in charge of the country before 
the collapse of communism. 
Second, freedom remains an abstract notion. The majority of society 
perceives no connection between a comfortable life, respect for human 
dignity, fairness and democracy, freedom and human rights. Third, definite 
ideas were formed in the society during the transition period with respect 
to the unjust nature of privatisation and public property-sharing, about its 
practical pillaging and robbery of the people. In essence, there is a widely 
held view that everything was taken by those who had power, their 
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not ill-founded ideas automatically render any wealth as illegitimate as in 
the mind of the general public in the societies of Central Asia. 
Fourth, the population that grew up in an atmosphere of permanent 
lies and manipulation during the Soviet era has continued to be highly 
sceptical of official claims and does not trusts official information or rather 
has grown used to constant lies. On the other hand, aggressive official 
publicity, especially the kind that proposes simple, though far from truthful 
answers to complicated issues, still remains a very efficient tool. 
And finally, nearly two decades after the end of the Soviet Union, the 
sense of absolute power of the state remains, while the notion of the futile 
struggle of the ‘little man’ with the state, which was deeply ingrained in the 
‘Soviet’ man, continues today. The individual has simply turned away from 
the authorities and officials still more. The notion of an opposition between 
‘us’ and ‘them’ has acquired an even more tangible form. The expectation 
that the State will solve our problems has been preserved and has even 
become stronger. We have only to wait and endure a little longer. At the 
same time, we only hope it will not get worse! 
Distrust in democratic slogans and disbelief in the possibility to 
change anything have grown such that even protests against the failure to 
pay pensions and salaries, which has led to hunger, have attracted only as 
few as several hundred persons. Meanwhile, demonstrations agitating for 
freedom of speech, democratic development or political rights can achieve 
little in this atmosphere of apathy.  
In short, authoritarian regimes have been established throughout the 
region: from the totalitarian dictatorship in Turkmenistan to the hard 
authoritarian regime in Uzbekistan and up to the more or less ‘soft’ 
authoritarian regimes of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. National 
mass media of the countries of Central Asia are completely controlled by 
the ruling authorities. Political systems are not developed; political 
pluralism, in fact, is absent or reduced to a minimum and no real 
separation of powers has been established. Parliaments and local 
authorities are appendages of the executive power, while the real levers of 
power are held by presidential structures, with no system of restraints or 
counterbalances. 
All the constitutions of the region’s countries, which formally fix the 
authority of the three branches of power, i.e. legislative, executive and 
judicial, serve to delineate the presidency as an independent branch of 
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arbitrator and coordinator of the other branches’ concerted actions. Such is 
the original interpretation of constitutional democracy in Central Asia! 
The most successful macroeconomic reforms have been carried out in 
Kazakhstan, to a certain extent in Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser extent in 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It is difficult to judge the success of economic 
reforms in Turkmenistan because of a lack of information. Nevertheless, 
even the success of macroeconomic reform in Kazakhstan, not to mention 
the slow rates of reform in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as the relative 
failures in Uzbekistan and other countries of the region, highlight another 
major problem: economic reforms at the level of microeconomics, at the 
level of business development, and especially small- and medium-sized 
business development, have not been successful.  
For such reform to succeed, at least two conditions must be met. 
There should be a decrease in the level of state involvement in economic 
management at the micro level and a sustainable system of the ‘game rules’ 
must be created and supported by efficiently operating state institutions 
and mechanisms. And this, in its turn, requires the construction of a law-
based state – the establishment of the rule of law, a real division of powers, 
the maintenance of judicial independence, equality of all citizens before 
law, the fostering of a legal culture and eradication of legal ignorance. 
Unfortunately, due to numerous reasons of a political character, these 
reforms, as a matter of fact, either did not begin at all, or were of a vague 
and inefficient nature. 
In addition, there was no system of restraints and counterbalances, 
nor a real division of powers; country leaders were not replaced for one 
and a half decades following the collapse of Communism, during which 
time the initial accumulation of capital was effected. All this caused severe 
corruption of the state institutions. 
3.2  Minimum conditions for political reform in Central Asia 
Democratic reforms, construction of a lawful state and promotion of 
respect of rights include, at least, two components: 
1.  Reform of the national legislation in the sphere of human rights with 
the aim to bring it into conformity with international standards, and  
2.  Reform of the state institutions.  28 | EUGHENIY ZHOVTIS 
 
3.2.1 Reform of the national legislation in the sphere of human rights  
It should be noted that in the early 1990s, that the countries of the region 
signed almost all the basic international documents on human rights: the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, 
Cultural and Social Rights, the Conventions on Children’s Rights, on the 
Liquidation of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, Convention on Torture 
Prohibition, etc. The last country to ratify the international pacts on human 
rights was Kazakhstan (2005). The ratification of the international 
agreements on human rights binds the participating states to bring their 
legislation and judicial practice in conformity with their provisions. As a 
matter of fact, however, none of the region’s states has followed this 
practice in a significant way. 
The constitutions of all the Central Asian countries contain sections 
devoted to human rights and freedoms, and the main provisions of these 
sections repeat the articles of the General Declaration of Human Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Any analysis of 
the laws that regulate political rights and civil liberties of these states, 
however, shows that there is a conceptual discrepancy between those 
principles and the norms containing the international tools on human 
rights. For the most part, the national laws retain a Soviet legislative spirit 
which, first of all, was directed at the restriction of human rights and 
freedoms and at granting an opportunity to the state bodies and officials to 
interpret those or other norms of the law in their own interest. The 
legislation is constructed on an obvious priority of interests of the state 
before the individual rights and freedoms!  
Fundamental principles intended to create the laws regulating 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the restriction on 
admissibility check, proportionality, legal predictability and definiteness 
are practically not applied in the preparation of draft legal acts concerning 
human rights. If we analyse the acts regulating specific rights and freedoms 
and judicial practice, for example, in the Republic of Kazakhstan (RK), the 
above-stated conclusion seems to be even more obvious. See box below 
offering a case study of Kazakhstan. 
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The lack of observance of basic rights: A case study of Kazakhstan 
a) The right to life. Although amendments to the criminal legislation have 
been approved in Kazakhstan, concerning the possibility to apply lifelong 
imprisonment as an alternative to the death penalty, and a moratorium on the 
death penalty was introduced, this is still a moratorium on the implementation 
of death penalty verdicts rather than a moratorium on their pronouncement. 
Having ratified in 2005 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Kazakhstan did not ratify the Second Optional Protocol to it aimed at 
cancelling the death penalty. Moreover, petitions from high-ranking officials 
began to appear more frequently over the last year about the need to restore 
the death penalty for terrorism and illegal trafficking of drugs. Finally, the 
national legislation does not determine the status of persons in relation to 
which the moratorium on execution of the death penalty verdict and the circle 
of their guaranteed rights is uncertain.  
b) The right to freedom from torture. Despite the fact that Kazakhstan ratified 
the UN Convention against torture in 1998, no announcements have been 
made to date for clauses 21 and 22 of the Convention, i.e. the competence of the 
UN Commission against Torture to consider individual complaints to 
application of torture in the Republic of Kazakhstan has not been recognised. 
Nor did the country ratify the Optional Protocol to this Convention, 
concerning the monitoring of confinement places for persons in custody for 
possible application of tortures. 
Having ratified the Convention in 1998, Kazakhstan thus assumed the 
obligation to bring the legislation into accord with the Convention, but the 
country did not start doing this until 2002, when the Convention-relevant 
definition of torture was included in the criminal legislation. 
In 2001 Kazakhstan submitted a primary report on the implementation 
of the Convention against Torture. After the report was considered, the UN 
Commission against Torture submitted 16 recommendations to the 
government of Kazakhstan, of which only three have been implemented. There 
is no independent agency in the country to investigate claims of torture made 
by the victims, nor effective procedures for documenting torture. Moreover, 
judiciary experience shows that many complaints about torture in the 
overwhelming majority of cases are dismissed by the judges as an attempt by 
the defendants to escape responsibility and therefore no effective investigation 
is carried out. 
c) The right to freedom of speech, expression and access to mass media. This 
right is regulated by the Law on Mass Media, which is practically a 
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late 1980s. Despite the constitutional interdiction of censorship, this law is 
practically aimed at the creation of a large-scale monitoring system for mass 
media, with the participation of public prosecutors and a special state body – 
the Ministry of Culture and Information. 
The Republic of Kazakhstan’s criminal legislation contains norms 
connected with criminal liability for insults and slander and, separately, for 
encroaching on the honour of the President and deputies of Kazakhstan’s 
parliament. Statutory acts published by state agencies, such as rules mandating 
mass media registration or journalists’ accreditation, render the laws of 
Kazakhstan relating to freedom of speech still more inconsistent with 
international standards. 
Finally, legislation to combat extremism and terrorism and on national 
security, which is being constantly supplemented, still contains many clauses 
that either directly limit the freedom of speech, or give the opportunity to the 
authorities to interpret ambiguous definitions and in whichever way they 
wish. In spite of numerous appeals by the OSCE Representative to bring the 
RK’s legislation concerning freedom of the mass-media into conformity with 
international standards, the situation has not changed. 
d) The right to freedom of association. As with the regulation on freedom of 
speech, this right is regulated by the Law on Public Associations which, in 
essence, is a continuation of the Public Association Law accepted in the Soviet 
Union in the late 1980s. The requirement of obligatory registration of public 
associations – contradicting international standards – is still fixed in the 
legislation, thereby practically forbidding the activities of informal public 
associations. 
Moreover, the administrative and criminal laws contain the norms that 
provide for responsibility for infringement upon the legislation on public 
associations on the whole, rendering it practically impossible to discern what 
offence has been committed and what responsibility will be applied. And, as in 
the case of the regulation of freedom of speech, the process of constantly 
adding legislation to counter extremism and to combat terrorism means that 
there are more and more norms that either directly limit freedom of speech, or 
give the authorities the opportunity to interpret ambiguous definitions in 
whichever way they wish. 
As a result of a mismatch between fair opaque principles and legal 
proceedings, some foreign and religious organisations were identified as 
extremist or terrorist in nature in absentia by decisions of judicial bodies. 
Although it is true that the majority of these organisations really are composed 
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not correspond to the requirements of Kazak legislation, and relevant court 
decisions were not promulgated. 
The law on political parties also does not conform to international 
standards, establishing an unreasonable registration threshold of 50,000 
members for a country with a population of 15 million, a complicated 
procedure for a person to acquire legal status, with the requirement to collect 
personally in one place 1,000 founding members of a party, with checks of the 
names performed by the judicial authorities, etc. 
e) The right to participate in the management of the country. The existing 
election law does not provide real political pluralism and equal opportunities 
for opposition parties and candidates; instead, it lays the foundations for 
conditions favouring the government. This bias is particularly notable in the 
formation of election commissions, which are almost entirely composed of 
representatives of pro-government parties, organisations or official bodies. 
Thus, during the period between elections, opposition parties and candidates 
have practically no access to national mass media. As a result of such practices, 
in a country with a population of 15 million where the official number of 
supporters of opposition political parties totals nearly half a million persons, 
there is only one opposition deputy in both chambers of Parliament (out of 116 
deputies), and the opposition has almost no representation in local 
representative authorities. The law on local government has not yet been 
passed, in spite of the requirement to do so in the 1995 Constitution. 
The discrepancy between legislative and judicial practice in the country 
compared to international standards has been so great that no elections in 
Kazakhstan, including presidential, parliamentary or local ones, have been 
recognised as corresponding to international standards by the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) during all the years it has sent 
election observation missions to Kazakhstan. 
There is a similar situation with respect to freedom of conscience and the 
right to a fair court proceeding. As far as the latter right is concerned, a special 
lecturer of the United Nations on the independence of judges and lawyers 
visited Kazakhstan in 2004. He published a report about this mission in 2005 
containing many recommendations, a majority of which have never been 
implemented. These features found in Kazakhstan are, to more or less the same 
degree, typical of all the countries of the Central Asian region. 
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3.2.2 Reform of the state institutions  
The progress achieved with respect to reforming state institutions in 
Central Asia is even worse than the situation prevailing in the area of 
national legislation on human rights. The majority of the state institutions, 
– first of all, law enforcement bodies, national security, the public 
prosecutor’s office and the courts – are the direct successors of the Soviet 
system and they continue to be Soviet in spirit in their organisational 
structure, ideology and their involvement in public policy. 
The constitutions of all the countries of the region, while formally 
based in principle on the division of authorities and the creation of a 
system of ‘restraints and counterbalances’, are, as a matter of fact, the main 
laws of authoritarianism in which the competence and powers are 
redistributed heavily in favour of the presidential branch of power. The 
presidents of all the countries of the region (with the exception perhaps of 
Kyrgyzstan, where efforts have been taken to revise the constitutional 
articles with the purpose of restricting presidential power in favour of the 
Parliament) possess unlimited political opportunities to control the state 
and society. 
One can say that all the levers of actual country management are 
concentrated in presidential administrations and agencies in which relevant 
departments carry out both external and internal policy. The system of 
such management of the structure, ideology and style of management 
reminds one of the supervising structures of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU). The small and powerful group around the president, 
which includes administration officials and a number of the most 
influential government officials, resembles, in many respects, the Politburo 
and administration itself – the Central Committee of the CPSU. 
In practically all the countries, national security bodies and public 
prosecutor offices are not a part of the government, but rather are directly 
subordinate and accountable to the president, thus providing the basis for 
and supporting presidential power. In view of the almost unlimited 
authority of presidents in Central Asia, these state bodies have such 
extensive functions that they directly participate in the main political 
process and the political struggle inside each country. 
When speaking about Kazakhstan, the unique governmental 
structure that has undergone structural reforms from the point of view of 
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under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the authority of 
the Ministry of Justice was a serious step to its demilitarisation and 
transformation from a retaliatory into a corrective establishment, although 
there have only been initial steps in this direction. 
The introduction of legal proceedings with the participation of a jury 
could also be worth mentioning. For the rest, the state institutions have not 
only not come nearer to international standards from the point of view of 
maintaining human rights and freedoms, but they keep on becoming tools 
in the political struggle reflecting and protecting the interests of the ruling 
elite. 
As was already noted, the Ministry of Culture and Information 
‘supervises’ and controls the mass media. In this capacity, the ministry 
periodically proposes initiatives to introduce anti-democratic amendments 
into the current legislation. There is a special representative body under the 
Ministry of Justice – the Committee on Religious Affairs that was set up to 
control religious associations. The Committee carries out its ideological 
functions in the best traditions of the Soviet past. 
The control over the non-governmental organisations and political 
parties, which was previously carried out by the Ministry of Culture, 
Information and Public Consent (nowadays the Ministry of Culture and 
Information), is now basically carried out by the public prosecutor’s office 
and national security and internal affairs agencies. Thus, there are special 
departments on communication with public associations in the system of 
internal affairs and departments of public security. Those departments 
essentially carry out the functions of political police. According to the 
concept of the activities of the public prosecutor’s office, among the seven 
strategic directions pertaining to the realisation of supervising functions, 
the control of mass media and public associations is included. 
Despite the introduction of legal proceedings with the participation 
of a jury, which, as has already been noted, could certainly be considered 
an important positive step, the court remains under obvious political 
control and it is extremely difficult to call it as an independent branch. 
Finally, all the state institutions are severely affected by corruption, which 
bears a systemic character and penetrates the state system from top to 
bottom. 
In 1993, the Republican Commission on Human Rights was set up in 
Kazakhstan under the President of the Republic, and in 2002, the Institute 
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Human Rights were also created. It was intended that these measures 
would represent a serious step on the way towards the creation of national 
institutions for human rights. However, these structures were created by 
Presidential decree, and as a result, they are essentially a part of the 
President’s administration and therefore cannot be considered as 
independent national structures for human rights. Their creation, 
subordination, powers and competence appreciably fall short of the Paris 
Principles of the United Nations regarding the status of national 
establishments engaged in the promotion and protection of human rights. 
With conceptually suspect legislation in the sphere of political rights 
and civil freedoms, as well as unreformed state bodies which tend to retain 
Soviet habits, it is not difficult to predict the inefficiency of procedures and 
the discrepancy between Kazakhstan’s judicial practice and international 
standards. 
The development of civil societies, as implied by the development of 
political parties, trade unions, non-governmental organisations, 
independent mass media and other public institutes, has practically failed 
in all the countries. The civil society of Turkmenistan simply does not exist 
in any sense of the word. The non-governmental sector of Uzbekistan is 
completely controlled by authorities, and any display of civil consciousness 
that does not coincide with the official point of view is generally 
persecuted. In Tajikistan, the activities of non-governmental organisations 
are severely limited at the psychological level due to the consequences of 
civil war. The most advanced development of civil society has been realised 
in Kazakhstan and, especially, Kyrgyzstan, but even there, one cannot 
speak about a consolidated and institutional expression and reflection of 
social needs and interests. 
3.3  What is the role of the international community and, first of all, 
the US and the EU in this process?  
Directly following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international 
community, on behalf of international organisations, international financial 
institutions and individual states (first of all, western ones), started to 
render active assistance to the newly independent states to help set them on 
their feet. In the region of the Central Asia, these activities were also aimed 
at the creation of a capable state system and a strengthening of the law and 
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of the economy and the development of democracy, a law-based state and 
the rule of law. 
One can see that the motivation, resources, methods and technologies 
used were inseparable from the interests of various international 
organisations or individual countries. Among these interests were both 
geopolitical and economic interests, as well as the interests of regional and 
global security, and, to some extent, common human interest for promoting 
universal values, including democracy, freedom and human rights. In 
addition, it is necessary to consider that all the assistance in the reforms in 
this region was carried out with a geopolitical ‘amendment’ for the 
interests of China and Russia. 
As far as the assistance is concerned for the creation of more or less 
capable state institutions that would allow us to speak of the countries of 
the region as ‘real states’, then we can speak of certain successes, although 
the events in Kyrgyzstan have shown that these systems are unstable, and 
nobody knows how they will develop when there is a change of power. So 
far there are many more questions than answers in the field of economic 
reform in all the countries, except possibly Kazakhstan. 
Now we shall try to estimate the international community’s policy 
efficiency in Central Asia in the sphere of democracy development, 
building a law-based state and respect for human rights and freedoms. 
Looking at the problem from the perspective of someone in the region in 
question, this policy was based on a number of basic theses: 
  Representatives of the top Party nomenclature are inclined to carry out 
economic and political reforms. They head the states that became 
independent and consequently aspire to be accepted in the 
international community, to become participants of international 
relations and international trade. This desire in itself can be a good 
catalyst on the way to democratisation. 
  The process of democratisation will take a lot of time and changes of, 
at least, one or two generations, especially to move beyond the 
generation of those raised with a Soviet mentality and communist 
ideology. Therefore the main emphasis should be placed on 
‘pushing’, where possible, reforms and ‘work for the future’, to 
prepare the next generations, free from the Soviet past and open to 
progressive and more rational mechanisms of governmental and 
social management, to bring change. 36 | EUGHENIY ZHOVTIS 
 
  Sustainable development is, first of all, about economic development 
and the maintenance of security. If the ruling elites guarantee it to a 
greater or lesser extent, then it is possible ‘to forgive’ some deviations 
from fundamental ideas of democracy and human rights fixed in 
international obligations. 
  Encouraging freedom, democracy, ideas of the open civil society, a 
law-based state and human rights should be carried out, bearing in 
mind local attitudes, traditions and the cultural features of the region.  
Such reasoning has had a direct influence on the programme of the 
help implemented in the region, by both international organisations and by 
individual states. It should be especially noted that due to a number of 
objective and subjective reasons, the short-term and intermediate-term 
measures to promote democratic reforms in the countries of Central Asia 
have never produced an impression of well-elaborated and well-
coordinated strategies. 
Instead, there is the impression that international organisations such 
as the United Nations and the OSCE are considerably limited in the extent 
to which they can facilitate reforms in such politically sensitive spheres as 
the development of democracy, civil society and fostering a culture of 
human rights. In this respect, however, the policy of the OSCE was 
certainly more transparent and progressive. The international financial 
institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian 
Development Bank, did not undertake any specific steps in this direction 
except for declaring an interest in sustainable development and political 
modernisation in the region. 
The European Union as a community of European states has not 
developed a clear and coordinated position in relation to democratic 
processes in the region, with the exception of some resolutions by the 
European Parliament. Instead, each of the European states has followed 
and protected its own interests in the region, first of all economic interests 
(namely energy resources) and geopolitical interests. It is sufficient to 
mention that during all the 1990s, European countries such as Germany, 
France, Italy, Spain and even Great Britain carried out no public policy in 
relation to the political processes and development of democracy in the 
region. Only the US made regular appeals for political reform and for the 
development of democracy and respect for human rights, irrespective of 
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little, while European policy became more visible only during the past 
three to five years. 
As has already been noted, assistance to the countries of the region 
from international organisations and western states has basically been 
directed at resolving the problems of the state-building, eliminating sharp 
social and economic disparities, reforming the economy and strengthening 
the national and regional security systems. In the field of democracy and 
civil society development, these programmes were basically directed at the 
support of non-governmental organisations, reform of legislation and legal 
institutes and development of educational projects. 
All the countries of the region developed personified authoritarian 
political systems, in which power is concentrated in the hands of the 
leaders, presidents and their close circle of advisors. No serious political or 
economic decision is possible without the clearly expressed political will of 
the head of state. And this political will should not only be clearly 
expressed, but also be accompanied by concrete steps to put it in practice. 
It is especially important to distinguish between the genuine political 
will to accept democratic reform and its imitation. The ruling post-
communist elites of the former Soviet Union have learned not only how to 
build ‘manageable democracies’ as defined by Russian President Vladimir 
Putin, but also how to build ‘imitative’ or ‘façade’ democracies. That is, the 
state and social systems are similar in form to constitutional democracies 
(provision of constitutions, elections, parliaments, local representative 
bodies of power, political parties, mass media, etc.), while in their content 
they are not so far away from the Soviet system. 
Unfortunately, a large number of the programmes organised by the 
international community in the sphere of democracy development, state-
building and promotion of human rights and freedoms in the region 
simply managed to support this imitation of democratic development. 
These were programmes on inter-parliamentary cooperation, judicial 
reform, legislative processes, etc. Their failure was explained by western 
politicians with the help of an argument offered by the ruling elites of the 
region’s countries, based on the above-stated theses:  
  Reform should first focus on the economy and security and then on 
democracy and human rights.  
  The democratic process is a long process. 38 | EUGHENIY ZHOVTIS 
 
  The countries of Central Asia must first overcome the legacy of 
totalitarianism and communist ideology. 
  The Asian mentality should be accounted for. 
  Ruling elites are basically ready for political reforms, but the people 
are not, and geopolitical conditions are adverse. 
Certainly, this criticism of the international community’s role in 
democratic reforms (or in its absence) in the region is not universally 
applicable and all-condemning. Educational programmes, assistance in the 
development of civil society, support for public debate in the society, at 
least in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, had and continue to have a 
positive impact. Some programmes aimed at the abolition of the death 
penalty or reform of the penitentiary system were also rather successful. 
However, these are more likely to be the exception rather than the 
rule. As can be seen, there have been no system changes. And this means 
that both the strategy and the content of supporting programmes require a 
certain revision. 
3.4  What can we say about the international strategies, policy and 
programme of support pursued in Central Asia? 
3.4.1 The policy should be fair, especially that at the international level  
During the Soviet time, the population was, metaphorically, trained to 
believe that 2x2 = 25 in the social and political sphere of our region. Right 
after ‘perestroika’ was finished, it was, in effect, declared by the authorities 
that 2x2 = 8 and still one should be grateful to the authorities that nobody 
forces them to say it is 25. Over 15 years after the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
the population is no longer forced to believe what is patently false. Rather, 
arrangements in each of the Central Asian countries ensure that through 
voluntary-compulsory mechanisms the population has come to accept that 
2x2 = 25, or 4.8, or 4.5, depending upon the rigidity or softness of the 
authoritarian tendencies in the country. And in so doing, the authorities 
sometimes cite the US or a European country as an example of where they 
also from time to time say that for the reasons of political expediency it is 
temporarily necessary to consider that 2x2 = 4.15….  
The European Union, as a whole, and each European country 
individually should consistently insist that 2x2 = 4 and that according to 
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the international community on freedom of speech, associations, movement 
and peaceful assembly, fair legal procedures and fair elections, the division 
of authority and systems of checks and balances are all understood as 
absolutely concrete things. 
The problems of manipulation, distortion and substitution of 
concepts relating to the key elements of the human dimension – the 
developments of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights – 
have become so sharp in the world that they require special attention. All 
the governments of the developed democratic countries, international 
organisations and international remedial organizations must undertake 
serious efforts at the international level to strengthen international remedial 
mechanisms and world politics in the sphere of human rights. 
These efforts are especially urgent in the light of direct attacks by 
Russia, Belarus and other authoritarian CIS states on the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, in particular, on the OSCE Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, on the missions of observers 
from the OSCE and the European Union, and on the OSCE centres in some 
countries. It is also necessary to resist attempts to transform international 
law and international agreements in the sphere of human rights into the so-
called ‘soft’ rights or ‘soft law’, as well as to default from obligations within 
the limits of which it is considered a usual phenomenon. 
The EU should endeavour to ‘reanimate’ the clauses that are 
contained in basic documents on human rights accepted within the OSCE 
framework, in particular, the documents of the Copenhagen and Moscow 
meetings on the human dimension, especially those relating to the 
extraterritorial nature of human rights. It is necessary to resist the attempts 
to declare human rights an internal affair of the states, which in one form or 
another is already ideologically propagandised in the documents of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Collective Security 
Treaty. 
In sum, if the EU wishes to influence the observance of human rights 
and freedoms in Central Asia, it must interact with international 
organisations and the governments of the democratic states, to take 
advantage of every possible opportunity to exert pressure ion the 
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3.4.2 The regional approach should be used very cautiously 
The EU has begun to use more frequently in its relations with the region. 
Despite their geographical proximity, the countries of the region strongly 
differ both in history and in economic capacity, in culture and in the way 
they have developed over the course of the past 15 years. Against this 
background, a ‘cross-border’ programme on democratic development and 
promotion of human rights will be artificial and in some cases simply 
unfeasible. Generally speaking, the regional political identification can 
cause erroneous strategies and decisions. Regional projects can be quite 
effective in limited spheres e.g. labour migration, regional trade, regional 
security, the struggle against the trafficking of people and drug-dealing, 
and projects connected with the distribution of water resources. 
As a whole, there have been modest results during the past 15 years 
by the European Union in its participation in the political development of 
the countries of Central Asia, especially regarding the promotion of 
democracy, freedom and human rights. This shortcoming is in a certain 
sense a challenge to European policy, and many things depend on how 
deeply the results of past failings will be analysed, and whether the 
proposed corrections of strategy will be adequate to the task in the region.  
3.4.3 European policy in the region should in full measure take account of the 
condition of the society 15 years after perestroika and the nature of the 
ruling political elite as well as the prospects for political development. 
It is obvious that the internal political processes in all the region’s countries 
will be, first of all, connected with intra-elite processes. It is improbable that 
any serious political changes will be connected with movements ‘from 
below’. For the time being, politics in the region will be a ‘top-down’ 
process. And under these circumstances, such a policy should be 
sufficiently flexible, but consistent considering the fact that the ruling elites 
are not solid. To some extent, both progressive and conservatives elements 
are present within their ranks, and, besides, China, and especially Russia 
exert influence on the internal political processes in the region, because in 
those countries similar processes are also taking place. 
Every possible effort should be made to maintain the dialogue with 
the society for the development of mutually acceptable political decisions, 
especially those connected with the c o n t i n u i t y  o f  p o w e r .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
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tendencies coming from Russia, which are appreciably supported and 
promoted by the authoritarian leaders of the region.  
3.4.4 To facilitate democracy development in Central Asia, two strategies are 
available for the construction of lawful states, civil societies and respect 
for human rights depending on the disposition of the country’s political 
leadership. 
i)  For countries where there is  a  clearly expressed political will to accept 
systemic democratic reforms and to take concrete steps towards its 
realisation. In this case, the European Union, individual states, 
international organisations, and other donors should efficiently use 
the available financial, political and economic resources to facilitate 
these reforms with a maximum involvement in this process of local 
NGOs, national experts, scientists, practitioners, etc. Despite the fact 
that no political will is expressed for political modernisation or 
systemic democratic reforms in Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, and it is 
poorly expressed in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, it is 
nevertheless quite possible to initiate certain systemic steps in some 
directions. 
ii)  For countries where there is no political will for systemic democratic reforms 
on the part of the top leadership. In this case, first, it is possible to direct 
efforts towards the formation of such a political will, through appeals 
to the observance of international obligations through economic and 
political levers, including a country’s aspiration to expand trade 
relations or to integrate more closely into European structures, 
including the desire to preside over the OSCE. And secondly, if the 
emergence of such a political will, for whatever reasons, is 
improbable, one can assist in preparing for such reforms in the future 
when either the necessary political will would emerge, or there is a 
change of power creating more favourable conditions. Such 
assistance can be provided by helping with the creation of a viable 
concept for such reforms, producing ideas and promoting 
educational programmes.  
Such strategies should be directed in equal measure towards all 
c o m p o n e n t s  o f  d e m o c r a t i c  r e f o r m  i n  the region: legislative, institutional 
and judicial. 
To concentrate assistance on personnel retaining, capacity-building is 
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and unreformed institutions. Frequently, such programmes lead to the 
opposite result, leading the personnel of official institutions to be more 
cynical and legally ignorant. Therefore the programmes aimed at achieving 
reform should encompass to some extent all three components, and only in 
the context of reforming the legislation and the institutions can one speak 
about the need for educational courses and training and programmes. 
3.4.5 The implementation of programmes should be coordinated as much as 
possible. 
Various international organisations, including interstate ones, frequently 
implement the same programmes in the sphere of human rights, and, 
unfortunately, with the same low degree of efficiency. External and internal 
actors should be brought together into a serious coalition to be able to carry 
out similar programmes to facilitate reforms in the sphere of the rule of law 
and promotion of human rights and freedoms. In doing so, the strategies 
and programmes will probably differ substantially from one country in the 
region to another. | 43  
 
 
4.  THE EU AND KAZAKHSTAN: 
IS THE PURSUIT OF ENERGY AND 
SECURITY COOPERATION COMPATIBLE 
WITH PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND DEMOCRATIC REFORMS?  
BHAVNA DAVE
∗ 
Introduction 
Kazakhstan’s continuing socioeconomic and political stability, a formal 
commitment to political reforms and an avowed pro-Western orientation 
make it the European Union’s most reliable partner in the Central Asian 
region. Kazakhstan’s expanding economic and security partnership with 
Europe is part of its ‘multivectoral’ foreign policy geared at balancing its 
ties with Russia, China, the Western states and the Muslim world. 
Kazakhstan has skilfully utilised its geostrategic location as a corridor 
between Asia and Europe and the country’s rising profile as the leading oil 
exporter to Europe after Russia (almost 80% of EU imports from 
Kazakhstan consist of fuel) to carve out a special niche for itself within the 
European market. 
A telling indicator of Kazakhstan’s ambition to seek a prominent role 
within Europe was the intense diplomatic lobbying by Astana, 
accompanied by a large-scale public relations exercise, to attain the rotating 
OSCE chair for the year 2009. After a year-long delay, the ministerial 
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meeting of the 56 participating states of the OSCE eventually agreed at a 
meeting in Madrid in late November 2007, that Kazakhstan should take up 
the chairmanship of the Organisation in 2010, a year later than what 
Kazakhstan had bid for. The lack of a consensus within the OSCE had led 
to a postponement of a decision on Kazakhstan’s chairmanship as the US 
and the UK withheld support by questioning Kazakhstan’s commitment to 
human rights and democracy. 
The decision on Kazakhstan’s bid for the OSCE chairmanship was a 
critical moment in defining whether Kazakhstan, which had secured the 
backing of Russia, most other Soviet successor states and a growing 
number of West European states, will work to promote a set of common 
values and a commitment to democracy and human rights or whether it 
will serve to foster the claim by Russia and other post-Soviet states, also 
affirmed earlier by Kazakhstani leaders, that the organisation was 
increasingly being divided between a ‘first tier’ and ‘second’ tier’ set of 
nations. After a renewed pledge by Kazakhstan in late November 2007 to 
work to preserve the long-established practice within the organisation of 
decision-making through consensus, as well as to safeguard the election 
monitoring missions of the OSCE and the Warsaw-based Office of 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which had been 
criticised by Russia, the US dropped its objections to its candidacy. Thus, 
the goal of preserving the unity of the OSCE and its election monitoring 
missions has clearly taken precedence over those of human rights and 
democratisation. Kazakhstan obtained the 2010 chair by fostering a 
cautious optimism among the OSCE member states in Kazakhstan’s ability 
to use its good relations with Russia to safeguard the unity of the 
organisation. Although the decision in Madrid attaches little conditionality 
to the offer of chairmanship of the organisation, it does suggest an 
acceptance by Kazakhstan of some implicit conditions, judging by the 
detailed pledge made by Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin in 
accepting the offer.1 
In a separate vein, although the new EU Strategy on Central Asia (see 
Annex 3 at the end of this book) broadly pledges commitment to three key 
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aims – security, democracy and development – and defines the promotion 
of good governance and democracy as focal areas for Kazakhstan, it 
refrains from spelling out concrete benchmarks for progress in these areas. 
The EU’s decision to suspend the sanctions on Uzbekistan, which had been 
imposed in May 2005 in response to the refusal by Tashkent to allow an 
international investigation into the Andizhan events, suggests that i) the 
EU lacks effective leverage over key Central Asian states; but more 
particularly ii) the German-led EU presidency of the first half of 2006 set 
the agenda for Brussels to prioritise economic, energy and security 
cooperation over political reforms and commitment to human rights. This 
was reflected in the endorsement of Kazakhstan’s bid for the OSCE 
chairmanship by the German-led EU presidency, notwithstanding 
criticisms by leading Kazakhstani political and civil rights activists as well 
as international human rights organisations of Kazakhstan’s lack of 
commitment to human rights and democracy.2 Recognising the vital 
position to be assumed by Kazakhstan in 2010, this paper emphasises two 
key points: 
1.  the EU should continue to refine its strategy towards Central Asia by 
recognising Kazakhstan as a strategic anchor in the region and 
encourage it to play a more responsible role in aiding stability, 
security and effective governance; and 
2.  the EU should give priority to the promotion of democratic reforms 
and the transparency of political and economic processes together 
with its emphasis on aiding good governance, which can turn 
Kazakhstan into a more reliable partner for the EU and also help 
Kazakhstani leadership to serve as a positive engine for reform in the 
broader region. 
Clearly, the EU Strategy on Central Asia has acquired a sharper focus 
now as a result of the OSCE decision to strengthen Europe’s engagement in 
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Kazakhstan and across the region. In order for this engagement to be 
effective, the EU must work actively to develop a more comprehensive, 
differentiated, and at the same time balanced approach towards the five 
states of Central Asia. These states vary enormously in their economic and 
human potential and in their willingness and ability to implement political 
reforms. As the richest state with the most dynamic indicators of economic 
and human development, Kazakhstan’s record in promoting economic and 
political reforms needs to be assessed by making appropriate comparisons 
with other members of the ‘New Europe’ and not simply be seen as ‘better’ 
than that of the repressive regimes in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan or as 
‘impressive’ in contrast to the continuing instability and donor dependency 
of the two weakest Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
Having accepted Kazakhstan’s bid for the OSCE chairmanship in 2010, and 
spurned those who called for making a successful bid conditional upon 
implementing democratic reforms, the EU must not only work actively to 
promote a partnership with Kazakhstan based on shared interests, but also 
take the lead in establishing shared values.  
4.1  Economic success and political leadership 
Thanks to its enormous oil and mineral wealth, Kazakhstan boasts one of 
the most successful and competitive economies in the former Soviet sphere. 
Its economy has grown from $18 billion in 2000 to nearly $80 billion in mid-
2007 and is predicted to double in the next 7-8 years. Having already 
achieved recognition by the EU and the US Department of Commerce as a 
country with a market economy, Kazakhstan is aiming to attain WTO 
accession in the near future and be among the top 50 most competitive 
economies in the world within the next decade. Its GDP accounts for 
almost two-thirds of the combined GDP of Central Asian states and is 
likely to grow further, although slower than projected earlier due to delays 
in oil production in the Kashagan oilfield. The gap between its economy 
and that of its neighbours is increasing rapidly. Already the leading 
investor in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan has made significant investments in 
Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine, and is moving fast to invest in the gas 
sector in Turkmenistan. 
Kazakhstan’s economic success hinges on what President Nursultan 
Nazarbaev has tirelessly acclaimed as the ‘ethnic peace and political 
stability’ forged by his leadership. Nazarbaev’s Strategy 2030 has outlined a 
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economic success of Kuwait, and the social harmony, political stability and 
development levels of Western societies within the next two decades. This 
promise of stability and prosperity, to be materialised by oil wealth, has 
enabled Nazarbaev’s regime to garner considerable domestic support, 
mould public opinion and manufacture legitimacy.  
In propounding the view that democracy can only be built on a 
sound economic footing and in a stable political environment, Nazarbaev 
and leading members of the ruling elites are championing a vision of 
‘managed democracy’ that resembles the one prevalent in Russia, and has 
some parallels with the model followed in Singapore and Malaysia, than 
the practice in Western Europe and in other established democracies. By 
establishing an essential linkage between economic prosperity, socio-
political stability and democracy, the ruling elites, now linked with the Nur 
Otan party, have gone on to craft the country’s legislative and electoral 
institutions in a way that assures them a continuing mandate after pushing 
all other parties out of the formal political process. Having won the 
presidential elections in December 2005 by obtaining 91% vote, Nazarbaev 
went on to secure all seats for his party Nur Otan in the elections to the 
lower house of the parliament (Mazhilis) in August 2007. In early 2007, the 
largest pro-regime party Otan refashioned itself into an enlarged entity Nur 
Otan after other pro-regime parties – Asar, founded by Dariga Nazarbaeva; 
the Civil Party of Kazakhstan sponsored by the ‘Eurasia Group’ headed by 
the oligarchs Alexander Mashkevich, Patokh Shodiev and Alizhan 
Ibragimov; and the Agrarian Party of Kazakhstan – merged with it and 
elected Nazarbaev as their supreme leader.  
The parliamentary elections were held two years ahead of schedule 
following a spate of constitutional amendments which lifted the two-term 
limit on Kazakhstan’s ‘First President’ and effectively paved the way for 
him to become president for life. The amendments also transformed the 77-
member Mazhilis into a 107-member chamber in which 98 deputies are 
elected on the basis of a party list system on proportional vote, eliminating 
single member constituencies, including the right to seek election as an 
independent. The remaining nine are elected by the Assembly of Peoples of 
Kazakhstan, a body created at the personal initiative of Nazarbaev in the 
1990s and permanently chaired by him. It provides for a symbolic 
representation to ethnic minority figures who owe their position to the 
patronage of the regime rather than to the support of their ethnic 
communities.  48 | BHAVNA DAVE 
 
Nazarbaev and the top ruling authorities in Kazakhstan were fully 
aware that a positive assessment by the OSCE-ODIHR of the elections was 
to be crucial in strengthening Kazakhstan’s bid for the OSCE chairmanship. 
All previous elections in Kazakhstan had fallen short of this norm. 
Independent observers characterise this outcome as the resurrection of the 
‘Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic’, with Nur Otan stepping into the 
position held by the Communist Party during the Soviet years.3 Prominent 
figures within the government have since intensified international public 
relations campaigns by extolling Kazakhstan’s ‘democratic’ achievements 
and averring that a ‘one-party system’ may in fact be a stronger guarantor 
of ‘stability’. 
The Soviet-style vote in support of the incumbent in the 2005 
presidential election and the election of the parliament composed entirely 
by a single party Nur Otan which is named after the president suggest that 
the political system in Kazakhstan hinges more on Nazarbaev than ever 
before. All potential contenders for the presidential office, including 
successors from within the ‘family’ ranks, have been sidelined. Dariga 
Nazarbaeva failed to obtain nomination on the Nur Otan ticket after her 
party Asar merged into the former, and she has kept a very low profile 
since her husband Rakhat Aliev (whom she promptly divorced in June 
2007), was charged with the kidnapping and murder of senior officials in 
Nurbank as well as of corruption and money laundering. Kazakhstan is 
seeking his extradition from Austria, where he had been posted as 
ambassador and was most active in procuring support for Kazakhstan’s 
candidacy for the OSCE chair. The Austrian court has rejected the request 
for Aliev’s extradition as the Kazakhstani authorities have begun a trial of 
him and his associates (most of whom are abroad) in absentia. In addition 
to owning numerous businesses, media channels and stocks in banks and 
other companies together with Nazarbaeva, Aliev exerted a strong 
influence over the National Security Committee in which he had held the 
position of a senior Deputy Chairman. Now writing his memoirs called 
‘Godfather-in-law’, Aliev has alleged that the media outlets owned by him 
have been illegally transferred to the financial group Kazakhmys to prevent 
the publication of materials implicating top officials in financial misdeeds 
and in ordering the killing of the opposition leader Altynbek Sarsembaev in 
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February 2006. In an interview with Radio Free Europe in October 2007, 
Aliev held Nazarbaev personally responsible for these killings and 
promised to produce evidence ‘in due course.’4 Kazakhstani officials are 
anxious to prevent him from possibly testifying in the ‘Kazakhgate’ 
hearings in the US involving alleged kickbacks from Western oil interests, 
or from revealing other incriminating details concerning the President and 
key figures within the government. Given that Aliev himself has been a 
highly controversial figure who has alienated many influential people 
within the regime, as well as in the opposition, it is not ruled out that he 
may still strike some sort of a deal with the Kazakhstani authorities. 
Timur Kulibaev, who is married to Nazarbaev’ second daughter 
Dinara, has amassed vast wealth and influence through control over the oil 
and pipeline business and held various leading positions in the energy 
sector of the country. Unlike Aliev and Dariga Nazarbaeva, who together 
harboured political ambitions, the Kulibaevs have not sought to hold any 
political office and concentrated only on expanding their financial empire 
(both were listed in the Forbes 2007 list of the world’s richest billionaires).5 
Incidentally, the remaining five Kazakhs on the Forbes list control three of 
the most influential financial groups (Alexander Mashkevich and Alijan 
Ibragimov of the Eurasia Group, Vladimir Kim of the Kazakhmys Group, 
and Nurzhan Subkhanberdin, the Kazkommertsbank Group).6 As in 
Russia, the leading ‘oligarchs’ in Kazakhstan have not sought a formal 
political position though they indeed constitute a key pillar of support to 
the regime and exert considerable informal influence in a political system 
that lacks transparency. In what may be an important signal to domestic 
and international observers that Nazarbaev is not preparing to hand over 
power to any contender within the family, in September 2007 Kulibaev was 
removed from the post of president of the newly formed holding company 
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Samruk, which manages the top energy companies of Kazakhstan. 
However, there is no evidence of decline in his economic influence.  
Two of Kazakhstan’s most prominent financial groups – the Eurasia 
Group and the Kazakhmys Corporation – are very closely associated with 
Nazarbaev and are among the key sponsors of the party Nur Otan. The 
Eurasia Group (Eurasia Natural Resources Corporation) owns various 
industrial enterprises and mining business which are estimated to account 
for about 15% of the GDP of the country. It made a net income of $1.26 
billion in 2006 on revenues of $3.26 billion.7 The Kazakhmys Corporation, 
which is managed by two Kazakhstani Koreans Vladimir Kim and 
Vladimir Ni (who has now retired), controls key mineral resources and 
metal industries. Its revenues rose from $2.28 billion to $2.79 billion in 2007 
and it became a member of the UK FTSE 100 stock-market index. Its 
president Vladimir Kim, worth $5.5 billion, headed the list of 7 Kazakh 
billionaires on the Forbes list. 
Overall, Kazakhstan’s relative economic well-being and socio-
political stability can be attributed to 1) a firm control and management by 
President Nazarbaev of the country’s enormous oil and natural gas 
reserves, combined with mineral wealth, which have attracted some $34 
billion in foreign direct investment since 1991; and 2) a skilled 
disbursement of this wealth and political privileges to the urban, highly-
skilled technocratic class, bureaucrats, government officials as well as 
entrepreneurs through the use of patronage, balancing of clan and 
ethnicity-based attachments, and rewards for political loyalty.  
Having held the top leadership position since 1989 under Soviet rule, 
Nazarbaev has displayed considerable political acumen in steering his 
country along an economic transition to establish a modern, competitive, 
market-oriented economy. While showing remarkable pragmatism and 
flexibility in responding to new challenges, he has also skilfully improvised 
upon Soviet-era mechanisms of coercion and control for extracting the 
compliance of the citizenry to his particular form of rule. Nazarbaev has 
erected a patronage-based system in which the inner circle of family, 
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friends and business associates exerts formal and informal influence over 
vital economic resources, industries, political positions and media channels. 
Nazarbaev has continued to broaden and regenerate his clientelist base, 
offering rapid career advancement to technocratic elites and top level 
government bureaucrats. Political loyalty to the regime is the best means of 
attaining career mobility whereas the pursuit of independent political 
ambition invites severe sanctions.  
4.2  Internal political structure and stability 
Kazakhstan’s 1995 constitution and subsequent amendments have vested 
unlimited constitutional and de facto powers upon the office of the 
president in what already was a unitary, highly-centralised presidential 
system. Subsequent constitutional amendments have conferred immunity 
from prosecution to the ‘First President’ and will allow him to play an 
advisory role upon quitting office. The prime minister, who is appointed by 
the president, is a technical functionary entrusted with implementing socio-
economic policies and delivering results without challenging the authority 
of the president. The presidential administration, which is an extra-
constitutional structure beyond the purview of the parliament, exerts 
considerable power and influence, whereas the Council of Ministers 
headed by the prime minister forms the second, and subordinate, flank of 
the executive.  
A notable development since 2004 is the emergence of a third centre 
of power, although one still much weaker than the other two, in the 
growing influence of Kazakhstan’s Security Council.8 Currently headed by 
Berik Imashev (its previous heads were Marat Tazhin and Bulat 
Utemuratov – two of Nazarbaev’s closest confidantes), the Security Council 
has acquired a leading role in coordinating the activities of the law and 
order authorities, formally under the control of the Ministry of Interior 
Affairs, thus eroding the authority of the prime minister. Kazakhstan’s 
National Security Committee has also expanded its functions by launching 
anti-terrorist activities and intensifying monitoring of various religious 
groups, opposition and civil rights NGOs. Aliev, who has held a senior 
position in the National Security Council, is reported to have pockets of 
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influence within the security services. Kazakhstan’s top political 
establishment was shaken by the sensational posting of transcripts of 
recorded conversations purportedly among top government figures 
discussing illicit campaign-financing methods on two opposition websites 
(www.kub.kz and www.inkar.kz). The tapes contain a voice purported to 
be Nazarbaev’s, instructing an aide to induce some of the most influential 
entrepreneurs to make large-scale ‘donations’ to the Nur Otan Party.9 It is 
widely believed that people loyal to Aliev in the security services may have 
been responsible for obtaining the tapes and leaking them to the pro-
opposition websites. The government has reacted by practically imposing 
censorship and seeking to control flow of information over the Internet.  
The appointment of 41-year old Karim Masimov, an ethnic Uighur, 
fluent in English, Chinese and Arabic in addition to Russian, as prime 
minister early in 2007 brought several reform-oriented technocrats within 
the cabinet and led to significant changes within the government.10 Daniyal 
Akhmetov, who held the post earlier, now heads the Ministry of Defence. 
Tokaev now occupies the pivotal post of Chairman of the Senate. The post 
was previously held by Nurtai Abykaev, a kin of Nazarbaev and widely 
seen as a ‘grey cardinal’, presently ambassador to Russia. Abykaev’s 
temporary exit from the domestic scene may be geared at protecting him 
from rumours about his alleged complicity in the killing of Altynbek 
Sarsenbaev, a leader of the opposition party Nagyz Ak Zhol, in February 
2006. A number of former employees of the Ministry of Interior and the 
N a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  S e r v i c e ,  s o m e  o f  w h o m  w e r e  c l o s e l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
Abykaev, have been convicted in the Sarsenbaev murder case.11 Past trends 
indicate that the key figures within the inner circle have easily re-entered 
domestic politics after having held vital diplomatic posts abroad. 
Numerous Kazakhstani analysts note that a ‘compromise’ between Aliev 
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and Nazarbaev is not ruled out. Many also note the efforts to purge the 
National Security Council of Aliev loyalists by charging them of 
involvement in the murder of Sarsenbaev and in the kidnapping and 
murder of the two top Nurbank officials. 
With increasing evidence that Nazarbaev is neither preparing to 
nominate a successor nor faces any effective leadership challenge from 
within or from the opposition, two key members of the presidential inner 
circle – Kasymzhomart Tokaev and Marat Tazhin – are seen as the strong 
guarantors of Nazarbaev’s support base. Both owe their political 
prominence to their unswerving loyalty to the president and to their 
reputations for technocratic prowess, and are likely to play a decisive role 
in a battle for succession in the event of Nazarbaev’s sudden death. Tokaev, 
a Sinologist who has previously held the posts of Ambassador to China, 
Minister of External Affairs and Prime Minister, currently holds the crucial 
post of Chairman of the Senate, which has the constitutional authority to 
assume power in the event of the death or incapacitation of the president. 
Having headed the National Security Service in the past, Tazhin now holds 
the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. While Tokaev and Tazhin 
have strengthened their positions by demonstrating loyalty to the 
president, another close presidential associate Imangali Tasmagambetov, a 
former akim (head) of the oil-rich West Kazakhstan oblast and currently the 
akim (mayor) of Almaty city, is encountering growing criticism from 
Nazarbaev and other top figures for his handling of various land and 
property disputes in the city and may find himself in political disfavour. 
4.3  Foreign relations and oil export routes 
Kazakhstan has done well to exploit its territorial expanse and the need for 
multiple outlets for oil exports to follow what it terms a ‘multi-vectoral’ 
foreign policy. Rather than attaching priority to a single country, its foreign 
policy is geared at developing close partnerships with all of its neighbours 
and an active engagement in multilateral regional organisations, 
particularly the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Community 
(Eurasec) and the EU. This approach has allowed Kazakhstan to deepen its 
already close ties with Russia, expand economic, political and strategic 
cooperation with China, develop growing ties with the European Union 
a n d  p r o c u r e  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  U S .  I n  w h a t  i s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  r h e t o r i c a l  
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Nazarbaev has also called for establishing a Eurasian Economic Union on 
the model of the EU. Outlining Kazakhstan’s new military doctrine, the 
Defence Minister Daniyal Akhmetov acknowledged that participation in 
the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and military 
cooperation with its member states is a priority for Kazakhstan. As a key 
member of CSTO after Russia, Kazakhstan sees itself as better-placed to 
gradually build a further partnership with NATO and the US. While its 
relationship with Russia and key role in the CSTO is the primary source of 
security and diplomatic leverage, Kazakhstan’s political elite is eager to 
push for a closer collaboration with NATO and the US, particularly 
through participation in peace support operations. 
Without a doubt, Kazakhstan needs a close and preferential 
partnership with Russia to increase its oil exports, and thereby build a 
stronger economic base. At the same time, President Nazarbaev is also 
looking to diversify the country’s energy export routes. At present, the 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) linking the Tengiz oil field in 
Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiisk is the largest 
export route for transporting oil from Kazakhstan. It carried 31 million 
tonnes of oil from Kazakhstan in 2006 (above the design capacity of 27 
million tonnes annually for its first stage) and is planned to transport up to 
67 million tonnes annually in its second stage, which will allow Kazakhstan 
to transport this oil to Europe with Russia’s consent. Kazakhstan is seeking 
further oil export routes that complement, rather than compete with the 
routes offered by Russia. Russia remains keen to channel the main Central 
Asian energy export routes across its territory. In May 2007, President 
Putin persuaded Kazakhstan together with Turkmenistan to back 
Moscow’s plan to build a gas pipeline to bring gas from the two Central 
Asian countries along the Caspian shore and into Russia – rather than 
across the Caspian and the South Caucasus, the route favoured by the EU 
and the United States. 
China has also sought access to Kazakhstan’s energy resources. A 
1000 km-long pipeline linking Atasu in central Kazakhstan to Alashankou 
on the Chinese border is already operational and will provide a new source 
of oil for China to develop its western Xinjiang region as it is connected to 
the Caspian in 2008. Although further expansion of this route is planned, 
the high transportation costs make the economic benefits of the pipeline to 
Kazakhstan uncertain. The route currently has greater political than 
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Issues such as oil export routes and energy security are vital for the 
EU. Kazakhstan is the EU’s biggest trading partner in Central Asia, with 
bilateral trade worth over €15 billion. About 85% of Kazakhstan’s exports 
to the EU consist of oil and gas. Should the EU’s relationship with Russia 
be transformed and result in a much closer economic and strategic 
partnership, Kazakhstan’s partnership with the EU and participation in 
many of its programmes could be enhanced further. Since pipelines via 
Russia are still the most economical and politically reliable route for 
Kazakhstan, the balancing skills of Kazakhstan’s leadership will come 
under stress if the continuing differences between the EU and the OSCE on 
the one hand and Russia on the other are further exacerbated.  
Nazarbaev has already indicated a willingness to consider any 
pipeline route that could be “profitable for Kazakhstan”, while reiterating 
that it is a partner, and not a competitor with Russia in seeking to diversify 
its export routes. A continuing EU engagement can enable Kazakhstan to 
become more closely involved in extending the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline and possibly use its close ties with Russia to assuage the latter’s 
discontent over the route. 
Furthermore, closer cooperation between Kazakhstan and the EU is 
crucial in aiding the development of the trans-Caspian-trans-Black Sea 
energy transit corridor and for the Odessa-Brody pipeline. By aiding a 
diversification of oil export routes, the EU is keen to ensure a secure supply 
of oil and help Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to obtain higher 
export prices – notably for gas exports – and establish a stronger position 
vis-à-vis Russia. Kazakhstan has been steadily increasing its investment in 
Georgia, particularly in the transportation infrastructure, becoming the 
third major investor after the UK and the US. As a result, it is in a position 
to play an important role in achieving the EU’s aims in the south Caucasus 
through its investment in the economies of the region.12 Given the 
widespread agreement within the EU to support these pipeline routes and 
enhance energy security, there are four vital issues that the EU must 
address in expanding energy cooperation with Kazakhstan: 
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•  Ensuring transparent management of revenues from oil and gas 
through closer cooperation with international efforts in this area, such 
as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI).  
•  Implementing comprehensive policy measures for an equitable 
distribution of wealth and social welfare. Although poverty levels are 
declining, an estimated 16-18% of the population, a vast proportion of 
which resides in remote rural areas, live below the poverty line. 
Growing inflation and the rising prices of basic commodities such as 
bread as well as housing have hurt other social strata surviving just 
above the poverty line.  
•  Development of grassroots institutions for civic participation and 
lifting various legal barriers that restrict basic civil rights to public 
assembly and to participation in electoral contests. This will help to 
rectify the emphasis of the regime on promoting ‘democratisation 
from above’ (and presumably promote a more genuine 
democratisation). 
4.4  Realising the New EU strategy for Central Asia 
As the EU seeks to develop a coherent although internally-differentiated 
strategy towards its recent members, it must also be mindful of the shared 
historical experience of the Central Asian people as well as the significant 
variation in socio-economic development, reform-orientation and state 
capacity among them. Kazakhstan has shown a keen interest to participate 
in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), a privileged relationship 
between the EU and current non-member states around the borders of the 
EU that do not have the prospect for EU membership. Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, the European Commissioner for External Relations and European 
Neighbourhood Policy, emphasised developing a more differentiated 
approach by the EU and establishing a unique relationship towards each of 
the Central Asian states.13 
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Kazakhstan has continued to emphasise its ‘Eurasian’ status, 
underscoring its geographical, historical and ethno-cultural ties with 
Europe and the desire to play a prominent role in the Western club of 
nations on the basis of its enormous size and economic potential. Although 
pragmatic considerations push the present Kazakh leadership to maintain a 
balance between Russia, China and the West, a growing stratum of its 
elites, in many cases educated in the West, are fully cognizant of the 
advantages to be attained from a close and growing multilateral 
partnership with Europe. They see Europe as providing vital technical 
assistance in modernising Kazakhstan’s educational, health and social 
infrastructure, in addition to reforming its economy. 
If Kazakhstan is the obvious candidate for regional leadership and 
the most reliable partner for the EU in the region, it is in large part due to 
the failure of Uzbekistan, a powerful contender for regional leadership, to 
utilise its enormous potential despite possessing the most diversified 
economic infrastructure and human capital. President Islam Karimov’s 
resistance to reforms has generated a systemic socio-economic crisis that 
the Uzbek regime is tackling through an alarming use of repression since 
the killings in Andijan in May 2005. Succession in Uzbekistan is unlikely to 
be as smooth as in Turkmenistan, which appears to be taking incremental 
measures to engage with the outside world and extricate itself from the 
personality cult of its ex-leader Saparmurat Niyazov. This turns Uzbekistan 
into the gravest long-term threat to stability in the region. While committed 
to establishing relatively open political systems, both Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan are weak states lacking resource wealth, plagued by poor 
governance capacity, and dependent on donor support. 
However, the EU must not succumb to the facile reasoning that 
Kazakhstan is far ‘better’, and ‘more democratic’ than the rest in the region 
which is seen as lacking structural and cultural conditions to build 
democratic institutions and processes. Such a view can easily lapse into 
condoning the Kazakhstani regime’s formalistic and instrumental pledge to 
introduce political reforms and reinforcing its fixation with ‘stability’. As a 
fast expanding economy with a GDP that is currently almost two-thirds 
that of the entire Central Asian region, Kazakhstan’s record in promoting 
democracy and human development needs to be assessed in comparison 
with other post-communist states that have a comparable success in 
establishing market economies and aiding privatisation. While sensitivity 
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Soviet years – is necessary, ‘culture’ should not be viewed as a static 
variable hampering democratic development. The powerful resistance 
within Kazakhstan to creating an open media and a competitive political 
system comes from groups and interests within the present regime who 
have accumulated enormous wealth, sought to legitimise these by 
acquiring political office and denying their opponents a share in the 
country’s political institutions.  
Kazakhstan’s present political elites, despite having skilfully branded 
themselves as reform-oriented technocrats, secular and pro-Western in 
outlook, are isolated from the citizenry and lack a strong social base or 
significant popular support. Their political career and economic well-being 
are dependent on demonstrating loyalty to the president and refraining 
from assuming an active political or social role. These elites are 
concentrated in the former capital Almaty and the new capital Astana, 
where voter turnout in the August 2007 parliamentary election was the 
lowest, 22% and 42% respectively. Independent observers and opposition 
activists in Almaty claim that the turnout was in fact only 16%, which cast 
doubt on the validity of the votes. Of those who voted for the opposition 
Social Democratic Party, official data show that 10.6% of voters were in 
Astana and 21.5% in Almaty.14 
These figures suggest two key trends: 1) that an important section of 
the inhabitants of these two cities, which have benefited the most from the 
reforms, are disinterested in voting in elections that provide no real contest; 
and 2) a significant proportion among them are inclined to support non-
regime parties, including the opposition (the opposition claims to have 
obtained a far greater percentage of votes than indicated by the official 
figures). While neither the EU member countries nor other Western states 
have the capacity to directly aid pro-reform and democratic forces in the 
country, it is at least vital to be aware of the underlying pluralism and 
political differences within Kazakhstan’s top political elites and upper 
middle classes and be cognizant of how the regime has rewarded 
compliance and political apathy under the guise of promoting ‘stability’. 
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4.5  Kazakhstan’s OSCE chairmanship of 2010 and commitment to 
political reforms 
As noted above, Kazakhstan’s ruling elites were fully aware of the need to 
ensure that the presidential election of 2005 and the parliamentary elections 
of August 2007 met the basic international standard as spelled out by the 
OSCE to boost their candidacy for its chairmanship of the organisation. 
While there were fewer technical and procedural violations in both the 2005 
presidential elections and the 2007 parliamentary elections, the entire 
administrative and propaganda machinery worked together to favour the 
incumbent and discredit the opponents.15 Nazarbaev secured another 7-
year term by garnering 91% of the vote, an outcome that would be 
considered implausible and even illegitimate in a democratic or 
democratising country. Referring to him as ‘Mr 91 percent’, independent 
journalists have warned about the impending ‘100 percent’ scenario in the 
next presidential elections, originally scheduled for 2012. However, 
amendments passed in May-June 2007 have reduced the presidential term 
from 7 to 5 years, which means that the next presidential elections will be 
due in 2010, the year when Kazakhstan will chair the OSCE. There may be 
a distinct possibility that elections could be held earlier.  
Attaining the OSCE chair and gaining a visible niche within the 
European framework had become a matter of status and prestige for the 
Nazarbaev regime. Kazakhstan has already hailed the decision as a major 
diplomatic victory. But such a victory also opens it up to far greater 
scrutiny of fellow OSCE member states, the EU, as well as international 
human rights organisations. 
Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin’s speech to the OSCE 
meeting in Madrid in November 2007 contains an outline of the accepted 
conditions and an impassioned pledge to comply with the OSCE’s 
commitment to democracy and human rights.16 He pledged to amend 
Kazakhstan’s highly restrictive Media Law as well as the Law on Elections 
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by taking into consideration the OSCE’s recommendations. In amending 
the Media Law, he promised in particular to “withdraw draft laws that 
would increase liabilities for defamation in the media; instead, consider 
reduction of criminal liability for defamation; support the development of 
self-regulation mechanisms of the media; and liberalise registration 
procedures for media outlets, in consultations among authorities, 
journalists, and the OSCE.” The pledge to reform the Law on Elections 
promised to liberalise registration requirements for political parties; 
implement ODIHR’s recommendations on the functioning of political 
parties and on media coverage of elections and to enhance local 
representative bodies within the overall system of government. However, 
this pledge still lacks any substantive plans to review the May 2007 
amendments on electing members of the Mazhilis which have made the 
legal framework for elections even more restrictive and are inimical to the 
development of a truly competitive democratic system. First, the 
requirement that all candidates be elected according to a party list on a 
proportional basis has eliminated elections by single mandate vote and 
privileged loyalty to the party over accountability to one’s electorate. 
Second, in requiring the candidates to be members of parties, citizens are 
denied the right to seek election as individuals or as independent 
nominees. Third, the 7% threshold is too high in a country where the ruling 
party already dominated the previous Mazhilis elected in 2004. Finally, the 
provision to reserve 9 seats for members of ethnic minorities, who are to be 
elected by the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan (APK), fails to provide 
for a democratic method of representing ethnic minorities. The APK is an 
appointed body that meets under the chairmanship of the president, who is 
its patron and benefactor. At the same time, ethnic minorities lack any 
mechanism of participating in the appointment of their 
representatives. 
4.6  Can the Kazakh political elite reconcile the practice of 
democracy with its vision of prosperity? 
Nazarbaev and his associates continue to contend that democracy can 
e m e r g e  o n l y  o n  t h e  b a c k  o f  e c o n o m i c  p r o s p e r i t y  a n d  s o c i a l  s t a b i l i t y .  
Increasing oil exports and high global oil prices have propelled 
Kazakhstan’s economic growth to over 8% annually since 1998, in which oil 
revenues accounted for about two-thirds of the country’s budgetary 
revenues in 2006. As Kazakhstan aims to join the ranks of the top five oil THE EU AND KAZAKHSTAN | 61 
 
exporters by the year 2015, oil will account for over three-fourths of its 
budgetary revenues. However, Kazakhstan was forced to revise its 
economic growth projections from 9% to about 5% in 2008 due to the delay 
in starting commercial oil production in the Kashagan oilfield, which have 
also made the government lower its projected oil export target by some 
20%.17 Financial experts have been warning about increasing instability of 
Kazakhstan’s financial markets with international ratings agency such as 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) downgrading its sovereign credit rating in 
October 2007 to the lowest investment grade category BBB-, and Moody’s 
also downgrading the debt ratings of prominent Kazakhstani banks.  
The promise of rising prosperity, which has allowed Nazarbaev to 
muster considerable popular support and legitimacy, will be harder to 
deliver in 2008, when Kazakhstan will begin repaying foreign loans 
following heavy borrowings. Inflation, at 18% in late 2007, is likely to soar 
as prices of essential commodities and real estate continue to increase. The 
real estate market in Almaty and Astana has become overheated with 
prices increasing at least eight-fold over the past 6-7 years. An economic 
setback could spur the lower strata of the population, who have remained 
apolitical but supportive of the government, to demand greater material 
and social security and shake Kazakhstan’s ‘stable’ political system.  
The Kazakhstani political establishment tends to equate any reference 
to the promotion of democratisation and civil society as the imposition of a 
Western ideological agenda which is fraught with negative and 
destabilising consequences. The state-regulated media skilfully portray the 
‘colour revolutions’ in the near abroad as a popular outpouring against 
economic discontent and which has only exacerbated lawlessness. Such 
propaganda has had a considerable effect in inoculating the ordinary 
people ‘against political change’ to support ‘stability’ and in equating 
democracy with social unrest and Western propaganda. 
Voicing its commitment to establish a ‘responsible’ civil society, 
Kazakhstan’s ruling elites have used economic carrots, political control and 
electoral mandates to pressure non-governmental organisations and 
independent political parties to forge a ‘constructive partnership’ with the 
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government. As the government has stepped up funding to loyal or pro-
government NGOs (a new legislation now lifts the limits placed on the 
government to fund them), NGOs engaged in advocacy of civil rights and 
political reforms who are dependent on foreign donors and their activities 
have come under continuing surveillance through financial audits and 
other forms of control. Much of Kazakhstan’s much-acclaimed social and 
ethnic stability is achieved by curtailing civil and political rights and 
rewarding a culture of civic apathy and political disengagement. 
So far the Nazarbaev leadership has opted incrementally to allow 
‘democratisation from above’ by initially overseeing the emergence of a 
multi-party system and then streamlining it into a one-party system, 
regulating electoral competition, and attempting to create a structure of 
NGOs and civil society that is loyal to the regime. The state-appointed 
Commission on Democratisation and Civil Society devotes itself to this 
task. The reforms proposed by the regime in response to the mounting 
pressure from the OSCE, particularly the US, have been formalistic and 
cosmetic. The government tends to announce its desire and commitment to 
political reforms in the presence of leading international actors, but often 
fails to follow up with appropriate legislation and implementation. Just a 
few days before the high-profile annual meeting of Eurasian Media Forum 
in 2007 organised by Dariga Nazarbaeva, a new, more liberal draft media 
law was introduced in the parliament.18 Though the draft media law eases 
restrictions on freedom of information and media registration, it retains the 
provisions that prosecute journalists for writing articles that undermine 
“the honour and dignity of the president”. The OSCE, and leading 
international media watchdogs such as Freedom House, have called for the 
abolition of this particular clause. Thus the pledge by Foreign Minister 
Tazhin at the Madrid meeting needs to be followed through with a 
comprehensive and substantive set of reforms. 
Notwithstanding the incremental promotion of democratisation from 
above, it is vital to note that neither the regime, nor international actors can 
fashion the development of democracy and civil society in the desired 
direction. The Kazakhstani ruling elites’ support to democratisation may be 
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largely instrumental and self-serving, but it still provides an opening for 
long-term processes conducive to political liberalisation, transparency and 
civic participation.  
The Kazakhstani ruling elites’ support to democratisation may be 
largely instrumental and self-serving, but it still provides an opening for 
long-term processes conducive to political liberalisation, transparency and 
civic participation. Leading Kazakhstani human rights activists have 
expressed a cautious optimism that the increased international spotlight on 
Kazakhstan as the first non-European OSCE chair could herald greater 
political reforms, whereas a denial of the chairmanship would have 
certainly deprived its political elites of much incentive to reform and 
pushed them further towards Russia.  
The EU needs to have a much clearer approach in emphasising the 
need for substantive democratisation policies to ensure that the award of 
the OSCE chair does not simply put a seal of international legitimacy on a 
regime that has not yet proved that it shares the core values of democracy 
and human rights. 
Kazakhstan has a great potential to play a positive role in bridging 
the growing rift between the EU and Russia. A greater transparency will 
allow its political elites to strike a more effective balance between Russia, 
the EU and China. Some policy analysts have suggested that the EU can 
strengthen its role in Central Asia by forging a partnership with the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which includes all Central 
Asian states except Turkmenistan, Russia and China. While urging that the 
EU’s Central Asia strategy must make a closer case for EU-SCO links, it is 
vital also to note that ‘economic’ and ‘security’ issues do not push out the 
commitment to promote democratic and governance reforms.19 
4.7  Conclusion: Long-term prospects for reforms 
Despite the numerous shortcomings of its political system, Kazakhstan 
possesses the various supporting conditions for achieving a transition to 
democracy in the long run. This is because the establishment of a 
competitive, market economy has unleashed several processes that indicate 
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a long-term trend towards democratisation. Among the most significant of 
these are the emergence of a private and competitive educational system, 
the rise of an upper middle class, the introduction of a modicum of 
electoral competition, and a strong desire among the political elite and the 
educated citizenry to be part of a ‘European’ framework. These resonate 
with the emphasis on education and human development in the EU 
Strategy on Central Asia. 
To be sure, the rapid emergence of a market economy has generated 
stark economic disparities and weakened the social safety network, as it 
has enhanced the ability of the regime to use patronage and sanctions to 
subordinate private business. Markets have not produced an independent 
entrepreneurial class or facilitated the expansion of a middle class that can 
press for political and economic reforms to limit the role of the state. On the 
contrary, business interests and entrepreneurs remain dependent on 
governmental patronage and goodwill. 
When the development of institutions of political representation and 
civil participation do not keep pace with the rapid rise in oil-based 
revenues, it becomes ever more challenging to establish a rule of law, 
accountability and transparency. In order to cushion the economy from 
fluctuating global oil prices, Kazakhstan set up the National Oil Fund in 
2000. Its reserves have already grown to $20 billion, thanks to high world 
prices of oil. However, questions pertaining to the transparency, 
management and redistribution of oil fund revenues have not been 
addressed. 
The EU must develop a nuanced approach in urging compliance with 
these recommendations, offer sustained support to building mechanisms of 
transparency and accountability in political processes and financial 
dealings and renounce the cliché of the ‘preservation of stability’ so 
beloved by the ruling group in Kazakhstan. It must ensure that the desire 
to secure further cooperation in the energy sector does not derail pursuit of 
its fundamental aims.  
While the EU strategy towards the region understandably couples 
security and energy interests, such a strategy cannot be de-linked from an 
overall emphasis on political reforms and transparency.20 According 
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priority to energy and security interests over democracy and institution-
building is harmful in the longer run. Cultivation of close cooperation in 
energy and economic issues without a simultaneous emphasis on pursuing 
political reforms, combating corruption and encouraging civic participation 
will be detrimental to both EU and to Kazakhstani citizenry in the longer 
run. In the absence of a democratic framework, such cooperation can only 
aid technocratic purposes, benefit the top strata of society and produce a 
new class of professional technocrats interested in enhancing their career 
prospects and perpetuating rather than reforming the present system. 
Together with the OSCE, the EU must emphasise the urgency for 
Kazakhstan to launch a set of comprehensive democratic reforms that can 
provide the basis for a sustainable process of political reform in the 
country. This emphasis offers incentive and hope to the pro-reform elite 
within the government, civil rights NGOs as well as the growing middle 
class to press for political reforms in order to be more closely tied with 
Europe. 
4.8  Recommendations to the EU 
The following recommendations identify a set of reforms that the EU 
should seek to promote in Kazakhstan through its engagement with a 
dialogue focused on developing concrete ways to implement such reforms. 
•  Lift all constraints on the civil right to public assembly. Kazakhstan must 
scrap the numerous legal restrictions on freedom of assembly. Under 
current provisions, prior permission from the Ministry of the Interior 
is required in order to organise any public meeting. Existing laws and 
informal actions prevent opposition and civil society groups from 
holding a public meeting in any of the central areas of the major 
cities. The planning of the new capital Astana and the various 
construction projects in the city allow the government to control 
public space and make it logistically difficult for citizens to organise 
public meetings in any of the central areas. The authorities 
deliberately attribute a subversive and destabilising agenda to even 
the smallest act of public protests as they seek to preserve ‘stability’ 
by rewarding political apathy and lack of civic activism. 
•  Introduce substantive measures to ensure the independence and openness of 
the media. Kazakhstan’s media is privately-owned but controlled 
almost entirely by major financial groups affiliated with key members 
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parties. Kazakhstan must be encouraged to repeal its highly 
restrictive media law which currently makes it impossible for banned 
news outlets to re-register or for a banned journalist to be absorbed in 
the existing media channels. The clauses about protecting the 
“honour and dignity of the president” in the law, other anti-libel 
provisions as well as anti-terrorism legislation are widely used to 
restrict basic media freedoms.  
•  Review the 2007 amendments providing for electing Mazhilis (the lower 
house) deputies on a party list based on proportional vote with a high 7% 
threshold. Kazakhstan has not complied with any of the 
recommendations made by the OSCE-ODIHR to reform its Law on 
Elections. Instead, the 2007 constitutional amendments provide for 98 
out of 107 Mazhilis seats to be elected on a party list based on 
proportional vote, setting a high 7% barrier. This system produced 
only one winner as all other parties failed to cross the stipulated 7% 
threshold. Kazakhstan must be persuaded to adopt a mixed system 
which i) combines voting for party lists with single mandate voting; 
ii) lowers the required threshold for political parties; and iii) removes 
the clauses that bar a person convicted of an administrative offence 
from contesting elections. Independent and opposition figures have 
routinely faced politically-motivated charges of economic 
misdemeanours, some of which have been upheld by the courts, in 
turn disqualifying them from standing for any public office.  
•  Ensure independence and impartiality of the Central Election Commission 
(CEC). Under the present system, the presidential administration 
maintains complete control over the appointment of the CEC. The 
latter in turn has an uncontested mandate to appoint lower-level 
election commissioners. This system rests on patronage and has 
allowed the regime to successfully utilise the so-called 
‘administrative resources’ in order to produce a desirable electoral 
outcome. The Election Commission is fully loyal to the president who 
handpicks its members. Orderly organisation of elections and 
successful delivery of expected results have opened up further career 
paths for the chairman and other members of the CEC. The EU, 
together with the OSCE, must press for reforms that limit the power 
of the president to appoint members of the CEC and regional and 
district and local election commissioners and allow an effective say to 
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•  Provide for proper procedures for electing local elections: Foreign Minister 
Tazhin reiterated his commitment to enlarge powers of local 
representative bodies within the overall system of government. But in 
a political framework where the parliament is entirely constituted by 
the pro-presidential party Nur Otan, and the members of the Election 
Commission at all levels are dependent on the regime’s patronage, 
enlarging powers of local bodies or providing for direct elections will 
have no positive effect. Local reforms must be carried out in 
conjunction with reforms at the higher levels.  
•  Ensure independence of the judiciary. Under the country’s strong 
executive system based on presidential patronage, the judiciary, like 
the legislative branch, has remained loyal to the regime. The judiciary 
has continued to protect the interests of the state and its functionaries 
rather than those of individuals, minorities and the weaker strata of 
society. Despite notable improvement in wages and professional 
training for judges, Kazakhstan’s judiciary has a very poor record in 
handling cases related to civil liberties and human rights and has not 
issued a single verdict in the past decade that acquitted members of 
the opposition or independent journalists in respect to charges 
brought against them by individuals affiliated with the regime. The 
EU strategy has defined the judiciary as one of the focal areas in 
Kazakhstan for promoting reforms. If this focus is to be effective, the 
EU needs to develop a more nuanced approach towards promoting 
legal-judicial reforms and ensure that reforms of a technical nature 
(i.e. the introduction of jury trials, the improvement of training and 
salaries for judges) go hand in hand with promoting judicial 
independence. 
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5.  THE EU AND UZBEKISTAN: 
WHERE TO GO FROM HERE? 
MICHAEL HALL
∗ 
Introduction 
In 2005, following the suppression of the Andijon uprising, the European 
Union, alone among world powers, took a necessary and principled stance 
towards the regime of Uzbekistan’s President Islom Karimov. A visa ban 
was imposed on officials believed to be involved in the indiscriminate 
killing of mostly unarmed civilians, an embargo was placed on arms 
shipments to Uzbekistan and high-level bilateral relations were frozen. 
Now, almost two years later, the strain in relations appears to be taking its 
toll on both sides. The Uzbek government has made tentative overtures to 
the EU, and there are indications that some in the EU are willing to accept 
such overtures at face value in the rush to normalise relations, often citing 
security and energy concerns, as well as ‘progress’ in the sphere of human 
rights. Unfortunately, arguments that Uzbekistan can meaningfully 
contribute to European security – of any kind – and that the Karimov 
regime is willing to reform do not stand up to closer examination. While it 
is to be welcomed that Germany chose to make Central Asia a foreign 
policy priority during its Presidency of the EU in the first half of 2007, any 
normalisation of relations must be contingent not on promises or cosmetic 
changes from Uzbekistan, but on concrete measures taken to improve the 
lives of its citizens. To accept anything less would be to commit a grave 
disservice to ordinary citizens, and would be devastating to the EU’s 
credibility. 
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5.1  Human rights dialogue with Uzbekistan likely to be dead-end 
As part of its efforts to improve its image in the EU, Uzbekistan in 
November 2006 agreed in principle to begin a ‘dialogue’ with the EU on 
human rights, an agreement that has yet to yield any concrete results. Even 
as both sides talk of ‘dialogue’, the relentless persecution of human rights 
activists, independent journalists and opposition supporters – both within 
the country and abroad – continues. As an illustration, let us recount three 
recent cases. 
  Umida Niyazova. An independent human rights activist who had 
previously worked for a number of international organisations, 
Niyazova, a 32-year-old single mother, was stopped by customs 
officials in December 2006 at Tashkent’s airport while returning from 
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, where she was a trainee at the OSCE Academy. 
Customs officials confiscated her laptop computer, on which, they 
subsequently claimed, they had discovered “extremist materials”. 
Niyazova left Uzbekistan for Kyrgyzstan, where she sought political 
asylum, but then returned to Uzbekistan in January 2007, having been 
told that the charges were dropped. She was immediately arrested 
and held incognito for several days in Andijon before being returned 
to Tashkent, where she was charged with the smuggling of 
contraband, distribution of extremist materials and illegal border 
crossing. After a closed two-day trial, on 1 May 2007, Niyazova was 
convicted on all counts and sentenced to seven years in prison. 
Following an international outcry, her sentence was changed to a 
three-year suspended sentence; the price for her freedom was 
Niyazova’s public repentance and a denunciation of the activities of 
international human rights organisations such as Human Rights 
Watch. 
  Isroil Kholdorov. A leader of the banned opposition movement Erk 
(“Will”) in Andijon, Kholdorov, 57, fled to Kyrgyzstan following the 
2005 uprising and sought political asylum there. He continued his 
public denunciations of the Karimov regime, and is believed to have 
been kidnapped by Uzbek security agents and forcibly returned to 
Uzbekistan. On 19 February 2007, he was sentenced to six years in 
prison for, among other things, establishing an illegal group, illegal 
border crossing and the distribution of extremist materials.  
  Gulbahor Turayeva. A doctor and NGO activist from Andijon, 
Turayeva, 40, was an eyewitness to the slaughter in Andijon and had 70 | MICHAEL HALL 
 
repeatedly challenged the Uzbek government’s version of events. In 
January 2007, she was arrested while crossing the border from 
Kyrgyzstan, bringing with her materials published by the banned 
opposition movement Erk (“Will”). She was sentenced to six years in 
prison in April 2007 for slander, distributing threatening materials 
and infringing on the constitutional order. A further conviction for 
slander on 7 May resulted in a fine of roughly $518 being added to 
her sentence; initial reports were that her prison sentence was also 
almost doubled. As was the case with Niyazova, Turayeva’s sentence 
was commuted to a three-year suspended sentence on 12 June 2007, 
after she also made a humiliating public denunciation of her previous 
statements and of the statements of other foreign journalists 
regarding the Andijon events. 
The release of Niyazova and Turayeva is, of course, to be welcomed. 
At the same time, the fact that both have been arrested and convicted 
means that their freedom is still at great risk. In the meantime, there are 
continuing concerns about the well-being of other detainees, such as 
human rights activist Mu’tabar Tojiboyeva, businessman and political 
activist Sanjar Umarov, and independent journalist (and nephew of the 
president) Jamshid Karimov, all of whom are believed to have been 
severely mistreated in detention. Tojiboyeva and Karimov have been 
subjected to forced psychiatric hospitalisation. And Uzbekistan’s prisons 
remain full of thousands of other individuals unjustly arrested and 
imprisoned – in often extremely inhumane conditions – on a variety of 
politically-motivated charges. 
Niyazova, Kholdorov, Tojiboyeva, Umarov, Karimov, and others like 
them are all victims of a regime that seems to view any independent 
activity – be it religious, political, economic or cultural in nature – as a 
potential threat. Those who dare step out of line face intimidation and 
harassment  − including beatings by unknown assailants1  − arrest on 
trumped-up charges, and perfunctory trials with apparently pre-
determined verdicts. And persecutions are not limited to Uzbekistan itself, 
as Kholdorov’s case indicates; since the Andijon uprising, Uzbek refugees 
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and asylum seekers in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Ukraine have 
been the victims of kidnapping and illegal deportation.2 
Similarly, Tashkent has done little to address the EU’s concerns about 
its handling of the Andijon uprising. The Uzbek government did agree to 
allow a group of EU experts to visit Andijon in December 2006, although 
the time the EU’s experts were allowed to spend in Andijon and the 
number of people they were allowed to meet with in general were limited. 
There have been grudging acknowledgments from the Uzbek side that its 
forces may have made mistakes in their response to the uprising. And in 
October 2006, Andijon governor Saydullo Begaliyev was fired by Karimov 
himself, who stated that Begaliyev’s administration, by ignoring socio-
economic problems in the province, was partially to blame for the Andijon 
events. All encouraging signs, perhaps, but progress on this front has been 
stalled as well. The Uzbek government was apparently reluctant to hold 
any further meetings, reportedly announcing that the Andijon issue was, in 
their view, “closed”. A second meeting was eventually held, yet also 
yielded no results; a planned third meeting has yet to be scheduled. In the 
meantime, the Karimov regime continues to insist – without offering any 
convincing evidence3 – that the Andijon events were the work of terrorists 
with extensive foreign backing (including the alleged support of the US 
embassy in Tashkent, Western-funded NGOs and Western media outlets 
such as the BBC). And acknowledgments along the lines of ‘mistakes were 
made’ fall far short of allowing a full-scale, unfettered independent inquiry 
into the bloody events of May 2005. 
It is certainly significant that Karimov pointed to socio-economic 
concerns in his sacking of Begaliyev. What is often overlooked, however, is 
that Begaliyev’s style of government was the rule, not the exception. 
Regional administrators throughout Uzbekistan are appointed or removed 
at the behest of the president, and are fully aware that their political 
                                                      
2 The Moscow-based human rights organisation ‘Memorial’ has been particularly 
diligent about tracking such cases (for more information, see their website, 
www.memo.ru). 
3 What evidence the Uzbek government has offered has been in the form of 
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survival – and personal freedom – depend on appeasing Karimov, with 
little or no attention given to the needs of the local population, to whom 
administrators are not in any way accountable. This is particularly the case 
in Uzbekistan’s cotton-growing regions, where local administrators are 
under massive pressure to see to it that government-set harvest quotas are 
met. 
With failure to meet quotas a common reason for their dismissal, 
local administrators resort to whatever means they see as necessary. Large-
scale forced labour with little or no compensation, physical intimidation – 
including beatings – of farmers who fail to deliver, seizure of land from 
those who try to grow other crops for subsistence or sale – all are 
commonplace. With more and more young men leaving impoverished 
rural areas to seek work in Tashkent – or leaving Uzbekistan altogether – 
the burden falls increasingly on the women and children left behind. As is 
the case with gas, the revenues from Uzbekistan’s cotton fibre exports – 
perhaps as much as $1 billion per year – often vanish into off-budget 
accounts; again, it is thought to be the Karimov regime and its security 
services who benefit, and not the impoverished and occasionally brutalised 
farmers.4 While Begaliyev and others face periodic dismissal,5 as long as the 
system itself remains fundamentally unchanged, there is little reason to 
expect their successors to act any differently. 
In sum, the steps taken by Uzbekistan to address the concerns 
expressed by the international community on the Andijon events and on 
the human rights situation in the country have not been sufficient to justify 
a return to the status quo ante. This is not to suggest that dialogue should be 
                                                      
4 For more information, see International Crisis Group, The Curse of Cotton: Central 
Asia’s Destructive Monoculture, ICG Asia Report No. 93, 28 February 2005. 
5 An interesting case is that of former Jizzakh Governor Ubaydullo Yomonqulov. A 
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abandoned, yet dialogue for its own sake will accomplish nothing. Any 
normalisation of relations with Uzbekistan must follow concrete steps by 
the government to improve the lives of its citizens and address the 
international community’s concerns about human rights. In the past, the 
Uzbek government has proven willing to make the occasional token 
gesture in these areas when international criticism has grown 
inconveniently strident. Fundamental changes, however, have been utterly 
lacking. During the years of its close relationship with the Karimov regime, 
the United States constantly advocated ‘dialogue’ as a means to bring about 
such change in Uzbekistan. The Andijon events and the continuing 
repressions that have followed showed convincingly exactly how much the 
years of dialogue with Karimov had accomplished.  
5.2  Uzbekistan’s limited potential as energy exporter 
While the EU strategy has not yet been made public, concerns have been 
voiced that it may prioritise the EU’s energy concerns above human 
security and human rights concerns in Central Asia. The EU’s desire to 
diversify its energy suppliers is perfectly understandable. It is questionable, 
however, to what extent Uzbekistan can genuinely contribute to EU energy 
security. Uzbekistan’s gas delivery network is highly inefficient, and barely 
able to meet the needs of its own consumers. The Russian gas giant 
Gazprom enjoys a virtual monopoly on the export of Uzbek gas, and given 
the lack of alternate routes – and Uzbekistan’s ever-closer relations with 
Moscow – this is highly unlikely to change any time soon. 
What is more, the small amounts of gas that Uzbekistan exports 
usually come at the expense of its own citizens, who face frequent shutoffs 
of gas during the winter months. This has led to increasing discontent 
within Uzbekistan, and demonstrations provoked by interruptions in gas 
supply took place in many regions of the country prior to the Andijon 
uprising. Recently, there have been reports of renewed demonstrations, 
particularly in the impoverished Autonomous Republic of Qaraqalpaqistan 
– paradoxically, the source of much of Uzbekistan’s gas.  
A further question is what happens to the revenues generated by the 
export of Uzbek gas. As with Uzbekistan’s other main export commodities, 
such as gold, cotton and uranium, it is believed that the lion’s share of the 
proceeds do not in fact go into state coffers but are diverted into off-budget 
accounts controlled by the Karimov regime and its close allies, particularly 
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intentions to improve domestic delivery and boost exports through 
structural reforms and new exploration, yet its own ability to implement 
such measures is limited, and the notoriously corrupt investment climate in 
Uzbekistan seems to be giving even such major players as Russia’s 
Gazprom some pause. At any rate, whatever increased production does 
result will inevitably enter the Gazprom-dominated delivery system.6 
In short, it does not seem likely that Uzbekistan can contribute in any 
meaningful way to EU energy security. What is more, the manner in which 
its own energy resources are exploited makes them more of a force for 
resentment and instability within Uzbekistan itself than a force for 
socioeconomic development. This may have consequences for states or 
companies seen as benefiting from the unfair and opaque use of energy 
resources. Rising public resentment against foreigners – and locals – 
working in the energy sector in Kazakhstan are one sign of this, and recent 
events in the Niger Delta show that such resentments can have very 
dangerous consequences over the long term. 
5.3  EU in danger of misreading the situation in Uzbekistan 
The idea that Uzbekistan can somehow contribute meaningfully to 
European energy security is one of a number of false assumptions about 
Uzbekistan that seem to inform much of the policy debate. One idea that 
simply must be abandoned is the view that Central Asian society in general 
– and Uzbek society in particular – is ‘Oriental’, ‘traditional’, and ‘clan-
based’, and therefore somehow fundamentally antagonistic to Western 
ideas of good governance and democracy. In fact, the most stubborn 
resistance to the implementation of political and economic reforms comes 
not from the public at large but from leaders such as Karimov, who see 
such reforms as threatening their stranglehold on political and economic 
life. Stereotypes such as these serve both Karimov and those abroad who 
wish to maintain the status quo – or at least avoid such sensitive topics. 
They do a disservice to both the citizens of Uzbekistan and the credibility of 
the West. Even if the establishment of a fully-functioning multi-party 
democracy along European lines may not – at present – be a priority for the 
average Uzbek citizen, it is indisputable that Uzbekistan’s long-suffering 
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population does indeed desire, at the very least, fundamental justice, 
fairness and accountability from those who govern them. One reason that 
groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir are as widespread as they are in Central Asia 
is that they offer a vision of at least some kind of justice and accountability, 
and while the vision they offer may be at best distasteful to many in the 
West, to many in Central Asia – particularly in Uzbekistan – it clearly 
represents a preferable alternative to the status quo. When approaching 
Uzbekistan, the EU would do well to ask itself which version of ‘justice’ it 
would ultimately like to see take root in Uzbekistan – one closer to its 
vision, or one closer to that of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Not to stand up for the 
former may well lead to the strengthening of the latter. 
This raises yet another false assumption about Uzbekistan’s 
importance to the West in general: namely, that Uzbekistan has an 
important role to play in the ‘global war on terror’. Although occasionally 
lionised by its admirers in the US as a strategic partner in the ‘war on 
terror’, in fact the Karimov regime, through its repressive and exploitative 
policies, has perhaps done more to foster the growth of radical Islamism in 
Uzbekistan and in the wider Central Asian region than it has to contain it. 
Rampant corruption, abuses of power, arbitrary arrest, the systematic use 
of torture, the suppression of any and all legitimate opposition movements, 
the evisceration of civil society, the co-opting of religious institutions and 
the closing down of alternative sources of information − all leave 
Uzbekistan’s citizens with fewer and fewer alternatives. While the current 
threat posed by militant Islam in Uzbekistan should not be exaggerated – 
as the government itself is wont to do – nonetheless there are reasons to be 
greatly concerned about the long-term dangers. And while none of the 
apparent acts of terrorism in Uzbekistan has specifically targeted European 
citizens or interests, terrorists around the world have demonstrated their 
willingness to use violence not only against their own governments, but 
against those states perceived as supporting them. 
5.4  The future of the Karimov regime 
Another question the EU – and indeed, all foreign governments seeking to 
cultivate ties to Uzbekistan – should consider is the future of the Karimov 
regime. At present, Karimov himself is in a curious legal position. 
According to Uzbekistan’s Constitution, Karimov’s term as president 
expired on 22 January 2007, seven years after his latest inauguration. 
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elections can only be held in December of the year in which the president’s 
term expires – meaning, if the letter of the law were to be followed, that 
Uzbekistan would technically be without a president for eleven months. 
The Karimov regime, however, has proven adept at interpreting the law to 
suit its own ends, and, where this cannot be done, simply changing it to 
meet the facts. There has been some speculation that the regime will do 
exactly this, perhaps by holding a referendum to extend the president’s 
term. A second scenario posits Karimov’s stepping aside in favour of a 
successor, or carrying out a symbolic restructuring of government while 
retaining de facto power himself. At present, there is no clear sign that 
Karimov is planning to do either; in fact, all indications are that Karimov 
intends to seek re-election in December. Given the nature of the Uzbek 
political system, there is little doubt that, if elections are indeed held, 
Karimov will win easily.  
Nonetheless, the issue does again raise a nagging question: who will 
succeed Karimov once he departs the political scene? While there has been 
speculation about certain individuals – including Karimov’s daughter 
Gulnora, National Security Service chief Rustam Inoyatov, Prime Minister 
Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and Moscow-based oligarch Alisher Usmonov – there 
is no clear ‘front-runner’ in line for succession. This is more than an 
academic question. The sudden death of former Turkmen President 
Saparmurat Niyazov is an example of how quickly and unexpectedly 
change can come. Despite predictions that Niyazov’s death could spark a 
potentially violent succession struggle, the transition in Turkmenistan has 
nonetheless been smooth – for the time being. It should not, however, be 
assumed that this would be the case in Uzbekistan as well. The people of 
Turkmenistan, for whatever reason, appear to have essentially made their 
peace with Niyazov’s style of government, and were never likely to openly 
challenge either his rule or that of his successor. In Uzbekistan, on the other 
hand, the population is many times larger than that of Turkmenistan, and 
anger – and even hatred – towards the Karimov regime have been steadily 
growing for a number of years. While Andijon sent an unambiguous 
message as to how serious unrest would be dealt with, the underlying 
tensions have not subsided. Furthermore, Uzbekistan, unlike its neighbour 
to the south, has an active radical Islamist underground. And Uzbekistan, 
unlike Turkmenistan, is home to wealthy and influential individuals 
outside of the regime itself, some of whom may decide to make 
independent bids for power once Karimov is out of the picture. In sum, 
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instability, and even violence, in post-Karimov Uzbekistan. Protracted 
instability or violence in Uzbekistan could well have disastrous 
consequences for neighbouring countries. 
5.5  EU priorities for a new relationship with Uzbekistan 
A common argument put forward by those who wish to see a rapid 
improvement in EU-Uzbek relations is that it is simply impossible to 
conceive of a Central Asian strategy that does not centre on Uzbekistan. 
First, there is reason to question the need for an overarching regional 
strategy for Central Asia, as all five countries have taken increasingly 
divergent paths since independence. More to the point, however, this 
approach may greatly exaggerate Central Asia’s importance. It is true that, 
with over 25 million people, Uzbekistan is by far Central Asia’s most 
populous country. On the other hand, at least as many people live in the 
surrounding countries, which, to varying degrees, have generally proven 
more amenable to reform than Uzbekistan. Even Turkmenistan, under new 
President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov, has promised reforms which, 
in comparison to the increasingly repressive and megalomaniacal policies 
of Niyazov, far exceed anything that Uzbekistan has committed itself to – 
although here, too, the EU and the international community in general 
must be cautious not to mistake promises for action. Rather than struggling 
to ‘engage’ with a regime that for years has stubbornly resisted 
international appeals for reform, a more productive approach may be to 
increase engagement and assistance to those regimes taking genuine steps 
towards improving the lives of their citizens.  
Also of concern is Uzbekistan’s ability to make life difficult for 
neighbouring countries, particularly Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. While 
Uzbekistan’s post-Andijon rapprochement with Russia has led to its re-
entry into Kremlin-backed regional integration schemes, such as the 
Eurasian Economic Communion (EurAsEC) and the Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation (CSTO), this has yet to translate into better bilateral 
relations with other member states. Kyrgyzstan has faced serious political 
pressure from Tashkent in retaliation for its granting of political asylum to 
Uzbek refugees in the past; consequently, Bishkek has been increasingly 
reluctant to do so, and those seeking refuge from persecution in Uzbekistan 
now face increasing difficulties finding safety. Only recently, and very 
reluctantly, has Tashkent agreed to allow visa-free travel for Kyrgyz 
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Uzbekistan, never particularly warm to begin with, have sunk to an all-
time low, with the two countries trading accusations of espionage and 
harbouring insurgents. Tashkent has also apparently been seeking to draw 
Russian attention – and investment – away from Tajikistan. Visa 
requirements for Tajik citizens remain in place. The fact that both 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are dependent on Uzbekistan for their gas 
supplies gives Tashkent increased leverage over both. As long as Tashkent 
feels that its ability to exert pressure on its neighbours is unchecked, no 
amount of ‘dialogue’ or ‘engagement’ is likely to dissuade it from doing so. 
To counteract this, any EU strategy for Central Asia should include plans to 
strengthen the infrastructural and energy independence of Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan vis-à-vis Uzbekistan and promote greater cooperation between 
these two countries and Kazakhstan, which is rapidly emerging as the 
region’s economic locomotive.  
Those who argue for such approaches have on occasion been accused 
of seeking to ‘isolate’ Uzbekistan. Nothing could be farther from the truth. 
The aim of such a policy would not be to isolate Uzbekistan, but rather to 
reward those governments that demonstrate the political will to make 
positive changes. It should be made very clear to the Uzbek government 
that improved relations with and greater assistance from the EU are 
available – provided it takes the first steps towards serious reform. Such 
measures should include:  
  ceasing all persecution of human rights activists, independent 
journalists and supporters of political opposition movements;  
  granting access by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) to all those in places of detention, and in particular to political 
detainees;  
  ending the use of forced labour during the cotton harvest (a practice 
that even violates Uzbekistan’s own laws); and 
  allowing a full and unhindered independent investigation of the 
Andijon uprising by an independent rapporteur, including access to 
returned refugees and those in detention.  
Measures such as these must be regarded only as starting points for a 
resumption of high-level bilateral dialogue between the EU and 
Uzbekistan. Given the nature of the Karimov regime, however, even such 
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to Tashkent in return for the purely cosmetic changes that have so far been 
proffered by the Uzbek side7 would send the wrong message entirely. 
In sum, it is difficult to see how the Karimov regime can in any 
meaningful way contribute to the EU’s energy, security or human rights 
objectives – however these may ultimately be defined – in Central Asia. 
While the normalisation of relations must remain the ultimate goal, it must 
also be made clear that the requirements for such a normalisation lie 
entirely with the Uzbek side. In the meantime, engagement with and 
assistance to those countries that have demonstrated at least genuine 
commitment to reform and to improving the lives of their citizens should 
be enhanced. It is to be welcomed that the EU plans to expand its on-the-
ground diplomatic presence in Central Asia; to do so in Uzbekistan may 
still be premature. What engagement there is should be only part of the 
EU’s multilateral relations with the Central Asian region as a whole, and 
should be kept only at the level necessary to maintain EU-sponsored 
projects in Uzbekistan aimed at improving the lives of ordinary Uzbek 
citizens. 
To say that Europe’s sanctions against Uzbekistan “are not working” 
is a gross oversimplification. True, the economic impact of such measures is 
negligible. But their symbolic importance simply cannot be overlooked. For 
one thing, the EU’s firm and unyielding position vis-à-vis Uzbekistan will 
send a strong message to other countries in the region: namely, that there 
are consequences for those who commit massive human rights abuses such 
as the Andijon massacre. On this front, the EU has done much to 
undermine its own credibility – Germany’s granting of a visa to 
Uzbekistan’s then Interior Minister Zokirjon Almatov, despite his presence 
on the travel ban list, was a serious blow – and to relax the sanctions 
regime now without signs of concrete progress from Uzbekistan would be 
disastrous. At a time when revelations about the abuse of detainees at 
Baghram, Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo have done serious harm to the 
credibility of the US on human rights, the importance of the EU taking a 
strong stance on human rights becomes paramount. 
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As far as Uzbekistan is concerned, there too the symbolic impact of 
the sanctions should not be underestimated. Put simply, Karimov does not 
wish to be a pariah. While major powers such as Russia and China seem 
willing to strengthen their ties with Uzbekistan without asking awkward 
questions about political and economic reform or human rights, it is 
questionable how comfortable Karimov truly is with the current state of 
Uzbekistan’s international relations; his long-standing mistrust of Russia, at 
any rate, is well known, and suspicion towards China has deep roots in the 
post-Soviet states, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
notwithstanding. The current state of (relative) isolation from the West is 
probably not entirely pleasing to Karimov, who is too savvy a politician not 
to want a greater degree of balance in his international relations. This can 
only enhance the effect of Europe’s sanctions. It seems plausible that the 
fumbling, at best half-hearted attempts by the Karimov regime to improve 
its image in the West are an indication of how much the current freeze in 
relations rankles in Tashkent. Tashkent needs Brussels far more than 
Brussels needs Tashkent. In the current diplomatic standoff, it must be 
Tashkent that blinks first. | 81 
 
 
6.  TURKMENISTAN AND THE EU: 
CONTEXTS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR 
GREATER ENGAGEMENT 
MICHAEL DENISON
∗ 
Introduction 
The sudden death of Turkmenistan’s President Saparmurat Niyazov on 21 
December 2006, has opened a window for engagement between the 
European Union and Turkmenistan. There appears to be a realisation 
across the Turkmen political elite that Niyazov’s style of policy micro-
management was unsustainable and undesirable, both in terms of its 
immediate outcomes and for its broader impact on political and social 
cohesion. Accordingly, a more balanced and predictable form of 
governance under President Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov has 
emerged, albeit with an increasingly accented personalistic tone. Although 
formal democratisation remains a distant prospect, a sequence of foreign, 
economic and social policy changes has begun to occur. The principal 
objectives of these shifts will be to reverse Niyazov’s most idiosyncratic 
and unambiguously damaging policies, and to commence a process of 
cautious re-engagement with the outside world. An important task for the 
EU is to understand these developments and assess whether they are 
designed principally to mitigate the damage of the Niyazov years, or 
whether they are harbingers of something more qualitatively ambitious. 
These reforms have the potential to be simultaneously emancipating and 
destabilising. Using a fusion of traditional Turkmen and Soviet techniques, 
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paid for by gas rents, Niyazov managed to create a regime that, for over 
two decades, rather effectively neutralised any actual or potential sources 
of opposition to his rule. Without that primitive overlay, some 
multiplication of political actors, combined with necessary reforms to 
increase the role of the private sector, is likely to test the state’s institutional 
strength, and open new internal commercial pressures for engagement in 
and beyond the region. 
At present, Turkmenistan can offer the EU only a limited menu of 
potential goods – a fairly reliable supply of cheap natural gas, and a modest 
addition to the Caspian oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) market mix. 
Given present concerns over Russia’s reliability as a long-term supplier of 
hydrocarbons, Turkmen gas reserves have acquired a new salience. 
However, there are significant obstacles in bringing them directly to the 
European market, not the least of which is the lack of either an existing 
infrastructure or a compelling incentive for the Turkmen leadership to sell 
the bulk of its onshore gas to Europe. The list of ‘harms’ to EU interests that 
might emanate from Turkmenistan is also correspondingly limited. The 
interest of the Turkmen people in radical, politicised Islam has historically 
been extremely limited, but may yet grow with the emergence of a 
disaffected middle-class. The prospect of any such radicalisation causing 
domestic political instability, or being targeted at EU interests, remains 
remote. Internal challenges to the current government are more likely to 
stem from internecine elite feuds that mask clan/regional interests. 
Informal in-country reports, for example, point to tension in Mary velayet 
(oblast or region) over the perceived exclusion of that region’s interests in 
the elite pacting process that occurred in the immediate aftermath of 
Niyazov’s death. The security services are believed to have taken personal 
control over the administration of the presidential election in Mary city, 
presumably to ensure that there was no regional deviation in the final 
result.1 The most significant security problem is likely to remain the use of 
Turkmen territory for the transit of narcotics from Afghanistan and Iran on 
to Russia and Europe. The EU can play an interdiction role in the 
disruption of this trade, but will depend on the cooperation of the Turkmen 
political, military and intelligence elites to make an impact. This cannot be 
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guaranteed, but there are recent signs that the government is taking the 
problem seriously.2 
Accordingly, the EU’s principal opportunity to engage with 
Turkmenistan is not likely to carry a short-term pay-off. Nor should one be 
expected. It will require careful work to help build the foundations of what 
Weber called a ‘legal-rational’ system of governance, underpinned by 
significant assistance, without conditionalities, in the education and health 
sectors. There is clearly a very serious debate going on within the Turkmen 
elite about its preferred form of relationship with Russia (and China).3 
Heavy-handed democracy promotion at the outset is likely to predetermine 
that outcome by driving the new regime into the arms of Moscow and 
Beijing. By focusing on technical governance issues, while making available 
the option of alternative natural gas export routes, the EU can assist in 
laying the foundations for genuine cooperation which will carry a more 
significant and uncomplicated political, security and commercial dividend 
in the medium-term.  
The remainder of this paper is structured into four sections: the first 
analyses of the reconfiguration within the Turkmen political elite 
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reassurances on existing contracts only, despite a reportedly generous package of 
assistance offered by Gazprom (Gazeta, 15 February 2007). Since then, elements 
within the Russian media have expressed alarm at the new ‘multivector’ 
orientation of Turkmen foreign policy, and expressed fears that the gas sales and 
pipeline agreements with China have seriously diminished Russian influence over 
Turkmen foreign policy (see for example, Alexander Zhelenin, “Price for Gas Issue: 
By concluding an agreement with China, Turkmenistan is leaving Russia’s zone of 
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occasioned by Niyazov’s death, and assesses its likely impact on domestic 
policy; the second section focuses on the important changes in the 
organisation and functions of the oil and gas sector in the period 
immediately before and after Niyazov’s death, and considers how the 
Turkmen government may seek to realise its main priorities for energy 
sector development; the third section seeks to explain the rationale behind 
post-Soviet Turkmen foreign policy in order to gauge whether and how the 
government is likely to reorient policy after the long period of relative 
isolation under Niyazov. The paper concludes by offering some specific 
policy suggestions for greater EU engagement with Turkmenistan that may 
encourage the country’s re-integration into the global community, while 
assisting the EU to extend its diplomatic and moral reach into Central Asia. 
6.1  The domestic political landscape 
Prior to 21 December 2006, Turkmenistan could fairly be described as a 
‘sultanistic regime’.4 President Niyazov ruled through a mixture of fear and 
rewards, using natural gas rents to furnish patronage networks and 
maintain a coercive state apparatus centred on the security services and the 
Presidential Guard. Augmenting these techniques of material control was a 
pervasive cult of personality built around certain motifs, texts and symbols 
associated with Niyazov himself, as well as other approved figures.5 The 
cult of personality fulfilled several important functions. It was (and 
remains) an important instrument of social integration in a society where 
national identity remains weak. It expressed the regime’s visual and spatial 
power, particularly in the urban redesign of Ashgabat, where it presented a 
continual reminder to Turkmen of the source of their political 
independence and heavily subsidised basic provisions. The cult was, 
through Niyazov’s books, particularly Ruhnama (Vols. I and II), an 
important mechanism for political socialisation, offering a normative 
navigational aid for Turkmen in the uncertain waters of post-Soviet 
transition. Finally, the cult increasingly functioned as an important 
strategic resource for mid- to upper-level officials who, by instigating ever 
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more extravagant projects, hoped to preserve or advance their own and/or 
their region’s interests.6 
The formal political landscape theoretically provides checks to 
presidential power but, in reality, has rarely done so. The Turkmen State 
Constitution is actually a relatively liberal document, providing for a 
separation of the branches of government and protection of the rights of the 
individual against unnecessary state intrusion. Although the President is 
accorded significant powers, the sovereign organ of state power is the Khalk 
Maslahaty (People’s Council), a unique fusion of the executive, legislature 
and judiciary, comprising 2507 appointed and elected delegates who sit for 
a few days once or twice every year. However, the Council has, in practice, 
largely functioned as a vehicle for the approval of government policy and 
the ritual acclaim of Niyazov. The election of Berdymuhammedov to chair 
the Khalk Maslahaty at an extraordinary session convened on 30-31 March 
2007, suggested that this practice will remain essentially unchanged for the 
foreseeable future. The Majlis, a 50-member Parliament which effectively 
succeeded the Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies, essentially undertakes 
the execution of daily government business with minimal dissent from the 
prearranged line of the Presidency and the Cabinet of Ministers. 
Two comments should be made about this rather bleak and flattened 
institutional landscape. Firstly, a process of minimal but significant 
liberalisation, that passed virtually unnoticed, was under way before 
Niyazov died, possibly to assuage criticism from international institutions 
such as the OSCE, but also perhaps to introduce a highly controlled outlet 
for the expression of political pluralism and, in the case of the 
constitutional amendments, to broaden the net of possible successors. 
Elections to the Majlis and Khalk Maslahaty in 2004 and 2006 respectively 
were increasingly, within limits, competitive, albeit between candidates 
pre-selected for their reliability. Not all candidates belonged to the 
Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, although all were no doubt hand 
picked. The Constitution was amended twice in 2005 in order to liberalise 
eligibility for the presidency, a sign that Niyazov’s health was known to be 
fragile but that a successor had not yet been settled upon. The second point 
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is that, traditionally, Turkmen politics has been conducted consensually. 
Pre-Soviet Turkmen tribal maslakhaty (village councils) were acephalous, ad 
hoc affairs with no permanent leadership, except in periods of conflict.7 
Where a decision could not be reached unanimously it was deferred until 
complete agreement was possible. Even persistent dissenters eventually felt 
obliged to fall in behind and support the communal decision 
wholeheartedly, knowing that some concession would have been 
formulated to accommodate their views. The alternative was to leave the 
group entirely. Adversarial politics in Turkmenistan is not a sign of health, 
but an act of treachery against group interests, a perspective that was of 
great incidental utility to Soviet officials. Niyazov effectively combined and 
adapted the traditional and Soviet ways of seeing and doing politics, 
retaining the forms of consensuality without the content.  
Niyazov’s death left the state constitutionally, institutionally and 
politically unprepared for the succession. In the event, nothing short of a 
coup d’état was accomplished in the hours afterwards. The Speaker of the 
Majlis, the constitutionally designated successor, was arrested and rather 
bizarrely charged with harassing a young female relative and other 
unspecified acts of corruption. Minister of Health Gurbanguly 
Berdymuhammedov was appointed as the acting president, and then duly 
confirmed in this post by a sitting of the Khalk Maslahaty on 26 December 
2006, before securing the inevitable election landslide victory against five 
nominal opponents on 11 February 2007. In this respect, the choice of 
Berdymuhammedov may be of lesser importance than the way in which 
the transition of power was effected, and its implications for future 
leadership successions. 
Unofficial sources in Turkmenistan suggest that Niyazov appointed 
Berdymuhammedov on his deathbed in the presence of General Akmurad 
Rejepov, the long-standing head of Niyazov’s Presidential Guard.8 On his 
initiative, the State Security Council therefore effectively appears to have 
                                                      
7 William Irons, The Yomut Turkmen: A Study of Social Organization among a Central 
Asian Turkic-Speaking Population, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 
1975; Paul Georg Geiss, PreTsarist and Tsarist Central Asia: Communal Commitment 
and Political Order in Change, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003; Arminius Vambery, 
Travels in Central Asia, New York: Harper, 1865.  
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brought Berdymuhammedov to power and then, crucially, directed 
constitutional amendments at the subsequent Khalk Maslahaty session that 
gave it the right to determine whether a president is physically fit to retain 
office, and to nominate an interim successor if not. In practice, this gives the 
State Security Council legitimate powers to remove Berdymuhammedov 
should he prove to be insufficiently compliant, and to replace him with 
another, more suitable candidate. As a member of the Ersari tribe from the 
Lebap region, Rejepov would possibly have been unacceptable as a 
presidential candidate to the Khalk Maslahaty, with its strong Ahal Teke 
tribal base. Berdymuhammedov has clearly gained political traction of his 
own (in the way that those other post-Soviet placemen, President Vladimir 
Putin in Russia and President Imomali Rakhmonov in Tajikistan, have 
done), subsequently arresting and imprisoning Rejepov and his allies in the 
“power ministries” in May 2007 and then subsequently cleansing the 
Cabinet of unreliable elements.9 Although his Cabinet is now heavily 
staffed by Ahal Tekes of similar age, background and education to 
Berdymuhammedov, he has still been cognisant of the need to distribute 
power between representatives of different tribes and regions, as was the 
case during the Soviet period.10 For example, Tachberdy Tagiyev, the 
powerful Deputy Prime Minister in overall charge of oil and gas issues, 
effectively represents the interests of the Yomut tribe of western 
Turkmenistan in the political elite, and the head of the Presidential 
Administration, Yklymberdy Paramov is from Tagtabazar in the 
southeastern Mary velayet.  
The promises of social and economic liberalisation made by 
Berdymuhammedov and the other candidates before the February 2007 
election indicate that there was a consensus among political elites that some 
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of Lieutenant-General Geldymukhammet Ashirmukhammedov, the Minister for 
National Security, and Khojamurat Annagurbanov, the Interior Minister, on 8 
October 2007.  
10 For Soviet ‘tribal policy’ in Turkmenistan, see Adrienne Lynn Edgar, Tribal 
Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
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form of major change is needed. There is no evidence that there was 
significant tension in Turkmen society, or that the reform pledges were a 
response to pressure from below. Rather the proposals signify that a new 
elite settlement is being worked through, probably along the following 
lines: 
1)  a more predictable, stable, rational system of governance manifested 
by the return of ministers shown the door by Niyazov; 
2)  the termination of the most harmful and arbitrary policies that were 
the product of Niyazov’s prejudices and paranoia, such as the 
amputation of components of the state cultural, education and health 
sectors; 
3)  a clean slate for state officials suspected of filing falsified reports of 
agricultural production and colluding with each other to deceive 
central government; 
4)  the release and partial rehabilitation of socially significant senior 
government officials imprisoned for corruption;  
5)  a compact on minimum state welfare provision, including the 
restoration of pensions abolished in January 2006, the maintenance of 
existing subsidies on water, gas and fuel, and the assurance of 
uninterrupted supplies of cheap flour; 
6)  a cautious programme of controlled liberalisation that excludes 
political reform but involves modestly increasing social freedoms, 
including increased access to the internet, perhaps more foreign 
travel and overseas scholarships for students, and greater openness to 
foreign investment; 
7)  the preservation of ethnic Turkmen hegemony over Uzbek and 
Russian minorities, but without explicit and aggressive 
discrimination; and 
8)  the funding of the above programmes through the capture and 
repatriation of significant gas and cotton revenues that were placed in 
Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund (FERF) accounts with Deutsche Bank 
under Niyazov’s personal control.11 
                                                      
11 For the candidates’ election platforms, see News Central Asia’s coverage 
(www.newscentralasia.org); Bruce Pannier, “Turkmenistan: Sorting out the 
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The policy announcements made thus far suggest that the restoration 
of social cohesion is the new president’s principal priority. Rapid and far-
reaching education reforms to be enacted include a reversion of the 
mandatory period of schooling back to ten years, a 40% rise in teachers’ pay 
and significant relaxation of regulations for university students, including 
exemption from military service, abolition of the two compulsory gap 
years, extension of degree schemes back to their Soviet level and an end to 
restrictions on university study abroad. The second major policy shift 
initiated by Berdymuhammedov has been the restoration of state pensions 
to their pre-January 2006 position. Cuts in eligibility had created significant 
hardship, particularly within the ethnic Russian population. These 
measures will place additional strain on the public finances, but higher gas 
export revenues, savings made by abandoning some of Niyazov’s more 
outlandish public works projects and firmer controls on official corruption 
will go some way to bridging any deficit. Moreover, the political dividends 
of populist reforms are likely to outweigh short-term budgetary 
considerations.  
Berdymuhammedov has been notably more cautious in tackling 
structural reform in the agricultural sector. The logical conclusion to draw 
from the convening of the extraordinary Khalk Maslahaty session on 30-31 
March 2007 specifically to address this issue was that the government was 
planning a major announcement along the lines of large-scale land 
privatisation. Instead, the session, with Berdymuhammedov assuming the 
role of Chairman, gave plenty of space for the airing of grievances, but 
actually proposed only to ensure that farmers received ‘inputs’ (feed, 
fertiliser, seeds, etc.) and state payments in a more efficient and timely 
fashion. More wide-ranging reforms may follow later in 2007, but it would 
appear that, for the present, the government is hoping to rebuild trust with 
farmers in order to give the existing system a chance to function more 
effectively.  
Although EU member states will keep a watching brief on the 
progress of these reforms, particular attention is likely to be paid to 
progress on human rights issues. A handful of reports by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) were critical of human rights abuses in 
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Turkmenistan earlier in Niyazov’s presidency, but it was only after the 
failed coup attempt of 25 November 2002 that the international community 
subjected the Niyazov regime to serious scrutiny and censure. In the spring 
of 2003, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
invoked its ‘Moscow Mechanism’ for the first, and so far only, occasion 
since the conflict in former Yugoslavia in 1993. The Turkmen government 
did not cooperate with the subsequent report prepared by Professor 
Emmanuel Decaux, which was highly critical of the policy of interrogating 
relatives of the suspected coup plotters, of the conditions of their detention, 
and of the judicial process all the way through to sentencing.12 Niyazov 
remained similarly unmoved by the passing of a non-binding UN General 
Assembly Resolution of 20 December 2004, which called on the Turkmen 
government to release prisoners of conscience, and adhere to its 
commitments on freedoms of thought, conscience and religion. Further 
reports prepared by the Open Society Institute, Amnesty International, the 
International Crisis Group, the London School of Tropical Hygiene, the 
Turkmenistan Helsinki Initiative and the International League for Human 
Rights have condemned the political hospitalisation of dissidents, 
conditions in civilian and military prisons, the treatment of ethnic 
minorities, the bullying and exploitation endured by army conscripts, the 
drastic reduction in primary health care provision, and the deterioration of 
education provision, but none has had any visible impact on government 
policy.  
The extent to which the power brokers in the new regime, many of 
whom are responsible for abuses perpetrated under Niyazov, are serious 
about improving human rights is wholly unclear. If reports from inside the 
country are accurate, the Berdymuhammedov era began inauspiciously 
with a serious riot in the notorious Ovadan-Depe political prison on 22 
December 2006, leading to the killing of 23 prisoners by special forces.13 
This prison has reportedly since been closed and demolished, which 
indicates some sensitivity to international opinion.14 To some degree, the 
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extent to which the new regime wishes to re-engage with the international 
community will determine its sensitivity to criticism. With both Russia and 
China steadfastly refusing to comment on the country’s internal affairs, 
however, the regime has, in the event of sustained Western criticism, solid 
‘fall-back’ options in its choice of strategic partners.  
A multiplicity of new challenges is also likely to emerge, not least of 
which is the puzzle of how to sensitively manage the process of 
decultification. It is likely that the Niyazov cult will remain in place for the 
time being, minus the expensive construction projects. A Khrushchev-style 
‘secret speech’ is not (yet at least) on the cards, but the new government has 
announced that Niyazov’s name has been dropped from the state oath,15 
and that new bank notes will no longer carry his image. As of September 
2007, the number of portraits of Niyazov adorning public buildings has 
diminished, with a proliferation of images of President Gurbanguly 
Berdymuhammedov instead, although this new symbolism has not been 
ideologised and remains rather devoid of content. Pointedly, Turkmen 
state television broadcast an opera (which had been banned by Niyazov) on 
the night of the presidential election for the first time in several years.16 
Any ‘thaw’ is likely to take the form of a gentle ‘crowding out’ of Niyazov’s 
presence rather than open disavowal.17 
Niyazov’s death may also allow some free play for the reassertion of 
sub-national identities. The dire warnings of state collapse after Niyazov 
were not predicated on substantive in-country research, or even serious 
comparative analysis. Turkmenistan has, by and large, an apolitical society. 
The number of pressure points that might trigger conflict is low – the 
spatial distribution and sparseness of the population ensures that there are 
few communal conflicts over land, water, religion or ethnicity. The 
suspension of Niyazov’s elaborate construction projects, and a more 
equitable distribution of rental income to those regions (Balkan, Mary and 
Lebap) where gas reserves are located, would do much to alleviate 
discontent at the channelling of government revenues into the capital city 
of Ashgabat, the historic centre of Ahal Teke influence. However, there is 
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no guarantee that this will occur and the traditionally delicate balance of 
regional interests in the oil and gas bureaucracy may require careful 
management in order to prevent senior officials from embezzling funds 
that they view as rightfully belonging to their tribe or region. Developing 
this issue, the reported shift in January 2007 to house arrest of powerful 
imprisoned state oligarchs, such as former oil and gas supremo Yolly 
Gurbanmuradov, indicates that a further complex realignment and 
upheaval of elites could be under way.18 
Accordingly, while the promises of reform are a positive indication of 
serious intent to respond to the more egregious legacies of Niyazov’s rule, 
they may uncover or unleash a set of ‘second order’ problems, such as 
uncontrolled corruption, intense ethno-regional bargaining and possibly a 
rise in organised criminal activity that cannot be successfully captured and 
controlled by the state. As the example of Kyrgyzstan since the ‘Tulip 
Revolution’ of 2005 has shown, these problems have tended to arise when a 
multiplication of political actors combines with the fragmentation of the 
political agenda.  
6.2  The energy sector 
The death of Niyazov has given rise to considerable speculation that the 
new government may seek to diversify its natural gas export options by 
reaching a commercial agreement on gas sales, either with individual EU 
member states, or with the EU collectively. Turkmen gas would be 
delivered by way of a sub-sea Caspian extension to the new Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzerum (BTE) South Caucasus pipeline which, in turn, would be 
connected to the projected Nabucco pipeline servicing the major European 
gas junction situated at Baumgarten in Austria. President Niyazov rejected 
such an option, preferring to maintain a core gas relationship with 
Gazprom, while developing projects to export supplemental volumes 
south-east, through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India (the now largely 
defunct TAPI pipeline project) and, pursuant to a preliminary agreement 
signed in April 2006, east to China.  
The export of significant onshore gas volumes in a westerly direction 
is possible but unlikely. Russia, through Gazprom, maintains a tight grip 
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on the existing pipeline infrastructure in Central Asia and has a 25 year 
supply contract covering almost all of Turkmenistan’s current gas export 
capacity. Turkmen gas output has stalled since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and requires external technology, capital and expertise, which 
Gazprom will provide, to restore production to Soviet levels.19 The 
Russian-Turkmen relationship is symbiotic. Gazprom provides a steady 
revenue stream and is responsible for pipeline maintenance and upgrading, 
and attaches no conditionality on human rights and democratisation issues. 
Russia/Gazprom has (or can adopt) a Soviet modus operandi with which the 
Turkmen elite feels comfortable. From the other side, Turkmen exports 
enable Gazprom to service its lucrative European contracts, and provide an 
important supply bridge before the Yamal peninsula project comes 
onstream. Thus, Gazprom will not surrender its hegemony in 
Turkmenistan lightly and, as yet, there is insufficient incentive for the 
Turkmen leadership to look seriously elsewhere.  
However, while the principal onshore eastern fields have been 
effectively ‘booked’ by Russia (and the new Yolotan field by China), there 
is potential for European international oil companies (IOCs) to look 
carefully at developing some of the more interesting offshore fields, 
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notably the Livanov-Barinova-Lam (LBL) structures, which are geologically 
integrated with the large Azeri Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) deepwater oil and 
gas fields, currently under commercial development by BP. While these 
prospective fields will not substitute entirely for Russian gas supplies, they 
will substantially augment existing Caspian basin volumes, and have 
relatively inexpensive tieback potential to western Caspian infrastructure, 
without disturbing Gazprom’s existing contracts and provoking a reaction 
against European IOCs working in Russia.  
The focus on downstream activities has led European policy-makers 
to completely neglect very serious governance issues in the domestic 
energy sector. No part of the state apparatus experienced more upheaval in 
the final 18 months of Niyazov’s rule than did the state energy 
bureaucracy. The frequent dismissal and rotation of state officials and 
ministers was characteristic of Niyazov’s rule. However, the purging of the 
sector’s most senior and competent personnel from May 2005 was 
supplemented by drastic structural reorganisation which has only been 
reconfigured on a more rational basis since March 2007 (see Appendix). 
The resultant bottlenecks effectively precluded officials from executing 
policy, engaging with foreign operators or monitoring effectively existing 
commercial operations.  
The two most powerful and longstanding members of Niyazov’s 
entourage – Deputy Prime Minister for Oil and Gas Yolly Gurbanmuradov 
and Head of the Presidential Administration Rejep Saparov – were both 
dismissed, tried and given long prison sentences for embezzlement in the 
early summer of 2005. It is believed that each was briefing against the 
other, and Niyazov took no chances by sequentially removing both.20 They 
were followed by a procession of other officials: the chairmen of 
Turkmenneftegaz, Turkmenneft, Turkmengaz and Turkmengeologiya, four 
of the country’s five state energy agencies, were removed and jailed, along 
with the head of the Turkmenbashi oil refinery and the chairman of the 
Central Bank. Nearly all of their replacements were, in turn, removed over 
the ensuing year, creating a form of ‘permanent revolution’ in the upper 
reaches of the energy bureaucracy. It is difficult to gauge to what extent the 
charges laid were real or imagined, although official toleration of some 
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level of corruption in the oil and gas business was believed to exist. It is 
possible that Rejepov and Gurbanmuradov had overstepped permissible 
limits or that they were seeking to transform their financial leverage into 
political muscle.  
The damaging shortage of experienced personnel was compounded 
by Niyazov’s decision on 2 September 2005 to abolish the Competent Body 
(the interface with foreign oil companies) and transfer its responsibilities 
and operations, along with those of Turkmenneftegaz, to the Ministry of 
Oil and Gas.21 Three quarters of the core staff concerned with the 
negotiation, licensing and control of contracts were sacked, and there were 
no clear lines of demarcation or authority within the Ministry for the 
implementation of executive decrees or new legislation. Such was the 
paralysis that ensued (allied to the fact that the legal signatory of 
Production Sharing Agreements with foreign companies is the Competent 
Body), that Niyazov informally reconstituted the Competent Body on 15 
December 2005 to act on a strict case-by-case basis under his personal 
control, reportedly signing off personally LNG sale contracts of only 
$10,000.22 
One of the most important issues facing President 
Berdymuhammedov was to reconstitute the state oil and gas bureaucracy 
and restore the negotiation, licensing and control functions to the 
Competent Body. This he did on 12 April 2007 with the creation of a new 
State Agency for Management and Use of Hydrocarbon Resources, which 
essentially assumed the functions of the disbanded Competent Body and 
will be an important step in facilitating further foreign investment in the 
sector. Turkmenistan’s relative diplomatic isolation can be partly explained 
by the acute shortage of competent personnel working at mid and upper 
levels of government, and their consequent lack of confidence and vision in 
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dealing with IOCs and international institutions.23 Not knowing what to 
do, officials have chosen to do nothing. This has been to the immeasurable 
benefit of Russia and Gazprom. There is, therefore, an important role for 
the EU in helping to equip a new generation of civil servants and technical 
specialists to serve effectively in government. 
6.3  Foreign policy 
Turkmenistan has followed a policy of permanent neutrality since shortly 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. This stance was 
formally recognised by UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/50/80 
passed on 12 December 1995, and then codified into domestic law on 27 
December 1995. Niyazov engaged only minimally with the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) and even sought unsuccessfully to downgrade 
Turkmen status to Associate Membership in August 2005.24 Niyazov did 
not accede to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), or the 
Eurasian Economic Community and has had highly circumscribed contact 
with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace programme.  
The rationale for this policy lies in several interconnected factors. The 
perceived loss of sovereignty in joining regional security institutions could 
have led to situations where Turkmenistan became a weak frontline state 
against countries such as Iran and Afghanistan, with whom it has no 
individual quarrel. The precursor of the SCO was very much geared to 
containing Taliban influence whereas, somewhat paradoxically, Niyazov 
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confirmed to the author by a British oil company representative resident in 
Turkmenistan for several years (interview conducted in London on 23 February 
2007). 
24 Turkmenistan has no dealings with the CIS Interstate Bank or the Inter-
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maintained cordial relations with the Taliban leadership. Secondly, threats 
to Turkmenistan’s sovereignty are more likely to emanate from unresolved 
border disputes with Uzbekistan, but the CIS Collective Security Treaty 
(CST) has no mutual defence or conflict resolution provisions for CST 
signatories who are attacked by other CST states. Finally, Turkmen foreign 
policy is founded on not prejudicing either transit routes or markets for its 
natural gas exports, hence the emphasis on functional bilateral ties with 
Iran, Russia and Kazakhstan.25  
The only significant change that can be expected from the new 
government is to extend these underlying principles to a wider set of 
actors. In practice, this means cementing relatively close relations with 
China, defrosting relations with Azerbaijan and cautiously engaging with 
the US and European states.26 Such engagement may take the form of 
exploratory discussions on new gas export routes, but could also 
encompass issues such as anti-terrorist and counter-narcotics cooperation, 
the provision of university places for Turkmen students and assistance on 
curriculum development, teacher training, installation of new facilities and 
provision of textbooks in the secondary and tertiary education sectors. 
The major obstacles to a more developed ‘Western dimension’ to 
Turkmen foreign policy lie in a mixture of functional and intangible issues. 
The first of these is the long-running dispute with Azerbaijan over the 
ownership of the Kyapaz/Serdar oil and gas fields in the central Caspian 
Sea. This disagreement is one of the core factors preventing an overall 
resolution of the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Settlement would also 
provide the key to the development and tieback of Turkmen offshore fields 
into existing Azeri infrastructure, because Kyapaz/Serdar lies midway 
between, and forms part of, the ACG and LBL structures described above. 
The inexorable logic of a jointly developed, cross-border exploration and 
production project would be for the oil and gas produced to transit the 
                                                      
25 See Nadia Badykova, “Turkmenistan’s Quest for Economic Security” in Gennady 
Chufrin (ed.), The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001, pp. 231-243. 
26 The only official visit by Niyazov to Azerbaijan occurred on 18-19 March 1996, 
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Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and BTE oil and gas pipelines to service 
European markets. The present stalemate suits both Russia and Iran, the 
losers in East-West transport corridor initiatives. However, the Azeri 
government is apparently keen to resolve the issue, bilateral diplomatic 
relations have been unfrozen and a negotiating process recommenced 
separate from the multilateral Caspian Sea Working Group (CSWG) 
framework. There might be a role for the EU, as an honest-broker, to assist 
with mediation and in formulating the technical criteria for demarcation of 
the border either inside or outside of the existing CSWG structures.27 
The more intangible issues revolve around the regime’s fear of 
external influences. Students sent abroad to study might never return, or 
alternatively, might import values and aspirations that contradict the 
government’s rather unsophisticated nation-building exercise and 
authoritarian methods of control. However, the government may have to 
take this chance, because otherwise the opportunities for those with an 
education to emigrate might simply multiply in any event. There is 
pretence in Turkmen public life that the population operates and thinks 
along the narrow lines laid down by official propaganda. The reality is 
different and more complex. Turkmen watch Russian satellite television 
and Bollywood films, and selectively lock into and drift out of official 
discourse when it is instrumentally profitable to do so. Alexei Yurchak 
records how late Soviet citizens increasingly removed themselves from 
state-directed leisure spaces, simultaneously living within the system’s 
formal constraints, and yet not following its parameters.28 This vnye 
(outside) style of everyday living, preferencing svoi (autonomously 
constructed) social networks over officially sanctioned activities does not 
entail the disparaging of the system as a whole. Rather it involves carving 
out a niche within it. Field research conducted in Turkmenistan between 
2002 and 2005 suggests that this was also true of life under Niyazov. 
However, without his remorseless and very real domination of public life, 
                                                      
27 Azeri Foreign Ministry sources indicated that, while the government “would 
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sovereignty/development solution (Source: Author interview, Baku, 14 November 
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it would be unrealistic for the new government to insist that the existing 
cult vocabulary constructed under Niyazov can still resonate with the same 
strength. The government’s response to this social legacy of the Niyazov 
era will be a critical determinant of the extent to which greater diplomatic 
engagement by the EU will translate into opportunities to develop civil 
society and commercial partnerships.  
6.4  Recommendations for the EU  
Turkmenistan is not so much at a crossroads as at the start of a journey. The 
shape and trajectory of the new political order is not yet definitively 
known. President Berdymuhammedov was, in the immediate hours after 
Niyazov’s death, the beneficiary of a Security Council putsch that displaced 
Niyazov’s constitutional successor. The Security Council has since 
consolidated its power by engineering three constitutional amendments 
that effectively enable it to dictate, or at the very least broker, the terms of 
future succession arrangements. While removing Berdymuhammedov 
from power is now a much more straightforward constitutional exercise 
than it would have been in Niyazov’s time, the president himself is 
emerging as an increasingly powerful elite figure in his own right who may 
be outgrowing his initial compromise candidate status. 
Berdymuhammedov’s has undoubtedly gained some independent 
political traction and genuine popularity of his own, assisted by a calm and 
reasonable manner, astute prioritisation of early reforms and careful 
diplomatic positioning. Although he may not be as comfortable as Niyazov 
with the technical details of the hydrocarbon sector, Berdymuhammedov’s 
considered approach to policy-making is a welcome antidote to the 
extravagances and idiosyncrasies of Niyazov’s rule. Berdymuhammedov 
also appears able to maintain the sometimes fragile informal coalitions that 
hold the state together. The new government is clearly dominated by Ahal 
Tekes, but the presence of senior ministers from other clans indicates that 
there is some degree of tribal balance and pluralism within the inner circle 
o f  p o w e r .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  t h e r e  i s  n o  r e a s o n  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  
Berdymuhammedov, with the backing of the Security Council, cannot 
remain in power for the foreseeable future. 
The EU can assist in getting the country moving in a secular, 
progressive, modernising direction that will balance necessary structural 
reforms with continuing welfare provision, particularly in the areas of 
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the most vulnerable and impoverished section of the community. Before it 
does so, it has to order its own priorities. The first of these is to decide 
whether democracy promotion initiatives are normative or instrumental. 
The encouragement of, and then subsequent withdrawal of support for, 
democracy activists in Azerbaijan in 2003 and 2005 greatly damaged the 
EU’s reputation among reformist elements in that country. At present, the 
EU has no significant interests in Turkmenistan and can afford to be purist 
in its approach, encouraging, but also maintaining pressure on, the new 
regime to adhere to normative international commitments on human rights 
issues. Instrumental democracy promotion can slip into support for 
authoritarianism, as the US government found in Uzbekistan between 2001 
and 2005. The purist approach is, in many ways, the simplest and the 
noblest. To work, however, it must be consistent and committed and must 
give Turkmen people both ownership and authorship of the political 
process.29  
The conscious subordination of democracy promotion to engagement 
on technical issues as a means of prefiguring wider social empowerment 
could also be justified, and might yield more measurable results in the 
medium-term. This approach would entail helping the government govern 
better, and focus on improving the opportunities and livelihoods of 
Turkmen rather than seeking formal democratic outcomes.  
The EU can initiate a number of practical, non-threatening and 
predominantly ‘apolitical’ measures, in conjunction with other institutions 
such as the OSCE, EBRD and UN agencies that would tangibly improve 
governance and living standards, and gently help to lead the country out of 
isolation. The EU should not seek to push the new government too far too 
fast, but could formulate attainable development objectives – for example, 
an English language text book for every primary school child within two 
years, or the provision of modern drug treatment centres in each of the 
country’s five regional capitals. That would make a tangible difference, 
without disrupting the balance of domestic political forces, or undercutting 
the government’s own reform agenda. Similarly, the EU has a role in 
working with the grain of government proposals to increase civic space. 
                                                      
29 See Gordon Crawford, “Promoting Democratic Governance in Central Asia: 
Barriers for External Actors”, unpublished paper presented at CORE conference, 
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Post-communist leaders have shown themselves to be adept at speaking 
back to Euro-Atlantic institutions their preferred agendas without enacting 
meaningful reforms. Thus, Berdymuhammedov’s expressed intention to 
provide internet access for every village is a matter of public record, and a 
role for the EU could be to ‘hold him to account’ on the pledge by offering 
to assist with the provision of computer hardware and dial-up facilities. 
Guidance is also essential on a more specialised technical level, for example 
training government and state agency officials in commercial contract 
drafting and in developing advocacy and judicial expertise, and court 
procedures that would increase the country’s juridical capacity. 
The recommendations above do not presuppose a developing 
political relationship between the EU and Turkmenistan. It would be fair to 
say that the prioritisation of democratisation and human rights issues by 
the EU in its March 2007 strategy document will, in the medium-term, 
engender suspicion and prevent the development of close bilateral 
relations. Unless the EU is prepared to instrumentalise or set aside the 
promotion of ‘European values’, perhaps for the sake of a long-term gas 
supply contract through a trans-Caspian pipeline, then some wariness and 
conscious distancing on the Turkmen side is inevitable. Moreover, the EU 
would be wise not expect too much from its energy dialogue. At present, 
the Turkmen leadership has very few incentives to ditch its long-term gas 
supply contracts to Russia and China. The prospect of large volumes of 
onshore Turkmen gas from the eastern Dauletebad and Yolotan fields 
being moved across the Caspian Sea and directly routed to Europe remains 
remote, and in many respects, unfeasible. As noted above, the focus of EU 
policy should be directed at encouraging European companies to develop 
promising offshore fields and then facilitating tiebacks to existing offshore 
infrastructure on the Western side of the Caspian. Although Turkmenistan 
will miss out on some downstream processing, such an arrangement would 
carry far less diplomatic and environmental baggage than an expensive set 
piece pipeline project across legally contested waters, and still be able to 
make a more than marginal addition to volumes presently being 
transported through the BTC and BTE pipelines. 
The EU should, therefore, be realistic in its ambitions by pressing 
hard on Turkmenistan’s existing treaty commitments if and when certain 
minimum standards of human rights observance are breached, but by 
generally adopting a policy of positive engagement and encouragement 
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Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner was right, after her meeting with 
Turkmen foreign ministry officials on the sidelines of the EU-Central Asia 
summit in Astana on 29 March 2007, to praise the reforms so far enacted 
and offer friendly encouragement for deeper dialogue. It would be fair to 
conclude that Turkmen as much as outsiders are looking forward to a fresh 
start in the country, but they must feel that they are both author and owner 
of any processes of reform and liberalisation for them to succeed. Within 
this framework, the 15 recommendations listed below are by no means 
exhaustive, but would, if implemented, represent a modest start and a basis 
for deeper engagement:  
•  The provision of EU scholarships in business, government, medicine, 
engineering, chemistry and agricultural management for Turkmen 
students 
•  Assistance with the provision of textbooks and other learning 
materials in the Turkmen, Russian and English languages for primary 
and secondary school pupils, teacher training through educational 
exchanges, assistance with sports facilities and computer equipment. 
Teacher training may be interesting too 
•  Technical assistance on restoring a functioning state oil and gas 
bureaucratic apparatus, including the Competent Body, and 
assistance with legal and commercial issues arising from the 
negotiation, performance and enforcement of PSAs 
•  The provision of scholarships and technical training for future oil and 
gas sector workers 
•  Assistance in the drafting of tighter local content laws for PSAs and 
construction contracts 
•  Short-term assistance in primary and preventive healthcare directed 
at rural communities 
•  Assistance in the reform of the agricultural sector, including water 
conservation, sanitation and environmental management, irrigation 
and livestock care, and in the modification of the existing state 
purchasing system 
•  Grants for the construction of water purification systems, particularly 
in smaller towns and villages 
•  Enhanced cooperation and training on border security and drug 
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•  Assistance in the monitoring and improvement of conditions in 
remand centres (Sizos), civilian and military prisons (including 
women’s prisons) and psychiatric hospitals 
•  The presentation of constructive options for a Western transit route 
for oil and gas products 
•  Mediation in the Caspian Sea border dispute with Azerbaijan over 
the disputed Kyapaz/Serdar fields 
•  Recognition of the previous government’s role in ending the Tajik 
civil war by helping Turkmenistan fulfil its aspiration of hosting a 
regional conflict prevention, mediation and resolution centre, that 
would lend content, value and prestige to the country’s permanent 
neutrality status 
•  Assistance with the establishment and management of a National Gas 
Fund to sterilise gas revenues and prevent ‘Dutch Disease’ 
•  Technical assistance in developing new, non-state media outlets 
(including Internet provision) and reviving the national film industry. 
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7.  TAJIKISTAN AND THE EU: 
FROM POST-CONFLICT 
RECONSTRUCTION 
TO CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT 
MATTEO FUMAGALLI
∗ 
Introduction 
For the European Union, the development of closer ties with Tajikistan 
within the context of the recently launched Strategy for Central Asia 
represents a significant opportunity. Tajikistan occupies a geographically 
peripheral position, but it is precisely this location outside the limelight – 
and therefore less subject to the pressures of geopolitics and the struggle 
for energy resources that shapes much of the politics of the rest of the 
region – that could allow the EU to foster new forms of cooperation with 
the local authorities. Policies should be devised that aim at strengthening 
the Tajik state’s capacities and stability, thereby significantly assisting 
reform and development in the country. At the same time this would mean 
building on the encouraging developments taking place in bilateral 
relations and taking additional steps aimed at achieving the goals above in 
a more effective way.  
The international community has typically looked at Tajikistan 
through the lenses of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. 
This has meant that bilateral relations have become routinised, and stasis 
rather than critical engagement has been the defining element of 
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international strategies towards the country. It is argued here that it is now 
time to dispose of this framework and to begin to deal with Tajikistan as a 
‘normal country’.1 Such a paradigm change would offer the European 
Union key opportunities, namely operating in a country that after the war 
has experienced relative stability (unlike some of its neighbours) and 
where, as a result, there is now the possibility to concentrate on advancing 
reform. Further, progress in key areas in Tajikistan would offer the 
opportunity to promote similar policies elsewhere in the region.  
7.1  Historical challenges facing the modern Tajik state and nation 
The formation of Tajikistan was the consequence of the Soviet process of 
national delimitation and the territorial-administrative re-organisation of 
Central Asia (1924-36).2 Home to sedentary and nomadic communities until 
the Russian conquest in the late 19th century, the populations of Central 
Asia largely lacked experience of modern statehood. Instead, several forms 
of allegiance co-existed and overlapped: at the supra-national level (Islam) 
and at the local level (city and regional affiliations). National loyalties had 
also hardly developed among the peoples of the region. The Soviet effort to 
introduce new forms of political organisations and identity in Central Asia, 
therefore, played a formative role in shaping the Tajik state and the Tajik 
nation.  
As a result of the process of national-territorial delimitation in 
Central Asia during the 1920s and 1930s – which established five entities 
(Union Republics) each of which bore the semblances of a state (with 
constitutions, flags, anthems, parliaments), but remained deprived of 
sovereignty, which rested with the Soviet state – Tajikistan was created in 
1929 as the last piece in the regional puzzle. Tajikistan had previously been 
part of the Uzbek Union Republic (SSR), endowed with a lower degree of 
autonomy (Autonomous Republic).  
With no history of previous independent statehood and no sense of 
political, institutional or even cultural coherence, different portions of 
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21-38. 
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territory were assembled to create a Tajik Republic. Historical centres of 
Persian/Tajik culture, such as the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand, were 
assigned to the Uzbek SSR. The Tajik Republic comprised the south-
western part of the Ferghana Valley (around Khujand), the Pamir areas 
(later to become Gorno-Badakhshan), the Hissar and Gharm valleys and 
the southern regions of Khatlon and Qurghonteppa along the Afghan 
border. A modus vivendi was established during the Soviet period, which 
allowed different regions to occupy distinct niches in the political and 
economic system of the country. At the same time, the division of the 
region left many in Tajikistan with a strong sense of historical injustice in 
terms of the loss of the ‘heartland’ of Tajik culture and the creation of a 
substantial number of co-ethnics concentrated in the Uzbek Republic. 
7.2  Tajikistan from conflict to reconstruction 
In the early 1990s, social and political order collapsed in Tajikistan when 
the liberalisation initiated by former Soviet President Gorbachev led to a 
sudden shift in power relations in the republic.3 A s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e s e  
changes, the precarious political balance put in place by the Soviets to rule 
the diverse regions of the republic was shattered and the country virtually 
imploded. A sudden and particularly brutal civil war erupted in 1992, 
which eventually left more than 50,000 dead and at least half a million 
people displaced. Although the bloodiest phase of the hostilities was over 
by 1993, the conflict continued until 1997, when a peace agreement was 
signed by representatives of the government forces and opposition factions. 
The peace accord set in place a power-sharing agreement where, at least 
formally, the government conceded to the opposition a role in the power 
structure and institutions. Ten years later, Tajikistan has slowly, but 
steadily emerged from the abyss of the civil war to a process of state 
formation and integration with the regional and international system.  
For the larger part of the past decade, analysts and policy-makers 
have tended to look at Tajikistan’s post-war course through the lenses of 
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conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. While this frame is not 
incorrect per se, this brought with it an implicit assumption that because 
Tajikistan was on a course of precarious recovery from the war, criticism of 
failed progress should be kept to a minimum to avoid the risk of derailing 
the post-conflict course, altering the fragile agreement and, in the end, 
plunging the country back into bloodshed. Although moderate 
encouragement was sensible, continuing to look at Tajikistan through the 
lenses of post-conflict reconstruction is turning post-war dynamics into 
stasis (perhaps even allowing the emergence of authoritarian politics).  
Faced with this situation, the new approach to Central Asia 
developed by the EU offers the opportunity to re-engage with Tajikistan at 
a vital stage in its post-independence history and, in particular, to 
introduce new policies that can assist the development of the country and 
avert the drift into authoritarianism. In this paper I concentrate on three 
main issues which the EU has identified as its priority areas in the region: 
security and stability, economic transformation, and democratisation and 
political reform. 
7.2.1 Security and stability 
Tajikistan has come a long way from the abyss of the civil war during the 
1990s. In the early post-war period, occasional episodes of unrest and 
insurgencies have continued even after the peace accord. Former warlords, 
disgruntled political figures and factions, or even renegade elements of the 
Tajik army have periodically challenged the authority of the centre. Former 
Tajik army Colonel Makhmud Khudoberdiev’s occasional insurgencies in 
the late 1990s are typical of the type of challenges that persisted in the 
aftermath of the peace accord. Allegedly with the backing of neighbouring 
Uzbekistan, Khudoberdiev attempted a mutiny in southern Tajikistan in 
1997 and later attacked government buildings in the northern province in 
what appeared as a failed coup in 1998. The turbulent period continued, 
and former field commanders and warlords (such as Yoqub Solimov) 
plotted against the authorities.  
After years of confrontation with former allies challenging his 
authority, President Emomali Rahmon has been able to consolidate his 
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(PDPT).4 This has brought the marginalisation of former warlords 
previously associated with the administration,5 but consolidation of power 
has come at the expense of legitimate dissent, as will be discussed later on. 
The country has remained overall stable and has not experienced the 
convulsions and unrest that have taken place in neighbouring Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan in recent years. As the occasional rebellions of former 
warlords decreased, another thorn in the authorities’ side is now 
represented by the question of border security. Tajik authorities have faced 
the accusation of connivance or ineptitude with respect to control over the 
country’s borders, as Islamic militants have been reported to have 
infiltrated Uzbek and Kyrgyz territory from the Tajik side of the border. 
Militant incursions in the summer 1999 and 2000, as well as the more recent 
clashes between criminal groups and border guards on the Tajik-Kyrgyz 
border in May 2006, illustrate well the authorities’ deficiencies in this area.6 
The EU Strategy for Central Asia for 2007-137 identifies security and 
stability in the region as its key strategic interests in the region. This builds 
on current European efforts in this direction: since 2000, European 
assistance to enhance border security and combat drugs trafficking has 
come through two related programmes: the Border Management 
Programmes for Central Asia (BOMCA) and the Central Asia Drug Action 
Programme (CADAP). These programmes cover a number of areas (legal 
assistance, assistance at the customs, intelligence, human resources, drug 
abuse prevention) designed to improve security in the Central Asian 
region. Security at borders has in fact improved in recent years, but the 
above-mentioned 2006 clashes are a reminder that more should be done in 
                                                      
4 Actually the ruling circles seem to come all from the President’s village of 
Dunghara in the southern Kulob region, causing wider resentment among the 
excluded groups from other parts of the country or even elsewhere in Kulob. 
5 This includes the removal from official posts of former field commanders Saidsho 
Shamolov and the Cholov brothers (Varorud, 21 January 2002). 
6 RFE/RL, “Central Asia: Fighting Erupts along Tajik-Kyrgyz Border”, 12 May 2006 
(available at http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/05/2c513239-7c60-433a-
a87e-37112536b9be.html). 
7 The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership (reproduced in Annex 3 at 
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this area. In particular, since Tajik troops have recently replaced their 
Russian predecessors on the Afghan border, border management appears a 
critical area where cooperation between the Tajik authorities and their 
international partners (including the EU and Russia) could be enhanced.  
7.2.2 Economic transformation 
The Tajik economy has grown significantly in recent years, which is 
obviously a welcome development. Industrial production has expanded, 
and so has agricultural output. Domestic consumption also grew as a result 
of a rise in salaries and especially of the remittances of Tajik migrants 
abroad. Poverty reduction measures have helped to decrease the poverty 
rate from 81% in 1999 to about 65% of the population in 2007. EC assistance 
to Tajikistan has played a critical role in enabling the local population to 
cope with the economic hardship of post-Soviet transition.8 
Since 1999 the country has reported a robust growth, due primarily to 
expanding cotton, gold and aluminium exports.9 The government has also 
pledged to undertake serious reforms in a number of areas, mostly to 
alleviate poverty, still widespread, land reform, and to address the 
question of public administration reform. The announced ‘National 
Development Strategy until 2015’ as a comprehensive strategy to ensure 
sustained economic growth and reduce poverty10 is an important step in 
this direction and this is an area where the EU, along with other states and 
international institutions can assist. If macroeconomic results have been 
positive, however, the Tajik economy has been dependent on three main 
sources of revenue, none of which bodes well for the long-term viability of 
the country’s economy: remittances from Tajik migrants abroad, trafficking 
of narcotics and international aid. The paradoxical situation here is that all 
three converge to make Tajikistan a rentier state,11 which is a state whose 
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9 World Bank, World Bank Indicators (2001-05), Washington, D.C. 
10 Available at http://www.untj.org/files/reports/NDS_(English).pdf 
11 On the concept of ‘rentier state’, see G. Luciani (ed.), The Arab State, London: 
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revenue depends on a small number of resources. The trafficking of 
narcotics risks turning the country into a ‘narcostate’12 and while some 
progress has been made and drug seizure levels have increased 
significantly in recent years, the administration has sent mixed signals. On 
the one hand attempts to curb corruption among border guards and the 
s e v e r i n g  o f  t i e s  w i t h  f o r m e r  w a r l o r d s  i n v o l v e d  i n  n a r c o - t r a f f i c k i n g  i s  a  
welcome development. On the other, this process appears selective, as the 
(brief13) appointment of former General Ghaffor Mirzoev, a former PFT 
commander,14 to head the State Drugs Control Agency raised doubts over 
the seriousness of the Rahmon administration in this regard.15 
Two other sources of revenue have enabled the population to cope 
with post-war hardship: remittances from labour migrants and poverty-
alleviation measures. It is difficult to imagine how the growing Tajik 
population would have survived without remittances and international 
aid.16 It is estimated that the annual remittances from labour migrants 
amount to $1.2 billion in 2005 (17% of the country’s GDP), up from $0.6 
billion in 2005 (12% of GDP).17 At the same time, however, there are limits 
to the benefits these measures bring to economic development; they are 
palliatives, not solutions. 
Action should be directed to help the Tajik economy to diversify and, 
thereby, to rely less on the fluctuations of global commodity prices. 
Tajikistan should also be more effectively integrated into the international 
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positions in official institutions (K. Nourzhanov, “Saviours of the nation or robber 
barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan”, Central Asian Survey, 24(2), 2005, p. 124). 
16 See note 8. 
17 EIU Tajikistan Country Profile (June 2007). Marat suggests that the figure may in 
fact be much higher, at about $6-8 billion, approximately the size of the country’s 
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economic system: the energy sector is an area where the country’s potential 
has not yet been adequately developed. Plans to channel Central Asian 
hydropower resources southwards would demand that Tajikistan’s 
infrastructure undergoes serious upgrading if the country is to benefit from 
transit trade.18 An obvious area here is the investment in the country’s 
hydro-electric potential. Despite a potential output of about 300,000 billion 
Kwh a year, the country currently generates only 5% of that.19 There is a 
large potential for investing in developing Tajikistan’s hydroelectric power, 
either independently or in coordination with Russian companies.20  
Russia’s recent difficulties as regards the Rogun dam project (the deal 
was finally torn up by the Tajik authorities21) shows that there is a space for 
non Russian companies to play a role in the local economy. Furthermore, 
the EU’s Water Initiative (EUWI) constitutes an important comprehensive 
initiative which acknowledges the important of the country’s hydroelectric 
power while also highlighting the question of safe water supply and 
integrated water resources management.  
Another area where more could be done is the transport 
infrastructure. The dilapidated national airline (Tajik Air) desperately 
needs an overhaul of its ageing and inefficient fleet; the country would also 
benefit from a tunnel connecting the northern and southern part of the 
country and while this project is in progress at present, the state of the Iran-
financed tunnel raises questions as to the safety and long-term viability of 
                                                      
18 This is an area that has been recently explored by the United States as well. The 
United States Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) in particular has 
commissioned feasibility studies in relation to the rehabilitation of existing power 
projects (Qayraqqum and Varzob) and the possibility to channel Tajikistan’s 
resources southwards to Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
19 Output was 16,491 billion Kwh in 2004, 17,086 billion Kwh in 2006 and 9,800 
billion for the first half of 2007 (EIU Tajikistan, op. cit., p. 19).  
20 Kazakhstan has pledged $100 million to develop Tajikistan’s electric power 
plants.20 Iran and Russia are currently investing in the upgrading of the power 
plants Sangtuda-1 and Sangtuda-2, respectively. (E. Marat, “Iran, Tajikistan 
strengthen cooperation in the energy sector”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 1 February 
2006).  
21 “Tajikistan/Russia politics: The breaking of the dam?”, EIU Country Briefing, 31 
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this link. The rail network has benefited from a new link with Uzbekistan’s 
capital Tashkent that by-passes Turkmenistan, thus avoiding the necessity 
of going through slow border checkpoints (with the attached strings of 
corruption and harassment) and the purchase of various visas. 
For large part of the post-Soviet period the Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement has regulated relations between the European Communities 
and Tajikistan. It will be replaced by the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA), which represents the framework within which the 
European Union has dealt with the individual Central Asian states. The 
PCA with Tajikistan, signed in 2004, is awaiting ratification by the EU 
members, and pending that, an Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-
related Matters signed on 1 May 2005, provides the implementation of 
trade-related provisions of the PCA. The PCA covers a number of 
traditional policy areas (including political dialogue, economic cooperation, 
democracy and human rights, prevention of illegal activities, cultural and 
financial cooperation), as well as new areas of common interest, such as 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), migration and terrorism reflecting 
the changes in the post-cold war international system. The importance of 
establishing rule of law, democracy and continuing political reform 
occupies a somewhat more peripheral place in the PCA and it is only in the 
recent EC Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the 
period 2007-13 and the EU Strategy, that these issues are addressed at 
length. 
7.2.3 Democratisation and political reform  
Progress has been made in the areas of security/stability and economic 
development (with all the caveats outlined above). It is in the area of 
political reform that the country is lagging behind. The political opposition 
as well as the media have been subject to tighter restrictions in what 
appears to be a decisive turn towards authoritarian policies. President 
Emomali Rahmon won re-election in November 2006 (until 2013). The 
opposition was weak, divided and often harassed. Moreover the Islamic 
Renaissance Party (IRP) is still in the process of redefining its role in 
national politics under the new leadership of Muhiddin Kabiri. Kabiri 
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decided not to field a candidate, and the opposition Democratic Party22 and 
the Social-Democratic Party boycotted the elections on the grounds that 
harassment and fraud would make them neither free or fair. Isolated 
protests against the elections were reported in some areas of the country, 
but none of these posed a challenge similar to those that led to the 
overthrow of the government in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan or other post-
Soviet countries. Challengers, real, potential or imagined, have 
progressively been sidelined, ensuring Rahmon’s dominant status. The two 
main challenges here are the criminalisation of political life and the overall 
institutional weakness of the Tajik state. Warlordism has been successfully 
contained since the end of the civil war and warlords have been jailed, 
pushed out of political life or killed. As President Rahmon’s authority in 
the country has consolidated, potential challenges by former warlords and 
allies have been gradually sidelined. Consolidation of central authority has 
not, however, decreased the influence of criminal groups in the country’s 
political and economic life.23 Tajikistan stands out as one of the most 
corrupt countries of the world. According to the organisation Transparency 
International, the republic ranks 150 out of 157, according to its Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI).24 The emphasis in the EU Strategy for Central Asia 
on the importance of rule of law, human rights, good governance and the 
presence of transparent political institutions for the “development of a 
stable political framework and functioning economic structures” is to be 
welcomed, and a strategy of critical engagement (combining 
encouragement with criticism, when appropriate) should help shape 
reform, despite the region’s many recalcitrant actors. In particular the EU 
Rule of Law Initiative should identify clear ways of monitoring and 
rewarding progress and training personnel and but should also be firm in 
                                                      
22 Democratic Party leader Mahmadruzi Iskandarov was imprisoned in October 
2005. The party later suffered from an allegedly government-induced split that 
undermined its position. 
23 E. Marat, Organized Crime, and Corruption in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Silk Road 
Papers, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University and Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala 
University, October 2006. 
24 See Transparency International’s 2007 country indexes 
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highlighting areas where implementation does not follow (or where 
legislative change is taking place slowly). 
At a more general level, the consolidation of formal institutions is 
taking place only gradually (if at all) and much of the politics in Tajikistan 
occurs through informal institutions. Patron-client networks dominate both 
the politics of the centre and the regions. The interplay between formal and 
informal institutions, however, need not be seen as necessarily conflictual.25 
While warlordism is certainly detrimental to the process of political reform 
in the country, working alongside local authority figures can contribute to 
make formal and informal institutions convergent towards the goal of 
initiating political reform. This should not be understood as suggesting that 
the EU should work with people outside the law. Rather, it should attempt 
to work along with traditional institutions such as the avlod (an institution 
comprising community elders and regulating relations among community 
members with shared kinship ties26) and the mahalla  (neighbourhood 
community) to ensure that local community leaders have a stake in the 
system and particularly in the functioning of the system. This is an area 
that has thus far not received sufficient attention from the European Union, 
which has preferred to emphasise the role of formal institutions. 
7.3  Conclusion and recommendations 
Noticeable progress has been achieved in EU-Tajikistan relations in the 
past, with humanitarian relief, poverty alleviation, border management 
and drug control among the areas on which the EU has focused its relations 
with Tajikistan. The PCA and more recently the EU Strategy for Central 
Asia and the EC Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia 
show a willingness to develop relations further on both sides, provided 
that the key priorities outlined in the documents are not diluted in a 
myriad of other issues. The breadth of the documents can come at the 
expense of its depth. More crucially the EU has to move away from 
reluctance to highlight areas in which progress is not being made, and 
                                                      
25 A similar point (at a more general level, and not specific to the case in question) 
is made in G. Helmke and S. Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative 
Politics: A Research Agenda”, Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), 2004, pp. 725-739. 
26 B.V. Babajanian, “The social exclusion framework and poverty reduction strategy 
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begin setting clear instruments to monitor and reward progress. 
Consequently, lack of progress should be clearly identified and pressure 
exerted to effect change. One first opportunity for developing closer 
relations is offered by the dramatic proportions assumed by the drugs 
problem in the region. Afghanistan’s record opium harvest in 2007 
demands that various international actors, including the EU through its 
relevant instruments (BOMCA/CADAP), closely cooperate with the Tajik 
authorities (especially the Drugs Control Agency) to ensure border security 
and the reduction of corruption of officials both at local and national level. 
It is therefore a pity that the EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana did not 
visit the country during his brief tour of the region in October 2007. Drugs, 
along with energy issues, figured high among the EU priorities highlighted 
in the talks,27 but Tajikistan’s central role as both part of the problem and 
possibly of the solution too was apparently missed. 
The approach that has informed international, including EU, action in 
the country, namely the focus on Tajikistan as a post-conflict country, has 
outlived its initial purpose. Unlike Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
has not experienced analogous domestic turmoil in recent years. Relations 
between Tajikistan and the EU have intensified over the years. The 
signature of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement certainly 
constitutes an attempt to bring them to the next level, and specific key areas 
for cooperation identified in the EU Strategy and more clearly in the EC 
Strategy for Assistance to Central Asia establish the conditions for the full 
potential of the partnership to be fulfilled. However promising, a number 
of actions should be taken that would directly identify and tackle problem 
areas, as outlined below.  
1. Work with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and Russia and 
China. There are several areas in which the interests of the EU converge 
with those of the above actors. Combating drugs trafficking and arms 
smuggling, as well as enhancing border security are common goals at the 
state, regional and international levels. The waning of US influence in the 
region has opened a space that has been filled by the swift return of Russia 
and a growing Chinese economic presence, as exemplified by the formation 
and consolidation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a 
regional organisation created in 2001, involving Russia, China, Kazakhstan, 
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Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.28 Russian and Tajik forces have 
cooperated on issues of border security and drug control for more than a 
decade. These are capital projects that other actors, including the EU, 
should build on. While Russia may not have been keen on sharing the 
provision of Tajikistan’s security with other powers, the EU could 
encourage the SCO to become a stronger regional organisation that could 
actually undertake operations in its member states, for example on the 
Tajik-Afghan border, where joint activities could be conducted with the EU 
in a way that would make the EU less intrusive and thus less menacing to 
Russia and other local actors.  
2. Talk to the local community figures. Patronage politics is endemic in 
the country and much of the political and economic developments occur 
outside the formal institutional framework. It should instead engage the 
local community leaders in the avlod and mahalla and make sure they have a 
stake in the system, so that cooperating with the EU will not simply mean 
benefiting from aid being ‘parachuted’ into a particular region, but will 
give them a stake in the reform process. Such local authority figures have 
played an important role in maintaining social stability and preventing 
conflicts from re-occurring.29 While patron-client relations may not have a 
positive impact on democratisation in the short term, informal institutions 
have played a crucial role in maintaining stability in the region and their 
role should not be discounted. Informal authority figures constitute ‘entry 
points’ to the system and working alongside them (and not against them) 
                                                      
28 Established as an intergovernmental organisation whose main goal was to 
establish mutual confidence between the member states and increase cooperation 
in border regions, the SCO has grown to become one of – if not the – most 
important regional organisation in Central Asia. It is the only one whose 
membership includes Russia and China. All the Central Asian republics, barring 
Turkmenistan, are also members. The SCO’s main strategic objective is the fight 
against terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. In light of the recurrent 
calls for US withdrawal from the region, however, one may also add to these the 
reduction of the US presence and influence in Central Asia.  
29 A similar argument was made in relation to the role played by the leaders of 
ethnic minority groups in managing and defusing inter-ethnic grievances tensions 
in M. Fumagalli, “Informal (ethno-)politics and local authority figures in Osh, 
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would give them a stake in the system and international actors access to 
local society.  
3. Press the authorities to alleviate the pressure on political opposition and 
liberalising the system. A useful initial step could involve alleviating the 
pressure on local and international NGOs and the media as well as the 
gradual opening up of the political system. Political opposition exists, 
inside and outside the parliament, but it remains under increasingly tight 
restrictions set by the authorities. The EU should establish clear 
benchmarks for measuring progress and should not refrain from 
highlighting problem areas. Cooperation to contain the rise of radical 
Islamist groups should be expected, but combating terrorism should not be 
used by the government as an excuse to target all opposition. Tajikistan has 
been less exposed to this type of threat than the neighbouring republics, 
also as a result of the fact that an Islamic party is legal in the country, but 
the lack of outlets for voicing demands and channelling dissent may lead to 
a rise in popularity of what at present are fringe militant groups. 
Restrictions on religious minority groups and on registrations of places of 
worships (both churches and mosques) should be eased.  
4. Establish a legal framework to prevent abuse of Tajik migrants in Russia. 
Attention should also focus on issues of human rights with regard to Tajik 
migrants in Russia (and elsewhere). The EU could work in concert with the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) and help delineate a legal framework to 
improve working and living conditions of migrants in the host country as 
well as in exerting pressure on the Russian authorities to ensure that abuses 
are not the norm. The Russian Federation has introduced new legislation to 
regulate and improve the working conditions of the migrant communities 
in the country and the EU should closely cooperate to ensure 
implementation and monitoring of the situation in Russia. 
5. Criminalisation of the political life, corruption and institutional weakness. 
These problems continue to represent fundamental challenges to the Tajik 
polity and society as a whole. The EU should increase pressure on the 
ruling administration to sever links between state officials and criminal 
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warlord Mirzo Ziyoev30). Tajikistani authorities and the EU should agree 
on a realistic timeline for introducing substantial reforms and for 
monitoring progress.  
6. Develop Tajikistan’s energy sector. Developing hydroelectric power is 
an area that is crucial for achieving long-term viability of the Tajik economy 
and is fundamental for the whole region’s economy too. Russian and other 
foreign companies have begun investing in rehabilitating and upgrading 
existing hydropower plants. The EU should work in concert with other 
actors to favour the development of Tajikistan’s unfulfilled potential in 
hydroelectric power in the region. The EU should also concentrate its 
efforts on facilitating bilateral and multilateral approaches to deal with 
disputes over water use and management as well as to develop water 
infrastructure (working in cooperation with local authorities to prevent 
potential environmental disasters resulting from the poor security of 
existing structures).  
7. Upgrade the country’s transport infrastructure. The movement of 
peoples and goods within the country requires far too long on bumpy 
roads. Roads connecting the capital Dushanbe with some of the major 
regional centres (Kulob, Khujand, Khorog) require urgent upgrading. In 
addition, attention could also focus on upgrading airport facilities 
(runways) and technical maintenance of ageing aircraft.  
8. Make the education and training of the local youth a priority. A central 
concern of international assistance programmes across the region has been 
the formation of the younger strata of the Central Asian population. This is 
particularly important in light of the fact that the Central Asian youth 
represents an increasingly large part of the region’s overall population. 
About 37.9% of Tajikistan’s population is under the age of 14,31 and it is 
inevitable to wonder about their future in a country in which the safety 
                                                      
30 Ziyoev was one of the leading figures in the United Tajik Opposition, which 
fought against the Rahmon faction in the civil war, but that was re-integrated as 
part of the reconciliation process. Another former warlord, the Interior Ministry’s 
Special Force Brigade commander, Major-General Suhrob Qosimov resigned in 
March 2007 (ASIAPlus, 13 March 2007). 
31 Data (July 2006 est.) are taken from the CIA World Factbook Tajikistan, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ti.html#People (accessed 
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valve for the young (especially male) population has been migration. 
Unemployment, drug use, poor health and declining levels of literacy are 
among the key challenges that the younger generation faces.32 The EU 
should continue its focus on youth and education; establishing a ‘European 
Education Initiative in Central Asia’ as indicated in the draft strategy is 
therefore an important step in this direction. In addition it should seek to 
coordinate its efforts with other organisations, such as the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank, as well as with Japan, which recently 
upgraded its assistance to the region. The aim should be the improvement 
of the quality of education provided in the country, through teaching 
training programmes, a rise in government spending in primary and 
secondary education and the expansion of scholarships and exchange 
programmes, but also tighter controls on corruption in schools and 
universities.  
9. Promote cross-border cooperation and trade. Cross-border shuttle trade 
has constituted a key strategy for local communities to cope with the 
economic duress brought by the post-Soviet transition. The EU should 
therefore encourage measures that enhance border security, but this should 
not come at the expense of promoting cross-border trade. The EC Regional 
Strategy explicitly refers to the Tajik (and Kyrgyz) border management 
services. 
10. Enhance EU visibility. The EU has played an important role in 
many forms and areas in Tajikistan, but its presence, although beneficial, is 
often not visible and this means that outside narrow elite circles, the 
ordinary population is not aware of its actions. Increasing visibility could 
take several forms. At a diplomatic level this would entail strengthening 
the diplomatic representation of the EU in Tajikistan, as well as developing 
closer contacts with the national parliament. Additional measures could 
comprise improving the institutional and infrastructural cohesiveness of 
the country, such as airports and roads, upgrading the country’s 
hydroelectric power stations and assisting and training Tajik forces. 
To conclude, this paper has argued that the ‘post-conflict 
reconstruction’ framework that has dominated international strategies with 
Tajikistan for a large part of the post-war period has now outlived its initial 
                                                      
32 Crisis Group, Youth in Central Asia: Losing the New Generation, Asia Report No. 66, 
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purpose. Through its recently launched Strategy for Central Asia and the 
EC Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia, the EU now has 
an opportunity to make a difference to the country’s prospects for 
economic development and socio-political modernisation if it adopts a 
strategy of critical engagement, whereby it monitors and rewards progress, 
does not hesitate to identify areas where reforms are lagging behind and 
places pressure on actors seeking to oppose change. 
 122 | 
 
 
8.  A VIEW FROM THE REGION 
NARGIS KASSENOVA
∗ 
Introduction 
The German Presidency of the EU in the first half of 2007 inspired great 
hopes regarding the development of relations between the European Union 
and the states of Central Asia. In Brussels and other European capitals, it 
was expected that Germany, as an EU political and economic heavyweight 
and one of the key promoters of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
would be able to foster a coordinated Central Asian policy giving direction 
and coherence to European engagement in the region. It was widely hoped 
– within both the governments of Central Asia and the societies of the 
region – that Germany, which has traditionally been the most pro-active 
European country in the region, would elevate the relations between the 
EU and Central Asian states to a higher level.1  
At the end of the German Presidency, in June 2007, the EU adopted 
The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership.2 It was the first-
ever EU strategy developed for Central Asia, and in this way, it marked a 
real breakthrough in the relations between European and Central Asian 
countries. In this document an attempt is made to go beyond the assistance 
                                                      
∗ Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Kazakhstan Institute of 
Management, Economics and Strategic Research. 
1 Germany is the only European country to maintain an embassy in all five Central 
Asian states. 
2 Council of the European Union (2007), The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New 
Partnership, Document 10113/07, Brussels, 31 May (endorsed by the EU Council 
Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 21-22 June 2007) (see 
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programme with generic developmental goals based on the perceived 
needs of the region, to define European interests in the region, find 
prospective areas for cooperation and improve the approaches by making 
them more effective.  
8.1  Key features of the new EU strategy: Interests, approaches and 
selected areas for cooperation 
The Strategy states that the EU is interested in “a peaceful, democratic and 
economically prosperous Central Asia”. The transformation of the region in 
this direction is to alleviate the present and potential negative impact of 
developments in Central Asia and its even-more problematic southern 
neighbourhood on European security. Central Asian security became more 
important for Europe in view of the EU enlargement that brought the 
region closer to European borders, and therefore made the potential of the 
impact stronger.  
The EU approach to security within the Strategy is comprehensive. It 
will continue to provide direct assistance to the security sector: helping to 
combat human, drugs and arms trafficking, proliferation, organised crime 
and international terrorism. It will also help to address the causes of 
instability, such as poor governance, lack of rule of law, poverty and 
violation of human rights, through various aid programmes.  
Another EU interest in the region lies in the energy sphere. European 
countries would like to have access to Central Asia oil and gas resources, 
and the region’s aim is to diversify trade partners and supply routes. The 
EU member states and the countries of Central Asia share an ambition to 
reduce their dependence on Russian supplies and pipelines. Therefore, the 
EU and Central Asian partners have complementary energy security needs 
and interests. 
By articulating its interests in Central Asia, the EU creates a more 
solid base for EU policy in the region. From the point of view of Central 
Asia, the adoption of the Strategy is also a positive development. It signals 
that the EU recognises that it has certain interests in the region and that the 
Union’s engagement is long-term. With Central Asia the adoption of the 
Strategy strengthens the perception of the EU as a political and even 
strategic actor in the region with its own agenda, supported by significant 
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As for changing approaches, the Strategy envisages an intensification 
of political ties (regular dialogue on a variety of topics with top officials), 
more assistance (double the amount/budget for the period of 2007-13) and 
a strong focus on bilateral relations. The previous assistance programme 
was criticised for excessive emphasis on the regional approach that proved 
largely ineffective in the circumstances of Central Asia.3 In the Strategy it 
was decided to maintain a regional approach for issues that need regional 
solutions (organised crime, drugs trafficking, water management, etc.) and 
to develop more tailored policies and cooperation programmes to deal with 
issues better solved on a bilateral basis, taking into account different needs 
and conditions in Central Asian states. These developments can only be 
welcomed, for they indicate more engagement, more resources and more 
attention to specificities and pragmatic ways of interacting with Central 
Asia.  
While the articulated interests and improved approaches to the 
region are very important, the core (real ‘meat’) of the Strategy is the 
section that specifies a number of areas for “a strengthened EU approach”. 
It shows what areas the EU is planning to focus on in order to promote its 
interests. These areas can be sub-divided into two groups. The first consists 
of areas that are fairly straightforward and imply a clear action plan with 
easily identifiable objectives and activities.  
One such area is headed ‘Investing in the future: Youth and 
education’. It is a very promising and forward-looking policy aimed at 
bringing up a new generation of Central Asians that would be more 
familiar with and attuned to European values and norms. The Strategy 
envisions the launch of the European Education Initiative for Central Asia 
to assist “the adaptation of the education systems of Central Asian states to 
the needs of the globalised world”, and support at all levels of education, 
from primary to higher. Europe has a lot to offer in this respect, and the 
will of European countries to help is met by the desire of Central Asians to 
study in Europe or according to European standards.  
Another unproblematic area is the ‘Promotion of economic 
development, trade and investment’. The accession of Central Asian states 
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to the WTO, encouraging exports and economic diversification to be 
promoted by the EU are objectives that coincide with the agendas of 
Central Asian governments. The same can be said about the Environmental 
Stability and Water subsection. Considering the poor level of 
environmental policies in the region, to achieve the goals will not be easy. 
However, the spirit of partnership between Europeans and Central Asians 
can be strong, since the cooperation is in the interests of Central Asian 
states.  
‘Combating common threats and challenges’ can also be placed in the 
first category, albeit with some reservations. European assistance in border 
management, fighting regional criminal activity and international drug 
trade has been and will be appreciated by Central Asian governments. The 
Border Management Programme for Central Asia (BOMCA), considered 
one of the most successful European projects in the region, is to broaden its 
activities.  
Difficulties might arise from differences in how Europe and Central 
Asian counterparts approach the problem of security. The understanding of 
security in Central Asia is strongly state-centred and determined by the 
logic of authoritarianism; political dissident is considered as a security 
challenge.4 The opposite assessments of the Andijan events given by 
European and Central Asian governments (supported by Russia and 
China) illustrate this point.5 Since the EU is not a guarantor of security in 
the region, however it will not have to face major dilemmas in this regard.  
The second group consists of areas of European action that do not 
have clear-cut solutions, that are subject to difficult dilemmas and where 
full-fledged cooperation of Central Asian partners is not guaranteed due to 
various reasons. One such area is Human rights, rule of law, good 
governance and democratisation, which that is outlined at the outset of the 
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approaches to security, see chapter 2 in this volume by Daniel Kimmage, “Security 
Challenges in Central Asia: Implications for the EU’s Engagement Strategy”. 
5 On 13 May 2005, the Uzbek government used indiscriminate violence to suppress 
unrest in the city of Andijan located in the Ferghana Valley. As a result, several 
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Strategy. It arises from the interest of the EU in a ‘democratic and 
prosperous’ Central Asia. In the Strategy the EU commits itself to 
launching a Rule of Law initiative, conducting training for regional legal 
experts and holding a regular dialogue on human rights with the 
government of the region, and other activities to promote good governance 
in Central Asia. The problem with this area is that the EU does not have 
enough leverage with the governments of Central Asian states, for the 
European ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ are not that big. The strategy introduces a 
sentence on conditionality for EU engagement, noting that the intensity of 
cooperation will reflect the commitment to transition and reform in each 
country. However, this can work only with the states that are strongly 
interested in strengthening ties with Europe for geopolitical or other 
reasons.  
European countries have already faced difficult choices with regard 
to their Central Asian partners. They had to decide how to react in cases of 
heavy violations of human rights (the Andijan massacre being the extreme 
case), what to do in respect to other instances of the violation of rights and 
how to assess largely fraudulent elections. It is clear that more uneasy 
choices are in store. It is likely that two dilemmas will remain central for 
the EU in Central Asia: how to balance the liberal goals of the promotion of 
democracy and human rights and realist interests of securing access to the 
region’s energy reserves, and how to engage and not to ‘lose’ the region 
without becoming too soft on local authoritarian regimes. 
Another area that implies making difficult choices is ‘strengthening 
energy and transport links’. Diversification of European energy supply 
means the development of infrastructure to bring Central Asian oil and gas 
to European consumers bypassing Russia. It is in the interests of both 
Europe and Central Asia, but European projects in the region have very 
slim chances of being realised as Russia is strongly opposed to them. 
Central Asian states are vulnerable to Russian pressures and so are 
European energy companies that have valuable assets in Russia. As noted 
by many experts, Moscow has been very successful in playing the energy 
card and dividing the European countries.6 It is also important to keep in 
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mind the third competitor for Central Asian resources – China, whose 
influence in the region has been consistently growing. If the EU is to make 
progress in this area, it will need to pool its resources and determine routes 
and arrangements that most closely comply with its interests.  
For the EU to answer these questions, it will need to address a 
number of serious geopolitical challenges: How to build a relationship with 
an increasingly assertive Russia and how to enhance European energy 
security without antagonising Russia? Whether to engage in Central Asia 
with the aim of seeking to become a strategic actor in the area, thereby 
significantly shaping local developments or whether to let the region slip 
under the traditional Russian control and new Chinese supervision? In this 
regard, the EU strategy is unusual for it does not dwell on the geopolitical 
context. Russia and China are not mentioned once.  
8.2  Why does Central Asia need greater EU engagement? 
Most of 20th century Central Asia endured the domination of Russia. With 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asian states found themselves on 
their own and in a complex geopolitical environment. They could go back 
to their roots and establish ties with Muslim states, become members of 
their organisations, and in this way rejoin the Islamic world; they could 
follow Russia in integrating with the Euro-Atlantic community; or they 
could start cooperation with neighbouring China. In the end, all of these 
courses were followed by governments of the region in the form of their 
‘multi-vector’ foreign policies. This balancing act worked for a decade, but 
it is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain due to the new assertiveness 
of Russia which wishes to strengthen its positions in the ‘near abroad’, a 
development that is coinciding with the growth of Chinese influence in the 
region. Both Russia and China are interested in squeezing out the West 
from the area. At the same time, the engagement of the US and Europe has 
also been on the rise. 
The four actors with the strongest capacity to influence the 
developments in the region are Russia, China, the US and the EU. If the 
interests of the region are considered in a comprehensive manner, from the 
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point of view of the costs and benefits of cooperation with each of these 
powers, then the EU would come at the top of the list.  
Russia is the traditional patron that Central Asians are used to and 
feel relatively comfortable with. It has an array of tools to use in order to 
maintain influence in the region (security guarantees, cheap arms, 
economic projects and investments, etc.). However, at present Russia 
cannot offer Central Asia real solutions to the problems of the region 
(poverty, poor governance and potential instability). It does not have 
enough resources, but more importantly, it does not provide a good 
example of how to deal with these problems. Besides, there are concerns 
about the Russia’s ‘big brother’ complex that makes it psychologically 
difficult for Central Asians to give up the ‘multi-vector’ diplomacy.  
China is politically and economically more successful than Russia. It 
is also able and willing to contribute to security and to the development of 
the region. However, further integration with China is even more 
problematic than that with Russia. Firstly, China cannot offer appropriate 
models for the transformation of Central Asian states into well-functioning 
polities because its current Communist party-controlled system is a 
political ‘yesterday’ for post-Soviet republics. Indeed, the Chinese 
government is in the process of experimentation itself and it is not clear 
how the political system of this country will evolve. Secondly, integration 
with China is problematic from the psychological perspective. There are 
already considerable fears of Chinese economic expansion and migration 
into the region, particularly in Kazakhstan, where the influx of Chinese 
migrants has been the largest due to economic opportunities in this 
republic. Unlike Russia, China is perceived as ‘the other’, a very different 
civilisation threatening the local identity.7 Similar to Russia, in Central Asia 
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Barometer Survey 2005. 25.5% of Kazakh respondents, 30.5% of Kyrgyz 
respondents and 21.9% of Uzbek respondents assessed the influence of China on 
their country as ‘bad’ or ‘rather bad’. The attitude of Tajik respondents was more 
positive, only 8.6% of respondents said that the influence of China is ‘bad’. This 
contrasts with the perception of Russia by Central Asians – 2% of Kazakh 
respondents, 0.8% of Kyrgyz respondents, 0.6% of Tajik respondents and 1.9% of 
Uzbek respondents defined the influence of Russia as ‘bad’ or ‘rather bad’.  A VIEW FROM THE REGION | 129 
 
the Chinese immigration is often discussed in terms of ‘slow infiltration’ 
and ‘taking over the territories.’8  
Ensuring the long-term security and prosperity of Central Asia are 
impossible without political reforms, and neither Russia nor China is 
interested in the democratisation of the region. Instead they have 
legitimised fraudulent elections and generally act to shelter Central Asian 
governments from international criticism of their repressive policies. Russia 
and China position themselves as leading security-providers for Central 
Asia through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). However, their narrow 
approach to security can render their engagement in these issues 
counterproductive. The latest SCO military exercise ‘Peaceful Mission 2007’ 
used the scenario of the Andijan events and joint forces were trained to 
suppress an uprising.9 It implies that Central Asian authoritarian 
governments can expect external support in case of a serious dissent by 
some of their citizens. At present, it is hard to imagine Russian or Chinese 
soldiers engaged in military actions in Central Asia. However, if this 
happens, a flare-up of anti-Russian and anti-Chinese sentiments can be 
expected which might result in the destabilisation of Central Asia. The 
suppression can also lead to further radicalisation of dissenting factions, 
which is not beneficial for the security of the region.  
The extent to which the US can deploy international and national 
support for maintaining and strengthening the sovereignty of the Central 
Asian countries makes it a very attractive partner for Central Asian states. 
However, the US is far away and its policies and level of engagement in the 
region are determined by the general considerations of Eurasian 
geopolitics, and are therefore subject to change. The emerging rivalry 
between the US and the leading neighbours of Central Asian – Russia and 
China – suggest that deeper cooperation between the states of the region 
and Washington could lead to increased tensions in the region.  
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Unlike the US, the EU has long-term interests in Central Asia for it is 
directly affected by the developments in the region. It has the resources 
and, as the new strategy indicates, the intention to engage seriously in 
Central Asia. It wants to contribute to the transformation of the region into 
a secure and well-governed area, which is in the best interests of Central 
Asians as well, and it can offer models of political development and good 
governance and patterns of cooperation that can be emulated to achieve 
this goal. It can provide an alternative gravitation pole for Central Asia, 
creating real opportunities for security and sustainable development. What 
has been lacking so far is a coherent European policy based on clearly 
defined interests and guided by realistic but ambitious goals in the region. 
The strategy is the first attempt to find this policy. Deeper partnership 
between the EU and Central Asia will be mutually beneficial. It remains to 
be seen whether the EU can master the political will to shape and carry out 
its agenda in the region.  
8.3  Democratisation, rule of law and human rights 
The EU Strategy contains a commitment to the promotion of the rule of law 
in Central Asia, rightly claiming that it is the basis of political and economic 
development. It is planning to support legal and judicial reforms, share 
experiences and best practices, train local experts, organise and sponsor 
specialised conferences, etc. However, it is clear that no real legal and 
judicial reforms can take place in the absence of political reforms. The 
judicial sector is not independent and is subject to corruption to the same 
degree as the rest of the political system. Sharing experiences and 
organising training sessions are very unlikely to have any impact beyond 
minor cosmetic improvements. On the other hand, training young people 
who have yet to enter the system might be more productive.  
Good governance, rule of law and compliance with human rights are 
impossible without democratisation and the introduction of proper 
mechanisms of checks and balances. The EU cannot democratise Central 
Asia, but it can continue pushing for the enhancement of the political space 
and greater political pluralism. The pressure of European countries and 
organisations has been the great support and often the factor of survival of 
pro-democracy forces in the region. As a result, Europe has become the 
most important ‘reference group’ for Central Asian representatives of civil 
society, political opposition and their supporters.  A VIEW FROM THE REGION | 131 
 
The ‘sticks’ Europe has in the region are not big, but nor should they 
be underestimated. Central Asian political elites do not want to be left to 
the mercy of Russia and China; they also need Western investments and 
technologies, factors that account for the persistence of the ‘multi-vector’ 
foreign policies of Central Asian states. It is important that they do not 
acquire the impression that European states and organisations can be 
blackmailed or bribed (which would fit into their worldview better). It is 
vital for Central Asia that Europe does not give up on the region and can 
summon up the necessary patience and strength to ensure its 
transformation into a ‘peaceful, democratic and prosperous’ area.  
8.4  Developing energy and transportation links  
Discussing energy and transportation links, the strategy dwells on the 
Caspian Sea-Black Sea-EU energy transport corridor. If it is built, Europe 
will acquire an alternative source of oil and gas supplies, and Central Asian 
states will receive access to lucrative markets and become less vulnerable to 
Russian pressure. The project is mutually beneficial, but, as already 
mentioned, it faces considerable constraints. The EU pipeline aspires to 
connect Caspian resources with European markets, such as Nabucco, and 
the trans-Caspian pipeline is meeting strong resistance, for Russia does not 
want to lose its monopoly control over Central Asian gas. Considering the 
leverage Moscow has with regard to Central Asia, European countries and 
European companies, it can be argued that the development of Caspian 
resources and their transportation directly to Europe cannot be 
implemented without a certain accommodation of Russian interests and the 
participation of Russian companies in the deals.  
Obviously, this is not an easy task. However, Europe has a number of 
strong cards to play. Firstly, without European and generally Western 
participation, it will be impossible to develop the Turkmen gas fields that 
are to provide the future gas for export. Secondly, Russia is unlikely to 
ratify the European Energy Charter, but it would need a legal framework 
for the protection of its pipelines from transit risks.10 The EU can negotiate 
such a framework keeping in mind the desired access to Central Asian 
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resources. Overall it would be more profitable for Russia and Europe to 
have a more cooperative framework that would allow choosing more 
economically viable pipeline routes over expensive geopolitics-driven ones.  
Apart from oil and gas, the Strategy touches upon the development 
of hydro-power and its distribution in the region of Central Asia. It deems 
the development of this energy resource crucial to promoting stability and 
prosperity in Central Asia and beyond, including Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. It does not make it clear, however, whether the EU supports the 
increase of links between Central Asia and South Asia via Afghanistan 
beyond the water and hydropower sector, in effect supporting the 
integration projects currently promoted by the US and development 
institutes and often known as the ‘Greater Central Asia Partnership’.11  
Such an integration project constitutes a very important issue for 
Central Asia. On the one hand, the project promises benefits to the 
landlocked Central Asian states, especially to impoverished Tajikistan, by 
creating opportunities for it to be integrated in the world economy. On the 
other hand, the risks of such an opening of the region to the highly unstable 
southern neighbourhood are so significant that they can easily outweigh 
any potential benefits. Drug trafficking, Islamic extremism are among the 
threats that Central Asian government believe will be aggravated, and the 
already-fragile security of the weak Central Asian states, which are only 
separated from each other by porous borders, might be completely 
undermined. Since there is a connection between Central Asian and 
European security (notably in the areas of drug trafficking, weapons and 
WMD smuggling, international terrorism and the spread of pandemics), 
Europe will be affected too.  
Regional experts tend to be very negative about the ‘Central Asian 
Partnership’ project. Kazakh scholar Murat Laumulin stated that “the 
merger of Central Asia with archaic Afghanistan can change the European 
vector in the development of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, that is interrupt 
the process of modernisation, which by fits and starts has been going on for 
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many decades.”12 In the opinion of his Kyrgyz colleague Alexander 
Knyazev, “any liberalisation of a border regime with a country producing 
90% of the world’s opium and heroin and that remains a haven for 
extremists and terrorist organisations, would turn the whole region into a 
huge Afghanistan”.13 Thus, there are fears that pushing Central Asia in the 
southern direction would undermine the achievements of the Soviet 
modernisation project and distance it from Europe.  
8.5  The special case of Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan is often singled out by European policy-makers and experts as 
the most promising partner for cooperation. It owes its favourable status to 
its rapid level of economic development, certain freedoms permitted by the 
relatively benign authoritarian regime, and very importantly some freedom 
of geopolitical manoeuvre that the country can afford due to its strengths.  
The Western vector of Kazakh foreign policy has always been strong. 
Its European orientation was driven both by the practical reasons 
mentioned above and also by the sense that the country is a part of Eurasia 
and, therefore, has a European identity (since part of the territory of the 
country is geographically in the European part of the continent). President 
Nazarbayev from time to time stresses that Kazakhstanis are Europeans.14 
The successful bid made by Kazakhstan for the chairmanship of the OSCE 
indicates that the political elites of Kazakhstan view the country as part of 
the European space, where they want to play a more active role.  
The political opposition in Kazakhstan is even more strongly pro-
European oriented. The programme of the single opposition presidential 
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(Greater Central Asia – A new US mega-project?), Kontinent No. 22 (158), 
November 2005, pp. 16-29.  
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candidate in 2006 was entitled “By way of justice – toward a dignified life!” 
(A Democratic Civilisational Alternative), and promoted the European 
orientation of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy.15 It stated that the survival and 
strengthening of the young nation-state of Kazakhstan is possible if it 
makes the right choice in terms of civilisational affinity and if it makes a 
conscious decision to deepen ties with Europe.  
It is a telling detail that when the US State Department reorganised 
and moved the Central Asian states from the Eurasian Bureau to the newly 
created South and Central Asia Bureau in 2006, Kazakh political elites were 
particularly perturbed. No Kazakhstani expert assessed this move 
positively, while, for example, a Tajik expert Rashid Abdullo evaluated the 
new grouping as more reasonable.16 The sense of separateness that 
Kazakhstanis have with regard to the rest of Central Asia can be traced to 
the Soviet times when the region was referred to as Kazakhstan and Middle 
Asia (Kazakhstan I Srednyaya Aziya).  
The EU can draw on these Kazakhstani perceptions and stress the 
integration possibilities. It is clear that Kazakhstan cannot be offered 
membership, but it can aspire to be part of the European neighbourhood 
programme at some point in the future and to participate in elements of the 
programme on an ad hoc basis. Unlike Russia, Kazakhstan will have no 
psychological difficulties in becoming a junior partner of the EU.  
Although Kazakhstani political elites are attracted to Europe, they are 
held back by the political legacy they have accumulated (corruption, 
repressive policies, lack of meaningful political reforms). They would not 
want to become pariahs in the West, however. The Kazakh leadership 
draws a considerable portion of its pride and legitimacy from the relatively 
positive image it enjoys in the West, and that is why it does not hesitate to 
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spend a lot of money on PR campaigns targeted at Western audiences and 
it makes the effort of imitating democratic processes.17  
At present, Kazakhstan is entering a systemic political crisis. The 
country cannot further develop in the current institutional framework. 
Besides, if until now, the growing economy served as a cushion for the 
regime, the major problems experienced in the banking and construction 
sectors (two pillars of the national economy) in 2007 have challenged the 
‘euphoria of success’ of recent years and have made the system more 
vulnerable. Difficult years lie ahead, and a lot will depend on whether 
Kazakhstan has accumulated sufficient potential in institutional consolidation and 
economic development to help the young nation-state get through this crisis.  
Therefore, it is premature to expect Kazakhstan to play the role of 
locomotive for regional integration. It is not yet ready. Also importantly, 
other Central Asian states are not ready for Astana to lead a process of 
integration for a variety of reasons, the most important being that they are 
all authoritarian states. The main priority in Kazakhstan today is to 
establish the conditions for institutional change and political reforms. The 
EU can make a considerable contribution to this aim through the use of its 
‘soft power’, which can prove effective if the EU policy is clear, consistent 
and supported by greater engagement.  
8.6  Recommendations for the EU 
1.  It is important to clarify the EU interests in the region against the 
background of other external actors’ interests, particularly those of 
Russia, China and the US. In the areas where the interests overlap, 
cooperation projects can be pursued. In cases where they differ, the 
EU should steadfastly pursue its own agenda. 
2.  The EU policies aimed at the promotion of good governance, 
democratisation, rule of law and human rights in the region of 
Central Asia are extremely important. Central Asian states are located 
in an authoritarian neighbourhood. The EU and the values it 
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embodies create an alternative gravitational pole for Central Asian 
societies that have been undergoing a serious transformation since 
the collapse of the USSR. The EU cannot democratise Central Asia, 
but it can continue pushing for the enhancement of the political space 
and greater political pluralism in the region. If it is done gently but 
consistently and if the right incentives are offered, the Central Asian 
authorities would come to the conclusion that the EU cannot be 
bought off or easily pacified. As for the Rule of Law initiative, only 
very small progress can be expected under the current political 
regimes. The most productive way seems to be through the education 
of young people.  
3.  It is of great importance both for the EU and the Central Asian states 
to build a transport corridor to connect Caspian resources with 
European markets. The success of the enterprise will be in doubt, 
however, unless some kind of cooperative framework is developed 
with Russia. If the EU can develop such a framework, this will be 
beneficial for all parties involved. 
4.  The ongoing process of integrating Central Asia with Afghanistan, as 
is being promoted by the US, can have very serious consequences for 
the security of the region and push back rather than advance its 
development. The EU should make a thorough analysis of the 
situation, with the aim of identifying possible risks of such 
integration for Central Asia and for European security.  
5.  Taking into account the pro-European sentiments in Kazakhstan and 
given the country’s advanced economic development, it offers itself 
as among the most promising in the region not only for cooperation 
with the EU, but also as a possible candidate for the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Such a reconfiguration of the Eurasian 
geopolitical space would be extremely beneficial for the region of 
Central Asia at large.  
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9.  THE EUROPEAN UNION’S STRATEGIC 
ROLE IN CENTRAL ASIA 
NEIL J. MELVIN
∗ 
Introduction 
For the first time since the collapse of communism, the EU is facing a 
strategic challenge in its external policies. The rise of Russia and China as 
international actors – with India close behind – and the growing confidence 
of some leading regional powers, such as Iran, are creating a serious threat 
to the EU’s ambition to apply external policies that reflect European values. 
Against this background, the employment of the democracy – promotion 
agenda developed during the 1990s is unlikely to be effective and may even 
serve to weaken the position of the EU in key regions. This situation 
demands an urgent and far-reaching rethink of the approach the Union 
takes to external relations. If the EU is to remain a serious global actor, it 
will have to find ways to reconcile the imperative of engaging in difficult 
regions beyond the immediate European neighbourhood while also 
remaining true to the values of the Union. 
An initial test of the Union’s ability to meet the challenges of the 
shifting international order is taking the form of the EU’s relationship with 
Central Asia. The region has recently emerged as an important focus for the 
EU for various reasons. Much has been made of the security challenges and 
energy opportunities in Central Asia – although it is also clear that 
obtaining access to energy resources is far from straightforward. Others 
have highlighted the EU’s obligation to foster democratisation and promote 
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human rights in one of the world’s most authoritarian regions. Above all, it 
is clear that the European Union’s ability to exert a positive impact on 
regions vital to the EU within Eurasia, such as the south Caucasus and the 
Black Sea, and important countries – notably Russia, Ukraine and 
Afghanistan – will be greatly enhanced if the EU can also play a more 
active role in Central Asia. 
Advancing the EU’s interests in Central Asia while also remaining 
true to the Union’s values will clearly be a tall order. Since independence, 
the region’s leadership has shown an almost genetic disposition to despotic 
rule. Central Asia has also become the focus of attention for Moscow and 
Beijing, which are anxious to gain access to the region’s energy resources 
and to ensure stability and security along their borders. Both are little 
troubled by the need to promote political reform in the region. 
In response to the challenge of developing deeper relations with 
Central Asia, the European Union – following the initiative of the German 
Presidency – has drafted a Strategy for Central Asia (reproduced in Annex 
3). This is an important and welcome development. The strategy offers an 
opportunity to bring forward new and creative ways to address the issues 
that face Central Asia and to do so in a comprehensive and strategic 
fashion. 
Finding the right mixture of policies is clearly an important part of 
developing the EU Strategy for Central Asia. But there is also a more 
important task for the Strategy. If the EU is truly to be a strategic actor in 
Central Asia, then the Strategy must set out a path for engagement in the 
region that offers the prospect of enhancing the Union’s influence through 
promoting policies that strengthen political, social and economic change in 
the region. In this respect, the Strategy should distinguish the EU from 
those international actors who are focused exclusively on stability and the 
status quo in the region. The Strategy should aim to build for the Union a 
clear identity as an agent for assisting with modernisation, reform and 
progressive development in the region in line with European standards. 
This will require careful, comprehensive and well-targeted policies and a 
light-footed approach. The key to the success of such a strategy will lie in 
identifying, engaging with and strengthening the dynamic of reform that 
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9.1  The EU’s challenge in Central Asia 
Central Asia is undergoing fundamental change. The change is multi-
dimensional in character and uneven in its impact and it is simultaneously 
affecting the states and the societies of the region. As a result, Central Asia 
has entered its most important period since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1991. The way in which the current changes are managed is likely to 
define the future of the region for a generation, if not longer. In response to 
these changes either the region’s existing political regimes will be 
restructured to meet the new conditions and, thereby provide the 
foundations for an authoritarian and unstable future, or parts of Central 
Asia will emerge as locations for substantial and sustainable processes of 
political, social and economic reform, with important implications for the 
wider region. 
External actors will play a key role in defining the contours of change 
in Central Asia. In recent years, a variety of powerful countries – 
principally China, the Russian Federation, and, to a lesser extent, the 
United States, Japan and Turkey – have sought to enhance their influence 
in Central Asia. The emphasis placed by many of these nations on ensuring 
stability – motivated in large part by interests in energy and other natural 
resources, geopolitics and by concerns about security threats from the 
region – raises the prospect that external influence will be directed to 
support the status quo in the region. 
To date, the European Union has played a marginal role in Central 
Asia. The initiative by the German Presidency of the European Union to 
launch a process of rethinking the involvement of the EU in Central Asia, 
culminating with the production of a Strategy on Central Asia, is thus 
timely. The European Union has the opportunity to strengthen its presence 
at a strategic moment for Central Asia. At the same time, the EU is seeking 
to upgrade its role in Central Asia from a weak position and with little in 
the way of new or increased resources. Strengthening the Union’s 
engagement in the region and enhancing its leverage can only be achieved 
realistically by playing to Europe’s strengths. 
The European Union cannot be a status quo actor in Central Asia. 
Such an approach would stand in opposition to European values and it 
would not be in the interest of the Union. Moreover, it would not be a 
politically tenable position amongst many of the Union’s member states. 
The European Union’s greatest strength is its commitment to the 
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law and cultural diversity. To compromise on these values would be to 
undermine the EU’s influence in Central Asia and more widely. The EU 
must, therefore, set itself clearly apart from those that place stability above 
progressive change in the region.  
This suggests that the EU should build its presence in Central Asia 
around the promotion of a forward-looking agenda of modernisation and 
social and political development. This can best be achieved through 
working with those groups, communities and countries that share a 
commitment with the EU to such change. That is, the EU should seek to 
find ways to assist the countries of the region to modernise and develop, in 
accordance with their own ambitions, while also ensuring this is not the 
modernisation agenda advanced by Russia and China (‘shut up and shop’). 
The EU should focus its efforts on helping to build and strengthen the 
foundations for pluralism and law-based states and to reinforce and spread 
the reform dynamic across the region. In these ways, the EU can challenge 
efforts to renew authoritarianism in the region. 
The EU’s approach should be based upon looking for real 
opportunities for change and to make use of these. In concrete terms, the 
EU should support bilateral and trilateral initiatives and regional 
cooperation designed to build closer ties with Europe and to open the 
region more generally through transport, energy, trade and investment, 
and communication/media links, but also in terms of strengthening human 
capital and promoting exposure to new ideas and access to information. At 
the same time, the EU should aim to build a framework of political and 
security cooperation within the region that rewards and strengthens those 
who show a genuine commitment to reform. A framework of positive 
cooperation should demonstrate the benefits of reform, thereby placing 
pressure on those who seek to oppose change and challenging those who 
argue that sustaining authoritarian orders is the only way to ensure 
stability in the region. 
9.2  The transformation of Central Asia  
With some of the most authoritarian regimes in the world, it is tempting to 
see little prospect for reform in Central Asia. The negative political image 
of the region is further compounded by analysis that stresses the traditional 
– family and clan – structure of Central Asian society and the prevalence of 
non-democratic values. The leaders that emerged to dominate the region in 
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strengthened the idea that there is little scope for change by promoting an 
ideology of authoritarian rule as the only way to ensure stability in the 
region. 
This is a depressing picture but it is also misleading. Central Asia is a 
diverse region with a wide variety of ethnic, linguistic, religious and social 
groups. It is also a region that has experienced different forms of political 
and economic development in the years since independence. Some 
countries, such as Kyrgyzstan, have seen the emergence of considerable 
political pluralism and a vibrant civil society. Others, such as Kazakhstan, 
have opted for economic reforms that have brought forth significant 
private business interests. Still others, such as Uzbekistan and – at least 
until recently – Turkmenistan have chosen a path of concentrating political 
and economic power within the hands of a narrow ruling circle. 
The political, economic and social diversity that exists across Central 
Asia and the fact that apparently traditional societies – for example 
Kyrgyzstan is often identified as a country rent with clan alliances – can 
also be the basis for pluralist politics, suggest that it is not conservative 
values and social structures that have played the primary role in propelling 
the region towards authoritarian government but rather the interests and 
political actions of ruling elites. 
In the years ahead, Central Asia is likely to become ever more diverse 
under the impact of internal change and external engagement and as a 
result of government policies. The change that will take place in the region 
will offer significant opportunities for promoting an agenda of reform and 
modernisation. There are five particular sources of dynamism in Central 
Asia that offer the opportunity for EU engagement in support of reformist 
agendas: 
  Elite transition. With the possible exception of Tajikistan, the states of 
Central Asia have entered an important period of elite change. The 
region’s Soviet-era leadership is beginning to be replaced or is facing 
replacement in the near future. Differing models of transition have 
emerged; from the street and parliamentary politics of Kyrgyzstan to 
the committee-style transition of Turkmenistan. In both cases, 
however, the new leadership has indicated a desire for change in 
their countries and this offers opportunities for the EU to work to 
ensure that the transfer of power does not lead to the consolidation of 
new authoritarian regimes. In the future, the key elite transitions will 
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significance. In both cases, the EU should be ready to signal quickly 
its readiness to support the new governments in reform and 
modernisation. 
  Economic change. In recent years, the economies of Central Asia have 
experienced significant growth, although from low starting points, 
driven primarily by strong world prices for the region’s natural 
resources. Hydrocarbon exports have played a basic role in this 
growth. As a result, parts of Central Asia are set to experience 
important economic development. Perhaps most significantly, 
Kazakhstan is emerging as by far the most wealthy and most 
dynamic economy. The growth of substantial indigenous economic 
resources within Central Asia offers new opportunities to promote a 
strengthening of investment, marketisation and economic integration 
between countries of the region. 
  Generational shifts.  While the population of Central Asia remains 
predominately poor, there are important changes underway across 
the region. Sizeable and influential groups are prospering and are 
looking for the emergence of societies and political orders that can 
accommodate their own aspirations, including a desire to play a more 
active role in decision-making of various types and to ensure their 
property rights and security through rule of law. Central Asia is also 
witnessing the emergence into adulthood of the first truly post-Soviet 
generation. The desire for access to education including international 
higher education is stronger than ever. Many of those who have 
experienced post-Soviet education, especially abroad, hold 
significantly different views on the future of the region from the 
Soviet generation currently in charge of the region. Strengthening 
links between the emerging generations in Central Asia and the EU – 
principally through education – is likely to be one of the most 
important long-term agents for reform in the region. 
  Geopolitical influences. During the first decade of independence, the 
countries of Central Asia pursued policies to consolidate their 
statehood by balancing relations between the former Soviet hegemon 
(Russia) and other international actors, while at the same time 
seeking to strengthen their position within the international system. 
The growing role of the Russian Federation and China in Central Asia 
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period and threatens to undermine the ‘multi-vector’ foreign policies 
of the countries in the region. 
  Anxious to avoid a return to external domination, some Central 
Asian governments (for example Uzbekistan currently) are seeking 
the involvement of other significant international actors in the region 
to help to balance the role of Russia and China. Some countries 
(notably Kazakhstan) are also looking to external actors to help with 
their integration into the competitive global economy. The EU has a 
clear opportunity to ensure that the desire among Central Asian 
countries to draw the EU into the region will be on the Union’s terms. 
  New asymmetries in Central Asia.  The political, social and economic 
changes occurring in Central Asia today – and that are likely to 
accelerate in the future – are creating new asymmetries in the region. 
These shifts will create new challenges – migration, greater inequality 
– and also new opportunities. The critical relationship is that between 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan’s rise threatens to eclipse 
Uzbekistan internationally and perhaps even Tashkent’s role in 
Central Asia. The fact that Kazakhstan has indicated a willingness to 
pursue reform in cooperation with Europe but also that past reforms 
have created an internal dynamic for change within the country 
provides a basis for the EU to strengthen reform in the region and to 
underline that the current policies pursued by the leadership in 
Uzbekistan risk leading the country to marginalisation. 
9.3  Priorities for the EU in Central Asia  
As the EU seeks to enhance its role in Central Asia, it faces a difficult task. 
The EU needs to build its leverage without even the distant prospect of 
membership of the Union for the countries of the region and it has at its 
disposal principally ‘soft power’ instruments. The Union also faces 
significant competition for influence from countries ready to commit 
greater resources to the region with little in the way of conditionality for 
their assistance in terms of political and human rights policies.  
Given this situation, the EU cannot hope to build its engagement in 
Central Asia within the framework of conventional competitive great 
power policies. Rather, the EU must differentiate itself from the other 
external actors in the region by setting out a positive vision of a future 
Central Asia to be achieved through modernisation and reform. While 
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region and, therefore, stress the need for stability and continuity, the EU 
should position itself to support and advance the attainment of this vision 
of change through building reform coalitions, including both civil society 
and leading figures and groups within the authorities. But to achieve this, 
the EU will have to establish a comprehensive and carefully differentiated 
engagement across the region, designed to build leverage through 
rewarding positive change. 
Leverage will only be successful if the EU accepts what it can do and 
avoids entering areas where it can have a marginal impact. The EU is 
unlikely to be able to build enough leverage to persuade the region’s worst 
dictators to change their ways except at a cosmetic level – as demonstrated 
by the lack of real progress in the ongoing EU dialogue with Uzbekistan. 
The employment of ways to express dissatisfaction – including through a 
more effective sanctions regime – should remain alongside steps to reward 
positive developments. 
9.4  A regional strategy of bilateral relations in Central Asia  
Kazakhstan is the most important country for the European Union in 
Central Asia. It will emerge as the region’s most powerful nation based on 
its substantial natural resources and commitment to economic reform even 
without help from the EU. The Kazakhstani authorities have launched a 
number of significant initiatives aimed at updating their military, 
promoting modern education and they have signalled their ambitions to 
play a greater international political role, including as a leading regional 
actor. They have also demonstrated a clear ambition to bring about change 
within their country to integrate more effectively within the global 
economy. As a result, society in Kazakhstan is likely to undergo important 
additional changes with the emergence of new groups interested in further 
change in the country. 
The European Union can only hope to build an effective strategy for 
Central Asia if it makes a significant commitment to strengthening the 
reform drive in Kazakhstan. This engagement should be two-fold in focus. 
First, the EU should step up its cooperation with the authorities and civil 
society groups in Kazakhstan to promote far closer ties with Europe in 
order to strengthen domestic processes of social and economic change. 
Secondly, the EU should intensify the dialogue with Kazakhstan about 
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Kazakhstan’s ambition to build closer links to European security and 
political institutions. 
Kazakhstan should be offered a real prospect of chairing the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2009. In 
return Kazakhstan should introduce a set of measures designed to set in 
motion a process of change that will lay the foundation for the emergence 
of a genuine and sustainable political pluralism in the country. 
Kazakhstan’s aim to strengthen its relationship with the Council of Europe 
could provide the basis for the country to be invited to join some of the 
Council’s mechanism – inter alia the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities. Astana (the country’s capital since 1997) 
could also develop enhanced cooperation with the EU in foreign and 
security policies (see below). 
Success in helping Kazakhstan to move closer to a European-oriented 
process of modernisation and reform would have a substantial impact on 
the situation in Kazakhstan but would also represent a dramatic challenge 
to the leaders of other countries in Central Asia. It would also challenge 
other external actors who offer little in the way of a future for the region 
that is substantially different from the present. 
Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated that political reform and a commitment 
by the international community to the support of civil society can help to 
establish the basis for the emergence of a diverse and dynamic politics. At 
the same time, the difficult economic situation in the country and problems 
created by corruption, extremism and substantial social divisions pose a 
constant challenge to the country’s fledgling political pluralism. The EU 
should focus on strengthening rule of law and furthering economic 
development, alongside keeping political reform going forward. The EU 
should seek to play an active role in moving the authorities and the 
opposition away from confrontation and towards a more constructive 
political dialogue. Active work in the area of conflict prevention should be 
stepped up. As with Kazakhstan, building support among the new 
generation through education should be a priority for the EU. 
Tajikistan has some of the poorest communities in Central Asia. At the 
same time, the leadership of the country is growing increasingly 
authoritarian and undermining some of the positive power-sharing 
arrangements that were put in place in the country as part of the peace-
building effort following the civil war (1992-97). In this sense, Tajikistan is 
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full-blown authoritarian order closely involved in corruption and narco-
trafficking. Policies aimed to tackle poverty, corruption and drug 
trafficking should remain a priority for the EU. The bilateral EU-Tajikistan 
relationship is, however, likely to be limited reflecting the scale of the 
country’s problems and the limited resources of the EU. For this reason, the 
EU should focus on cooperation with other external actors – notably the 
United States and Japan – on issues of development and the Union should 
aim to function as a catalyst for the engagement of multilateral 
organisations and IFIs in the country. 
Turkmenistan has, until recently, been seen as the most stark example 
of a country in which the interests of the EU (principally access to gas) 
stand in opposition to its commitment to the values of democracy and to 
human rights. The death last December of Saparmurat Niyazov, 
Turkmenistan’s President-for-life, offers a significant opportunity for the 
EU to find a new relationship with Ashgabad. The EU must move quickly 
to deepen its dialogue with the new leadership of the country in order to 
build a significant and sustainable dynamic for reform. The EU should 
initially focus its engagement on helping the new leaders of the country to 
reverse the damage of the Niyazov era in the areas of education, health, 
r u l e  o f  l a w  a n d  m e d i a .  W o r k  i n  t h e s e  a r e a s  s h o u l d  b e  u s e d  t o  b u i l d  
confidence and establish the basis for a broader political discussion on 
reform. 
Uzbekistan under President Islam Karimov has little to offer the 
European Union in terms of its efforts to enhance its role in the region and 
to strengthen reform dynamics. While there are pressures for change in 
Uzbekistan, the current political regime has through its harsh policies 
towards all voices critical of the ruling regime ensured that these are 
channelled into violent confrontation and radical politics. President 
Karimov has provided no opportunities for reformist forces to emerge that 
could help to bring forth a more pluralist and modernising environment. A 
closer relationship with Tashkent is, thus, likely to tarnish the image of the 
Union in the region and more broadly and so weaken the EU’s ability to 
play a positive role in Central Asia and in other difficult regions of the 
world. 
While it may be important to maintain a limited political dialogue 
with Tashkent – in the hope of bringing about a softening of pressure on 
some individual human rights cases – this is highly unlikely to achieve 
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commitment to real reform and introduce the sort of changes that will 
break the iron grip of the authorities on society before there can be any 
serious commitment from the EU. 
In the absence of such a shift in Tashkent, the EU should focus on 
engaging with Uzbekistan and the problems created by Tashkent’s policies 
through the range of multilateral mechanisms within the region and 
through regional cooperation organisations. Here the particular concern 
should be on opening up Uzbekistan – focused especially on the borders 
and finding ways to reach the country’s emerging generations through 
education and information/media policies. Non-official discussions 
between policy experts from Europe and Uzbekistan on a range of issues, 
including security issues, should be supported as a means to prepare 
cooperative agendas for the post-Karimov era. 
9.5  Strengthening regional engagement 
Regional powers in Central Asia. The growing attention to Central Asia by 
external actors, particularly focused on energy and security issues, risks the 
emergence of harmful competition and the strengthening of authoritarian 
politics in the region. This is a competition that the EU cannot win and it 
would be harmed if it tries to compete. 
In response to this situation, the EU should adopt a three-fold policy. 
The EU should be firm in the promotion of its own vision of a future for 
Central Asia. Second, the EU should strive to forge significant political, 
economic and cultural relationships with countries in Central Asia that 
share the Union’s vision of reform and that will strengthen the ability of 
those countries to balance the involvement of other external powers and to 
pursue their own national interests. Thirdly, the EU should seek to engage 
regional powers in forms of cooperation that can strengthen the EU’s vision 
of change for Central Asia. 
This should include, for example working with the Russian 
Federation in the areas of national minority rights, strengthening the 
Russian and other European languages in Central Asia and on educational 
issues, and keeping the region open to media and information, including 
Russian media, as well as combating drug trafficking. While with China, 
the EU should concentrate on cooperation around economic investment 
that diversifies the infrastructure of the region and serves further to open 
up Central Asia – especially focusing on border issues. Finally, the EU 
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issues of regional security and economic cooperation – notably the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Central Asia Regional 
Economic Cooperation (CAREC). 
It is also clear that the EU should coordinate its engagement with 
external actors that share a broadly common vision of Central Asia’s future 
– international agencies such as the IMF, the World Bank and others – to 
help ensure that their activities are reinforcing positive change. Here the 
EU’s political vision of change in the region could set the agenda for 
multilateral investment. Better coordination should be undertaken with the 
United States, Japan and, possibly, India on key issues to ensure that the 
activities of these countries do not work against the EU’s policies for 
reform.  
Human capital and new ideas. In terms of promoting a Central Asia that 
is friendly towards the EU, that is moving closer to the values of the EU 
and is committed to opening up to the world, the EU has considerable 
potential to play a strong role using soft-power instruments focused on 
enhancing the region’s human capital. Promoting a far better 
understanding of the European Union in the region is clearly a priority. 
Strengthening diplomatic representation is a useful step. But the contacts 
and information flows must go far wider. Support for the development of 
Central Asian professional groups and strengthened ties to such groups in 
Europe could help serve as a stimulus for change. Links between policy 
institutes in Europe and Central Asia could help to promote better mutual 
understanding and enhance regional knowledge of the successes of the EU 
and how these were achieved. 
The EU also needs a far better understanding of the range of 
processes of change in the region through policy-relevant research. There is 
an urgent requirement for the EU to find out what the different people of 
the region want and not just rely for information on what the region’s 
leaders say. This suggests that there is a clear need to enhance the region’s 
indigenous educational and analytical capacity. Providing scholarships to 
Central Asian young people to attend European universities can be helpful. 
But this is not a substitute for developing indigenous educational and 
policy institutions oriented towards and perhaps supported by the EU. 
Ultimately, broad change in Central Asia is most likely to come from future 
generations educated to examine critically the world in which they live and 
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Regional cooperation. Central Asia is a diverse region and the contrasts 
are likely to become even sharper in the years ahead. Some observers have, 
therefore, questioned the need for an EU regional strategy and expressed 
scepticism, based on the lack of past success, about whether regional 
cooperation should be promoted by the EU. To give up on the agenda of 
regional cooperation would, however, be to give up on a variety of issues 
fundamental to the societies of Central Asia – notably improving regional 
water management and other environmental challenges, cross-border 
trade, education, labour migration and the creation of an energy market. 
Building such cooperation should, however, be approached in flexible 
ways, including carefully focused and bilateral and trilateral initiatives that 
can build confidence and mutual understanding ahead of efforts to 
promote more comprehensive forms of regional cooperation. 
Rule of law and combating corruption.  Corruption is one of Central 
Asia’s greatest challenges. Widespread corruption, including at the highest 
levels in many of the countries of the region squanders scarce resources 
and corrodes the legitimacy of state institutions. Challenging corruption 
through the promotion of rule of law should be a priority of the EU in 
Central Asia in order to ensure more effective and legitimate governance. It 
is also a priority that is likely to command broad popular support in the 
region. The EU should work with the governments and civil society of 
Central Asia to ensure that income from natural resources is dealt with in 
an accountable and transparent fashion. Allegations that financial 
institutions in Europe have played a key role as repositories for monies 
gained illegally by Central Asian dictators and their families should be 
thoroughly investigated. 
Security challenges.  In the years since independence, many of the 
leaders of Central Asia have developed security agendas focused on 
perceived threats to the states of the region. Within these agendas, those 
who criticise and politically oppose the ruling regimes are often lumped 
together with other more radical and violent threats. 
Such understandings of security are incompatible with European 
notions of ‘comprehensive’ and ‘human’ security. In its dialogue with the 
authorities in Central Asia, the EU must move beyond narrow definitions 
of security and not be constrained by the anti-terrorism agenda promoted 
by many of the security services in the region. The EU should seek though 
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strengthen cooperation in the area of regional security and conflict 
prevention activities. 
This does not mean that the EU approach to security issues should be 
unfocused and confined to ‘soft’ questions. The EU should offer countries 
showing genuine progress in moving towards European norms the 
opportunity for a closer relationship to the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP). Some Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan for example, might be 
invited to align some of its foreign policy positions formally with EU 
foreign and security policy ‘declarations’. Cooperation might also be 
extended to practical issues with Central Asian states invited to contribute 
personnel to ESDP missions outside Central Asia, notably in the area of 
crisis management. In the future, the EU should seriously consider 
extending elements of the European Neighbourhood Policy to those states 
in Central Asia that demonstrate an active interest in a closer relationship 
to the EU and a preparedness to enter into a substantial dialogue on reform 
and development. 
9.6  Conclusions 
Central Asia is at a crossroads in its post-independence development. As a 
result, the European Union has the opportunity to play a significant role in 
moving the region, or, at a minimum, parts of the region, away from 
authoritarian rule and towards more positive forms of political and 
economic development. Such a shift in the region would be in the EU’s 
interests and also represent a significant strengthening of European norms 
in the post-Soviet space. 
The EU Strategy for the region is an important step for the EU-
Central Asia relationship but also, potentially, a signpost to the future 
direction of EU engagements in other parts of the world. Progress in 
Central Asia would indicate that the EU  can  mov e beyond its role as a 
European actor – through its policies of enlargement and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy – to being an international actor with a distinct 
approach and able to operate in the politically most difficult regions of the 
globe. 
It is clear that for the EU and Central Asia, the Strategy document is 
only the beginning of a new relationship. Much will have to be done to 
ensure the implementation of the Strategy and to ensure that Central Asia 
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that attention to the region is sustained beyond the German EU Presidency. 
What is equally important is that if the EU is to strengthen its influence in 
Central Asia, the Strategy will have to be underpinned by a clear, 
consistent and long-term political approach to the region that is in 
accordance with European values. It is only on this basis that the EU will be 
able to build an effective, sustainable and credible presence in the region. 152 | 
ANNEX 1 
MANDATE OF THE EU SPECIAL 
REPRESENTATIVE FOR CENTRAL ASIA 
COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2005/588/CFSP 
of 28 July 2005 
appointing a Special Representative of the European Union for Central Asia 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Hav in g reg ar d t o  t h e T reat y o n  Eur o p ean  Un io n , an d in  p art ic ul ar Art i cle s 14 , 
18(5) and 23(2) thereof, 
Whereas: 
(1) The European Union wishes to play a more active political role in Central Asia. 
(2) There is a need to ensure coordination and consistency of external actions of the 
Union in Central Asia. 
(3) On 13 June 2005 the Council agreed to appoint an European Union Special 
Representative (EUSR) for Central Asia (Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). 
(4) The EUSR will implement his mandate in the context of a situation which may 
deteriorate and could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION: 
Article 1 
Mr Ján Kubiš is hereby appointed as EUSR for Central Asia. 
Article 2 
The EUSR’s mandate shall be based on the Union’s policy objectives in Central 
Asia. These objectives include: 
(a) promoting good and close relations between countries of Central Asia and the 
Union on the basis of common values and interests as set out in relevant 
agreements; 
(b) contributing to strengthening the stability and cooperation between the 
countries in the region; MANDATE OF THE EUSRCA | 153 
 
(c) contributing to strengthening of democracy, rule of law, good governance and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Central Asia; 
(d) addressing key threats, especially specific problems with direct implications for 
Europe; 
(e) enhancing Union’s effectiveness and visibility in the region, including through 
a closer coordination with other relevant partners and international organizations, 
such as the OSCE. 
Article 3 
1. In order to achieve the policy objectives, the EUSR’s mandate shall be to: 
(a) follow closely political developments in Central Asia by developing and 
maintaining close contacts with governments, parliaments, judiciary, civil society 
and mass media; 
(b) encourage Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan to cooperate on regional issues of common interest; 
(c) develop appropriate contacts and cooperation with the main interested actors in 
the region, including all relevant regional and international organisations; 
(d) contribute, in close cooperation with the OSCE, to conflict prevention and 
resolution by developing contacts with the authorities and other local actors 
(NGOs, political parties, minorities, religious groups and their leaders); 
(e) promote overall political coordination of the Union in Central Asia and ensure 
consistency of the external actions of the Union in the region without prejudice to 
Community competence; 
(f) assist the Council in further developing a comprehensive policy towards 
Central Asia. 
2. The EUSR shall support the work of the High Representative in the region and 
work in close cooperation with the Presidency, Union Heads of Mission, the EUSR 
for Afghanistan and the Commission. 
The EUSR shall maintain an overview of all activities of the Union in the region. 
Article 4 
1. The EUSR shall be responsible for the implementation of the mandate acting 
under the authority and operational direction of the High Representative. The 
EUSR shall be accountable to the Commission for all expenditure. 
2. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) shall maintain a privileged link with 
the EUSR and shall be the primary point of contact with the Council. The PSC shall 
provide the EUSR with strategic guidance and political input within the 
framework of the mandate. 
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Article 5 
1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the 
EUSR’s mandate shall be EUR 470 000. 
2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be 
managed in accordance with the European Community procedures and rules 
applicable to the budget, with the exception that any pre-financing shall not 
remain the property of the Community. 
3. The management of the expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the 
EUSR and the Commission. Expenditure shall be eligible as from the day of the 
adoption of this Joint Action. 
4. The Presidency, Commission, and/or Member States, as appropriate, shall 
provide logistical support in the region. 
Article 6 
1. Within the limits of his mandate and the corresponding financial means made 
available, the EUSR shall be responsible for constituting his team in consultation 
with the Presidency, assisted by the Secretary General/High Representative, and 
in full association with the Commission. The EUSR shall inform the Presidency and 
the Commission of the final composition of his team. 
2. Member States and institutions of the Union may propose the secondment of 
staff to work with the EUSR. The remuneration of staff who might be seconded by 
a Member State or an institution of the Union to the EUSR shall be covered by the 
Member State or the institution of the Union concerned respectively. 
3. All A-type posts which are not covered by secondment shall be advertised as 
appropriate by the General Secretariat of the Council and notified to Member 
States and institutions in order to recruit the best qualified applicants. 
4. The privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion 
and smooth functioning of the mission of the EUSR and the members of his staff 
shall be defined with the parties. Member States and the Commission shall grant 
all necessary support to such effect. 
Article 7 
As a rule, the EUSR shall report in person to the High Representative and to the 
PSC and may report also to the relevant Working Group. Regular written reports 
shall be circulated to the High Representative, the Council and the Commission. 
On the recommendation of the High Representative and the PSC, he EUSR may 
report to the General Affairs and External Relations Council. 
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Article 8 
To ensure the consistency of the external action of the Union, the activities of the 
EUSR shall be coordinated with those of the High Representative, the Presidency 
and the Commission. EUSR shall provide regular briefings to Member States’ 
missions and Commission delegations. In the field, close liaison shall be 
maintained with the Presidency, the Commission and Union Heads of Mission 
who shall make best efforts to assist the EUSR in the implementation of the 
mandate. The EUSR shall also liaise with other international and regional actors in 
the field. 
Article 9 
The implementation of this Joint Action and its consistency with other 
contributions from the Union to the region shall be kept under regular review. The 
EUSR shall present a comprehensive written report on the implementation of the 
mandate to the High Representative, the Council and the Commission two months 
before the mandate expires. The report shall form a basis for evaluation of this 
Joint Action in the relevant Working Groups and by the PSC. In the context of 
overall priorities for deployment, the High Representative shall make 
recommendations to the PSC concerning the Council’s decision on renewal, 
amendment or termination of the mandate. 
Article 10 
This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of its adoption. It shall apply 
until 28 February 2006. 
Article 11 
This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
 
Done at Brussels, 28 July 2005. 
 
For the Council 
The President 
J. STRAW 
 
Source: L 199/102 EN Official Journal of the European Union 29.7.2005. 156 | 
ANNEX 2 
EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE OF THE EU 
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR CENTRAL ASIA 
COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/107/CFSP 
of 12 February 2008 
extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for 
Central Asia 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Hav in g reg ar d t o  t h e T reat y o n  Eur o p ean  Un io n , an d in  p art ic ul ar Art i cle s 14 , 
18(5) and 23(2) thereof, 
Whereas: 
(1) On 15 February 2007, the Council adopted Joint Action 2007/113/CFSP(1) (1) 
amending and extending the mandate of the European Union Special 
Representative (EUSR) for Central Asia. 
(2) On the basis of a review of Joint Action 2007/113/CFSP, the mandate of the 
EUSR should be extended for a 12-month period. 
(3) The EUSR will implement his mandate in the context of a situation which may 
deteriorate and could harm the Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives set 
out in Article 11 of the Treaty, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION: 
Article 1 
European Union Special Representative 
The mandate of Mr Pierre MOREL as the European Union Special Representative 
(EUSR) for Central Asia is hereby extended until 28 February 2009. 
                                                      
(1) OJ L 46, 16.2.2007, p. 83. Joint Action as amended by Joint Action 2007/634/CFSP 
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Article 2 
Policy objectives 
The EUSR's mandate shall be based on the Union's policy objectives in Central 
Asia. These objectives include: 
(a) promoting good and close relations between countries of Central Asia and the 
European Union on the basis of common values and interests as set out in relevant 
agreements; 
(b) contributing to strengthening the stability and cooperation between the 
countries in the region; 
(c) contributing to strengthening democracy, the rule of law, good governance and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Central Asia; 
(d) addressing key threats, especially specific problems with direct implications for 
Europe; 
(e) enhancing the European Union's effectiveness and visibility in the region, 
including through a closer coordination with other relevant partners and 
international organisations, such as the OSCE. 
Article 3 
Mandate 
1. In order to achieve the policy objectives, the EUSR's mandate shall be to: 
(a) promote overall political coordination of the European Union in Central Asia 
and ensure consistency of the external actions of the European Union in the region 
without prejudice to Community competence; 
(b) monitor, on behalf of the High Representative and in accordance with his 
mandate, together with the Commission and the Presidency, and without prejudice 
to Community competence, the implementation process of the EU Strategy for a 
New Partnership with Central Asia, make recommendations and report to relevant 
Council bodies on a regular basis; 
(c) assist the Council in further developing a comprehensive policy towards 
Central Asia; 
(d) follow closely political developments in Central Asia by developing and 
maintaining close contacts with governments, parliaments, judiciary, civil society 
and mass media; 
(e) encourage Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan to cooperate on regional issues of common interest; 
(f) develop appropriate contacts and cooperation with the main interested actors in 
the region, and all relevant regional and international organisations, including the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EURASEC), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in 158 | ANNEX 2 
 
Asia (CICA), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Central Asia 
Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC) and the Central Asian 
Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC); 
(g) contribute to the implementation of the European Union human rights policy 
and European Union Guidelines on Human Rights, in particular with regard to 
women and children in conflict-affected areas, especially by monitoring and 
addressing developments in this regard; 
(h) contribute, in close cooperation with the OSCE, to conflict prevention and 
resolution by developing contacts with the authorities and other local actors 
(NGOs, political parties, minorities, religious groups and their leaders); 
(i) provide input to the formulation of energy security aspects and anti-narcotics 
aspects of the CFSP with respect to Central Asia. 
2. The EUSR shall support the work of the Secretary-General/High Representative 
(SG/HR) and maintain an overview of all activities of the European Union in the 
region. 
Article 4 
Implementation of the mandate 
1. The EUSR shall be responsible for the implementation of the mandate acting 
under the authority and operational direction of the SG/HR. 
2. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) shall maintain a privileged link with 
the EUSR and shall be the primary point of contact with the Council. The PSC shall 
provide the EUSR with strategic guidance and political direction within the 
framework of the mandate. 
Article 5 
Financing 
1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the 
mandate of the EUSR in the period from 1 March 2008 to 28 February 2009 shall be 
EUR 1 100 000. 
2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be 
eligible as from 1 March 2008. The expenditure shall be managed in accordance 
with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the European 
Communities with the exception that any pre-financing shall not remain the 
property of the Community. 
3. The management of the expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the 
EUSR and the Commission. The EUSR shall be accountable to the Commission for 
all expenditure. 
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Article 6 
Constitution and composition of the team 
1. Within the limits of his mandate and the corresponding financial means made 
available, the EUSR shall be responsible for constituting his team in consultation 
with the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, and in full association with the 
Commission. The team shall include the expertise on specific policy issues as 
required by the mandate. The EUSR shall keep the SG/HR, the Presidency and the 
Commission informed of the composition of his team. 
2. Member States and institutions of the European Union may propose the 
s e c o n d m e n t  o f  s t a f f  t o  w o r k  w i t h  t h e  E U S R .  T h e  s a l a r y  o f  p e r s o n n e l  w h o  a r e  
seconded by a Member State or an institution of the EU to the EUSR shall be 
covered by the Member State or the institution of the EU concerned respectively. 
Experts seconded by Member States to the General Secretariat of the Council may 
also be posted to the EUSR. International contracted staff shall have the nationality 
of an EU Member State. 
3. All seconded personnel shall remain under the administrative authority of the 
sending Member State or EU institution and shall carry out their duties and act in 
the interest of the mandate of the EUSR. 
Article 7 
Privileges and immunities of the EUSR and his staff 
The privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion 
and smooth functioning of the mission of the EUSR and the members of his staff 
shall be agreed with the host party/parties as appropriate. Member States and the 
Commission shall grant all necessary support to such effect. 
Article 8 
Security of EU classified information 
The EUSR and the members of his team shall respect security principles and 
minimum standards established by Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 
2001 adopting the Council's security regulations(2), in particular when managing 
EU classified information. 
 
 
 
                                                      
(2) (1) OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1. Decision as last amended by Decision 2007/438/EC (OJ L 
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Article 9 
Access to information and logistical support 
1. Member States, the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council shall 
ensure that the EUSR is given access to any relevant information. 
2. The Presidency, the Commission and/or Member States, as appropriate, shall 
provide logistical support in the region. 
Article 10 
Security 
In accordance with the EU's policy on the security of personnel deployed outside 
the EU in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty, the EUSR shall take 
all reasonably practicable measures, in conformity with his mandate and the 
security situation in his geographical area of responsibility, for the security of all 
personnel under his direct authority, notably by: 
(a) establishing a mission-specific security plan based on guidance from the 
General Secretariat of the Council, including mission-specific physical, 
organisational and procedural security measures, governing management of the 
secure movement of personnel to, and within, the mission area, as well as 
management of security incidents and including a mission contingency and 
evacuation plan; 
(b) ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the EU are covered by high risk 
insurance as required by the conditions in the mission area; 
(c) ensuring that all members of his team to be deployed outside the EU, including 
locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or 
upon arriving in the mission area, based on the risk ratings assigned to the mission 
area by the General Secretariat of the Council; 
(d) ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security 
assessments are implemented and providing the SG/HR, the Council and the 
Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security 
issues within the framework of the mid-term and mandate implementation 
reports. 
Article 11 
Reporting 
The EUSR shall regularly provide the SG/HR and the PSC with oral and written 
reports. The EUSR shall also report as necessary to working groups. Regular 
written reports shall be circulated through the COREU network. Upon 
recommendation of the SG/HR or the PSC, the EUSR may provide the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council with reports. EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE OF THE EUSRCA | 161 
 
Article 12 
Coordination 
The EUSR shall promote overall EU political coordination. He shall help to ensure 
that all EU instruments in the field are engaged coherently to attain the EU's policy 
objectives. The activities of the EUSR shall be coordinated with those of the 
Presidency and the Commission, as well as those of the EUSR for Afghanistan. The 
EUSR shall provide Member States' missions and Commission's delegations with 
regular briefings. In the field, close liaison shall be maintained with the Presidency, 
Commission and Member States' Heads of Mission who shall make best efforts to 
assist the EUSR in the implementation of the mandate. The EUSR shall also liaise 
with other international and regional actors in the field. 
Article 13 
Review 
The implementation of this Joint Action and its consistency with other 
contributions from the European Union to the region shall be kept under regular 
review. The EUSR shall present the SG/HR, the Council and the Commission with 
a progress report before the end of June 2008 and a comprehensive mandate 
implementation report by mid-November 2008. These reports shall form a basis for 
evaluation of this Joint Action in the relevant working groups and by the PSC. In 
the context of overall priorities for deployment, the SG/HR shall make 
recommendations to the PSC concerning the Council's decision on renewal, 
amendment or termination of the mandate. 
Article 14 
Entry into force 
This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption. 
Article 15 
Publication 
This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
 
Done at Brussels, 12 February 2008. 
 
For the Council 
The President 
A. BAJUK 
 
Source: 13.2.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 38/21. 162 | 
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